DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC:
POLICY OPTIONS FOR A CHANGING REGION

by

Thomas Walter Shubert

March 1986

Thesis Advisor C.A. Buss

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

T228305

URITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT: Approved for public release: distribution unlimited
DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION: aval Postgraduate School / 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable): Code 56	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION: Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): onterey, California 93943-5000	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): Monterey, California 93943-5000
NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION / 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS: PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

TITLE (Include Security Classification)
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC: POLICY OPTIONS FOR A CHANGING REGION

PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Shubert, Thomas W.

TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Master's Thesis	FROM _____ TO _____	1986 March	208

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

COSATI CODES		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
U.S. policy, Southwest Pacific, Island states, Island nation New Zealand, Australia, nuclear-free zone, EEZ, Soviet Union

ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

This thesis proposes United States policy options for the Southwest Pacific. It examines the political, economic, military, and social environment of the Southwest Pacific. It then details current U.S. economic, military and political interests in the region. The thesis then assesses the threats to U.S. interests and proposes options to negate or minimize the impact of these threats. It is the contention of this writer that the United States must take a more active role in the affairs of the region and bring more political and security interests into the formulation of policies concerning the region, as opposed to previous emphasis on economic ones.

). DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT: ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: unclassified
a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL: Dr. C.A. Buss	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code): (408) 646-2521 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL: Code 56

D FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted. All other editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

The United States and the Southwest Pacific: Policy Options For A Changing Region

by

Thomas W.Shubert
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., East Carolina University, 1974
M.S.S.M., University of Southern California, 1981

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1986

ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes United States policy options for the Southwest Pacific. It examines the political, economic, military, and social environment of the Southwest Pacific. It then details current U.S. economic, military and political interests in the region. The thesis then assesses the threats to U.S. interests and proposes options to negate or minimize the impact of these threats. It is the contention of this writer that the United States must take a more active role in the affairs of the region and bring more political and security interests into the formulation of policies concerning the region, as opposed to previous emphasis on economic ones.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 7

II. THE AREA DEFINED 9

A. AUSTRALIA 9

B. NEW ZEALAND 13

C. AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND LINK 15

D. ANZUS 17

E. THE ISLANDS 20

F. SOUTH PACIFIC INSTITUTIONS 28

G. NUCLEAR TESTING 30

III. UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 32

A. BASIC TENETS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 32

B. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE SW PACIFIC . 33

C. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 41

D. SUMMARY 44

IV. OTHER STATES WITH INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC . 46

A. FRANCE 46

B. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 50

C. JAPAN 51

D. GREAT BRITAIN 52

E. THE SOVIET UNION 52

1. Historical Interest in the Region 54

2. Soviet Views on the Region 55

3. Views on ANZUS Difficulties 59

4. Views on Nuclear Free Zone 60

5. Soviet Power and Policy 61

V. TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE NEW ZEALAND 67

A. INTERNAL FACTORS 69

1. Anti-nuclear and Peace Movement 72

2. Opposition 76

3. Professional View 77

4. Legislation Introduced 80

B. UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND 81

1. New Zealand's Position 81

2. United States' Position on Labour's Policy . 86

C. AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON THE ISSUE 95

D. SUMMARY 102

VI. SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE 108

VII. FISHING ISSUE 113

A. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE 113

B. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 121

C. THE CARD IS PLAYED 123

D. REMARKS 127

VIII. THREATS TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION 134

IX. CONCLUSION 143

LIST OF REFERENCES 154

APPENDIX A. NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL BILL 162

APPENDIX B. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES 201

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 206

LIST OF FIGURES

	FIGURE	PAGE
1	Map of the Southwest Pacific	10
2	Map pf Australia and New Zealand	12
3	The Pacific Islands	21
4	Area Served by the South Pacific Commission	29
5	Lines of Communication in the Pacific	37
6	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	42
7	Area Covered by 200 Mile EEZs	115

I. INTRODUCTION

The goal of this thesis is to provide some insight into the current interests and objectives of the United States in the Southwest Pacific and to examine whether the present policies of the United States are adequate to meet the changing situation in the region.

In the past the United States has kept a low profile in the region, leaving regional affairs to the various Island states and general security matters to what was considered the firm anchors of Australia and New Zealand. The United States has relaxed in the knowledge that relationships among South Pacific Forum countries were harmonious and that the Islands were anti-communist and Western-orientated.

The United States has played an active role in the Southwest Pacific in that sector of the region where it has territories, these being the islands of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. However, in the rest of the Southwest Pacific, the policy of the United States has been to let Australia and New Zealand manage the region, since the interests and objectives of these two allies were seen as being very much in tune with those of the United States.

The contention of this thesis is that, in light of the current disputes between the United States and several states in the Southwest Pacific, especially with New Zealand and the Island states, and the opportunities this has presented the Soviets to

gain a foothold in the region, that it is time for the United States to adopt new policy directions in the area.

The research conducted in this thesis will examine whether or not current United States policy still serves United States interests and objectives in the Southwest Pacific. And that if it does not, what new directions United States policy should take in the Southwest Pacific. To accomplish this, this thesis will research the current political, military, and economic environment in the Southwest Pacific and the United States interests and objectives in this area, and possible future trends in policy. From this basis, policy options will be recommended that will hopefully lead to more effective protection of United States interests, both on the regional and global levels.

II. THE AREA DEFINED

An overview of the various states of the region and the physical, political, economic, and social environment in which they exist provides the current setting in which United States national security policy must operate. An understanding of the region is essential to the formulation of realistic policies for the United States.

The area with which this thesis is concerned is given the name of the Southwest Pacific , although someone examining the region from Thailand would probably term it the Southeast Pacific. Most literature concerning the region also refers it as the South Pacific and Oceania. The states with which this thesis is primarily concerned include Australia, New Zealand, and those Islands states and territories that stretch from approximately 10 degrees north to 50 degrees south of the equator as upper and lower limits and from 140 degrees west longitude to 130 east longitude.

A. AUSTRALIA

Australia is the sixth largest country in the world and the smallest of the world's seven continents. Australia has a land area of 2,967,909 square miles--an area almost the size of the forty-eight contiguous states of the United States. [1:32] The population, 15.5 million in 1985, is comparatively small but growing. It is largely urban, concentrated in the better watered areas that fringe the continent, especially the eastern littoral.

Figure 1 Map of the Southwest Pacific

Source: [1:874]

Successive recent Australian governments have carried out a program of massive growth and diversification. An ambitious immigration effort has doubled the population, and mixed large numbers of continental Europeans into a society whose ancestors had come largely from the British Isles. Australia has abolished the "White Australia" policy and has admitted significant numbers of Asian immigrants. Furthermore, steps have been taken to expand the industrial and educational basis of Australian society. [2:347]

These steps have resulted in a current day Australia that is a highly industrialized and independent nation deeply involved in international affairs. Nonetheless, the country's economy is still dependent firstly on agriculture and then on raw materials, ranging from iron ore and coal to nickel, uranium, diamonds, natural gas, and more. The new independent Island states in the South Pacific have looked to Australia for leadership as the most advanced and affluent power in its geopolitical sphere. [1:30]

The notable feature of Australian society is the consensus on political values, including the principle of popular control of government. The political value system introduced to Australia by the early settlers was rooted principally in the liberal thoughts of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the procedures for settling social and political conflicts were also patterned after the English model. These include the belief that government derives its just powers from popular consent, that government exists for the protection of certain inalienable individual rights, and that public officials should be subject to the close scrutiny of the community through

Figure 2 Map of Australia and New Zealand

Source: [1:873]

frequent elections. The tenets of values held by Australians are familiar to Americans and others sharing broadly in the liberal Western political tradition. [3:214]

Australia's political relations within the Southwest Pacific are complicated by ambiguities due to the inherent difficulties of Australia's position as a rich, high-cost, hedonistic and largely empty "European" outpost off the coast of Asia, by the demands of the Australian Labour Party's (ALP) left wing, and by the determination any government must demonstrate to play a definable role in the region and not simply tag along behind larger friends or groups of friends. [4:12]

Australia shares with New Zealand the benefits of being a long way from the major concentrations of military power, and from the focal points of superpower competition. Neither live side by side with nations that have standing forces able to present a major threat to them. Furthermore, it is self-evident that any defense emergency directly threatening Australia (or New Zealand) would be maritime in nature, at least initially. [5:7]

B. NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand lies approximately 1,500 miles southeast of Australia. It consists of two main islands, North Island with an area of 44,200 sq. miles and South Island with an area of 58,170 sq. miles, plus Stewart Island to the south, with an area of 625 sq. miles and some smaller islands. North and South Islands are separated by Cook Strait, which is about 19 miles wide at the narrowest point. [1:462]

New Zealand's development during the post-World War II period has been much less spectacular than that of Australia. New Zealand has achieved a high standard of living built on efficient production of livestock, meat, and dairy products. The British entry into the European Community deprived New Zealand of much of it secure export market, forcing a painful shift to Japan and other alternative customers (one of which is the Soviet Union). Unlike Australia, New Zealand does not have a widely varied mineral resource base or a highly industrial structure. [2:347] The processes of economic development that has occurred, has dictated a steadily increasing concentration of population, still relying on farm products and industrial output, in the major cities, especially within the North Island. [6:623]

The majority of the population is of European origin, with a total population in 1985 of 3.2 million. For nearly a century and a half--from the Treaty of Waitangi signed between the Maoris (the native people of New Zealand) and the European settlers in 1940--the European influence has heavily predominated. Recently however, there has been a pronounced reassertion of Maori rights and a renaissance in Maori culture, even though the Maoris represent less than 10% of the total population. [7:8]

In New Zealand the parliamentary model has been severely modified to where New Zealand can rightfully claim to be called "democracy's testtube." New Zealand once had provincial parliaments and an upper house in the national parliament. Both have been abolished and instead New Zealand formed 95 constituencies of equal population. Elections are held every three years, with over 90 percent of eligible voters casting

their votes. These structual changes have resulted in a very sensitive and dynamic political process. Many in New Zealand are becoming more active, perhaps sensing that the country's political direction is susceptible to "the confusion of the multitude."[1]

In the view of the New Zealand Government, and the population at large, New Zealand has played and will continue to play a very important role in maintaining the stability of the Southwest Pacific and regard New Zealand very much as a Pacific power. [9:m1] However, this role and interest in maintaining stability in the South Pacific may be in jeopardy due to the current New Zealand Government ban on nuclear-armed and propelled ship visits in order to get away from and protest, "things nuclear." According to the New Zealand Government, the country's location, far removed from potential adversaries, renders a "nuclear defense" unnecessary and unwanted. [10:2]

C. AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND LINK

Australia and New Zealand share a special relationship, but the ties which bind the two are not based on sentiment but on essentially practical considerations. They are a mixture of a

---

[1]When America's Founding Fathers debated the institutional future of the nation, some warned of the dangers of too much democracy. The argument favored a representative government, a republic to "guard against the confusion of a multitude." Madison and other federalist suggested a series of governmental checks and balances to temper the self-serving factions and the vicissitudes of populism. What emerged included a House of Representatives, responsible to local constituencies, and a Senate responsible for larger regional and national interests, and an Executive charged with safeguarding national security interests, among other responsibilities. [8:4-5]

common heritage in the British Empire and Commonwealth, geographic proximity, a tradition of allowing movement of people between the two countries with a minimun of restriction, a close military association embodied in the word Anzac and a highly preferential trading relationship. While each country has developed a distinctive national spirit, people speak with similar accents and share similar cultures. [11:2]

The successful negotiation of the Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (CER) in 1982 has laid the foundations for a common market between the two countries which will be of significant importance to both, but particularly in strengthening New Zealand. Australia is a vital middle power in the world comparable in many ways to Canada; New Zealand is a small country with many of the characteristics of Denmark. Under CER, New Zealand's future economic security and development will be inextricably bound up with Australia, although their political relations--in some ways very reminiscent of the relations between Canada and the United States--will continue to be those of two independent neighbors of markedly different size. [2:348]

As pointed out above, a military pact exists between the two countries, the Anzac Pact. This agreement came into force in 1944 and is a cornerstone of the Australia-New Zealand nexus. It was negotiated amid the stresses of war and it came about because the governments of the time agreed that if an Anzac voice were to be asserted about the conduct of the war and post-war developments there would be a better chance of persuading the great powers to take Australia's and New Zealand's views into account. Although there have been several differences of opinion

between the Australian and New Zealand Governments (such as over New Zealand's nuclear-free zone stance), the relations between the two have been fashioned since the war by the development of close consultation and more often than not unity of view on the major international issues of the day. [11:5-6]

Australia and New Zealand both see the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia as areas of primary strategic interest, as Australian Minister of Defence Kim Brezley pointed out when he stated:

> It is fundamental to the security interests of both Australia and New Zealand that the broad alignment between ourselves and the countries of ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum prove to be durable in the long-term. We concentrate our cooperative activity with regional partners in these areas because it is there that our interests are most directly involved, that we are best placed to develop our influence, and that we can make a practical contribution to wider Western security interests. [5:16]

The Polynesian South Pacific has been traditionally a New Zealand area of concern and Australia has focused more on Melanesia. Both countries have given the South Pacific more concentrated attention since the mid-1970's. Prompted by Tonga's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in April 1976 and reports that the Soviets had offered Tonga aid in exchange for right to build an international airport and set up a permanent fishing base, strategic planners were spurred to take a new look at the security ramifications of decolonization in the South Pacific. [12:472]

D. ANZUS

For Australia and New Zealand, their experience during World War II changed their prewar stereotypes forever. The shock of

realizing that Britain could no longer protect them againat external attack resulted in a rapid and fundamental reorientation in their thinking. The United States, which before the war had been regarded as distant, somewhat unfamiliar, and of secondary importance, now became clearly the powerful bulwark on which their military security rested. [2:347]

The ANZUS alliance entered into force on April 29, 1952. It was originally sought by Australia and New Zealand to prevent repetition of Japanese aggression. The Alliance has evolved subsequently into a component part of the interlocking anti-communist system of alliances linking the Western states. Collectively, these alliances aim to deter aggression and to provide for cooperation should deterrence fail. [10:1] For example, there are no direct political or legal linkages between ANZUS and the Five Power Defense Arrangement.[2] However, any potential aggressor in Southeast Asia must take into account that ANZUS alliance interests would be threatened by an attack engaging Australian and New Zealand forces there. [13:4]

The ANZUS Treaty is a broadly worded document (see Appendix B) and has come to be regarded by all three states as the basis for a very wide-ranging program of security cooperation which includes intelligence exchanges, regular joint exercises, logistics and defense technology agreements, joint planning and

---

[2]The Five Power Defense Arrangement of 1971, between Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Singapore, made Malaysia and Singapore responsible for their own defense and required consultation in the event of external aggression. It also provides for the stationing of Australian, New Zealand, and United Kingdom forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

regular consultative arrangements at the highest civilian and military levels. [14:78]

The ANZUS link has enhanced the influence and ability of Australia and New Zealand to preserve regional stability beyond what they could achieve in isolation. [15:1] Australia and New Zealand have a clear interest in doing what they can to see that the region is not open to exploitation by countries who do not share their values or basic commitment to individual freedom and democracy. [16:2] Both Australia and New Zealand have programs designed to support the security capabilities of friendly countries in the region. New Zealand has its military assistance program, and Australia its Defence Cooperation program. [5:17]

In retrospect, the Tonga incident in 1976 proved significant as a catalyst that sparked an overdue reappraisal of security in the Southwest Pacific by the ANZUS partners. At ANZUS meetings in 1976 and 1977 the two nations undertook to persuade the United States to accept their contention that Soviet activity in the Southwest Pacific was sufficiently threatening to ANZUS interests to warrant more attention to security matters. [12:472]

Having had it brought to their notice that the strategic setting in the Southwest Pacific was changing, the ANZUS allies determined to take active steps to protect their own security interests. In August 1976 and 1977, the ANZUS states agreed that it was totally unnecessary for them to take a direct military response to the situation. Instead, they resolved to increase economic assistance to the South Pacific and upgrade support for regional institutions. Provision of military aid and development of regional defense cooperation were to form only a minor part of

this. Because Australia and New Zealand had the closest bilateral ties to the South Pacific area, it was agreed that they should properly take the leading role in implementing the new policy. By increasing economic assistance to the Southwest Pacific the ANZUS states hoped to ensure that none of the new states would seek aid from any adversary of ANZUS or from sources deemed likely to promote radical ideologies. Additionally, by encouraging regionalism it was hoped that peer pressure and the influence of ANZUS nations themselves would constrain individual decisionmakers in the South Pacific from pursuing any "adventurist" policies. [12:473]

E. THE ISLANDS

The Pacific Ocean occupies a third of the earth's surface. Within it are located many thousands of islands, more than in all the rest of the world's seas combined. [17:651] Sparsely scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface, the 10,000 islands (sometimes called "Oceania") in the central and south Pacific Ocean include nine independent countries, two freely associated states, and a larger number of dependencies of the United States, France, and New Zealand.

The islands of the insular Pacific are unequally distributed within the vast expanse of ocean, and large portions of it are indeed quite empty. Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan, the first European known to transit the Pacific, discovered this basic fact of geography the hard way. He sighted only a few uninhabited reefs on his journey across the Pacific from South America to the Philippines before he sighted Guam in 1521. Had



Figure 3 The Pacific Islands

he missed Guam, he most likely would have thought that the ocean was without human inhabitants. [12:6]

The South Pacific Island countries are characterized by their small size (the whole island region has a population of only five million, with most living in Papua New Guinea), limited land resources and an economic dependence on larger states.[3] Like all developing countries the people of the South Pacific region wish to achieve the living standards of those in the West, but for most of the Pacific developing countries, the main problem is that the resources from which their political, social and economic needs have to be met are inadequate to maintain the levels of income to which they aspire, or even those to which they have become accustomed. [18:20]

---

[3]A number of broad classifications of Pacific Islands exist. The islands may be divided into continental islands, high islands, low islands and atolls. The continental islands are located on the broken edges of the continental blocks. Erosion has resulted in plains, deltas and swamps. The coastal pattern is one of small coastal plains alternating with low river terraces, high marine terraces, coastal hills and steep mountain slopes plunging straight into the sea. Papua New Guinea is the best example of a continental island. The high islands of the central Pacific are composed almost entirely of volcanic materials and are basically the peaks of the largest volcanoes in the world. Characteristic landforms of this islands are striking peak and valley forms and narrow beaches, with fringing coral reefs completing the pattern. Low islands are of two types: some are volcanic islands which have been eroded, while others are raised atolls. Caves and sinkholes occur widely, with small pockets of soil occurring within the limestone rocks. Surface water is extremely uncommon. The final island form is the atolls, which are roughly circular reefs of coral limestone, partly covered by sea water on which there are small islands made up of accumulations of limestone debris, and within which there occurs a lagoon of calm water. Atoll islets are commonly less than 9 feet above the high-tide level and vary in size from about less than 1 mile by 1 mile to over 37 miles long. Sources of fresh water are rain and a freshwater lens which is found floating on salt groundwater beneath the islets. [17:651-52].

TABLE I

ISLANDS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

POLYNESIAN ISLANDS	POLITICAL STATUS	LAND AREA (Sq Miles)	POPULATION 1984
American Samoa	US Territory	74	36,400
Cook Islands	Self-Governing State in Free Association with N.Z.	93	18,112
French Polynesia	French Territory	1,560	159,000
Niue	Self-Governing State in Free Association with N.Z.	101	3,000
Pitcairn Island	Colony of Britain	14	45
Tokelau	Territory of N.Z.	4	1,572 (1981)
Tonga	Independent (1970)	385	102,000
Tuvalu	Independent (1978)	10	9,000
Wallis & Futuna	French Territory	106	12,408
Western Samoa	Independent (1962)	1,100	158,000
MICRONESIAN ISLANDS			
Guam	US Territory	216	113,000
Kiribati	Independent (1979)	269	61,400
Nauru	Independent (1968)	8	8,600
Trust Territory of The Pacific Islands	Free Association with U.S.	716	140,000
MELANESIAN ISLANDS			
Fiji	Independent (1970)	7,150	680,000
New Caledonia	French Territory	7,450	145,400
Papua New Guinea	Independent (1975)	180,059	3,350,000
Solomon Islands	Independent (1978)	11,126	251,000
Vanuatu	Independent (1980)	4,680	132,000

Ethnically and culturally the islands of the Pacific fall into three subregions:

Micronesia--Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam, Nauru, and Kiribati;

Melanesia--Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and part of Fiji; and

Polynesia--part of Fiji, French Polynesia, Tuvalu, Tonga, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna, and the Pitcairn Dependency. [19:1]

Polynesian societies are basically patrilineal and genealogically ranked, with elaborate hierarchical systems of rank and class, best developed on the Hawaiian, Tongan and Society Islands. Micronesian societies are mainly matrilineal, with the exception of Yap and Kiribati. Melanesia is culturally the most diverse area of all. Hereditary ranking occurs in Fiji, but in many areas, especially in Papua New Guinea, status is achieved rather than inherited. Most groups are patrilineal, but matrilineal societies occur in New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. [17:653]

The Polynesians, broadly speaking, tend to take a less assertive role in regional affairs and generally their economies are in more serious trouble; the others have larger populations and wider resource bases and are apt to take wider interest in regional affairs. The Melanesians also tend to argue for a merger of the South Pacific Forum with other regional groups such as the South Pacific Economic Commission in Fiji. This is resisted by the smaller predominantly Polynesian states who fear that their interests would be overlooked in one large regional grouping. [20:112]

Population growth rates vary from 1.1 percent in Western Samoa, through 2.7 percent in Papua New Guinea, to 3.2 percent in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. Life expectancy is generally between 50-60 years. Most Pacific Islanders live in rural areas, with a high of 91 percent rural dwellers in the Solomon Islands and a low of 63 percent in Fiji. 2.7 million people, an estimated 89 percent of the population, reside in rural areas in Papua New Guinea. [21:735]

For most of the Southwest Pacific Island states, official development assistance (ODA)., comprising ODA loans and grants, constitutes a significant component of total external financing. ODA accounts for more than 90 per cent of external inflows into the following Island countries (in descending order of reliance): Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Niue, Samoa, and the Cook Islands. Nearly complete dependence on ODA for these countries reflects their inability to mobilize external resources on non-concessional terms. For a second group of Island states, ODA accounts for 66 per cent to less than 90 per cent of their external financing; these being: Kiribati and Papua New Guinea. In the remainder of the Island states, ODA plays a relatively less important role, although it is still important to the functioning of their economies. [22:195]

Unfavorable balance of payments position and low foreign exchange levels are common regional problems. Foreign direct investments are important in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. There has been a stable, even increased, flow of foreign direct investments to economies of the region, which have relied on and encouraged such investment as a long-term strategy. [22:104]

The bottom line for all these countries is that the inflow of funds from external sources is critical in keeping the economies (and the political and social systems) afloat.

The general employment situation is similar to many developing countries, with widespread unemployment in urban centers, especially among youth. The largest proportion of the workforce is engaged in agriculture and fisheries. While this proportion has been declining for some time in relation to the non-agricultural and services sectors, it remains the major part of the cash economy. The level of employment in subsistence agriculture is very high. Government priorities in most nations are aimed at finding suitable employment opportunities. There is little likelihood that significant industrial development will emerge to provide alternative employment for traditional farmers and fisherman. A reflection of this is considerable emigration of the young to developed, industrialized countries. [21:735]

The economic performance of several Southwest Pacific Island states economies have improved considerably since 1983. This economic growth has been propelled largely by a higher level of export-related activities. Higher demand and external prices for most commodities of significant importance to the island subregion--including coconut produce, palm oil, rubber, cocoa, copper and gold--resulted in an appreciable improvement in trade earnings. It is important to note that much of this improvement was a reflection of the recovery in the economies of industrial countries, mainly the United States. Additionally, the effect of increased external demand varied greatly among the countries of the subregion, depending on both the commodities they exported

and the conditions in the markets of their traditional trading partners. [22:38]

In the Southwest Pacific, there are no communist parties and Marxism is not an attractive philosophy in Island states where Christianity is deeply entrenched. In contrast to the experience of post-colonial societies in Africa and Asia, force has not been used in the Southwest Pacific countries to remove a government and there have been no military coups and there are no one party states. [23:71] Furthermore, the Islanders share the United States' respect for democracy and human rights and have modeled many of their institutions on those of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. [19:1]

Regarding the Pacific Island states, there is a growing opinion emerging among some members of the political elites of these states. Some feel that if it is in the national interest of these states to 'normalize' relations with the Soviet Union, then they will do so. They argue that the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, should not be overly concerned that these states cannot successfully cope with the Soviets, since they are just as capable of handling the Soviets as the U.S. and the Anzac combination. If other Western countries can profit from commerical and cultural transactions with the Soviets, and handle the pressures of the 'Bear', then it is chauvinistic of Western states to think that the Island states could not also handle relations with the Soviet Union.

F. SOUTH PACIFIC INSTITUTIONS

In striving for a regional approach to the political, economic, and security problems facing the various states in the region, the concerned states have founded several institutions to cope with these issues. The original and still functioning institution for the area, the South Pacific Commission, comprises the five metropolitan powers of Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., and the independent Island countries of Fiji, Nauru, New Guinea, Solomons, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. Formed in the post-World War II era of gradual decolonialization, the Commission has undergone several transitions from (1) an advisory body for the metropolitan powers, to (2) a body placing stronger emphasis on technical aid, and finally towards becoming (3) an education and training organization for the Island countries. Although the developed nations that founded the Commission intended for it to increasingly involve the indigenous peoples of the region, discontent over their inability to take part directly in decisions affecting the region lead the Island leaders to form their own coalition in the early 1970s. [24:1248]

It was New Zealand in 1971, at the suggestion of Fiji, that took the lead in founding the South Pacific Forum to allow the heads of the governments of the Island countries, Australia and New Zealand to discuss political questions openly. [25:16] This coalition has as its administrative arm the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). The Forum and SPEC were forged by the Pacific mini-states more or less as a challenge to the Commission's reluctance to address pressing political issues in



Figure 4 Area Served by the South Pacific Commission

such matters as distant water fishing rights. [24:1248] Only two developed countries, Australia and New Zealand, are part of the Forum's restrictive membership.[4]

In spite of their apparent rivalry, the two institutions instead serve complementary functions and facilitate flexibility and choice in multilateral cooperation in the South Pacific. The Commission, because of its emphasis in the generally nonpolitical area of training and research, can explore new and experimental ideas. The Forum, on the other hand, is able to deal more directly with sensitive political issues through its ministerial meetings while SPEC promotes cooperation on economic development and trade. Together, the Commission and the Forum represent a two-tiered approach that allows both research and policy-oriented activities to move forward. [24:1248] These two institutions have been among the most successful in the Pacific in terms of active involvement of a group of developing and develop nations.

G. NUCLEAR TESTING

Since the end of World War II, the region has been used for the development of nuclear weapons. The U.S. began testing in 1946 over Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands and it exploded its first hydrogen bomb on Enewetok Atoll in 1952. Over the next six years, some 66 tests were carried out at Bikini and Enewetok. Thereafter the United States moved its tests to Johnson Island,

---

[4]The member states of the SPF are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau have observer status in the Forum.

south of Hawaii. Britain also conducted an extensive program of atmospheric tests in the Southwest Pacific. It exploded some 12 nuclear bombs on Australian territory and then moved its tests to Christmas Island where it exploded its first thermonuclear device in 1957. As a consequence of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the United States and Britain ceased testing in the Southwest Pacific in 1963. France remain the only state which continues nuclear tests in the region. [14:80]

Given this background, the nations of the Southwest Pacific have sought to stop the use of their area as a testing ground for nuclear weapons development. And during the meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Raratonga from 4-6 August 1985, the nations of the Forum unanimously endorsed the draft Treaty on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone on the 6th of that month. The Treaty and its protocols are intended to lead to the acceptance by the international community, including the nuclear weapon states, of a zone in the South Pacific in which all the territories are free of nuclear weapons and that there is no testing of nuclear explosive devices and no dumping of nuclear wastes. [26:2] The action of the South Pacific Forum states makes their region the world's third nuclear-free zone, after the Antarctic and Latin America.

III. UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

A. BASIC TENETS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Specific United States interests and objectives in the Southwest Pacific are subject to the same basic tenets that underly all United States policies. The foundations that guide America's approach to the rest of the world are found in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States. The fundamental purpose of the United States, as laid down in the Preamble, is " . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose of the United States is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. [27:90]

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life. [27:90]

Our approach toward the rest of the world is based on the reality that our own security and prosperity require constructive engagement in the world beyond our own frontiers. We are locked in a global competition with forces whose objectives and methods are diametrically opposed to the values on which our society is

based. The fundamental values as I conceive them that guide U.S. foreign policy are:

1. As a pluralistic and diverse society, we have a strong bias toward pluralist democracy as a unifying system of government in other nations.

   --Democratic systems have proven to be a strong defense against communist penetration and subversion. People who live within a democratic system with individual freedom and guarantees of justice are not susceptible to the blandishments of Marxism-Leninism.

2. As beneficiaries of change, we are convinced that change cannot be resisted. We are confident that, when it is accommodated in an open, competitive system, change is a positive process. We are not wedded to the status quo.

3. As a "have" and "satisfied" nation, we are committed to the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are opposed to the use of violence and subversion as instruments of political change. [28:2]

American motives in the conduct of international relations are quite simple. The United States wants to assist in maintaining a world of independent nations, a world in which problems are solved not by force but by negotiation. We have secondary motives, like international well being and reinforcing peace. [29:8] But, it is also essential for United States foreign policy formulators to understand that an American foreign policy which is not grounded in our own democratic values will not be supported by the American people and therefore, could not be sustained. [28:2]

B. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE SW PACIFIC

Within a single generation the United States has fought three wars in the Pacific. As a result, Americans have been called upon to reexamine our national interests and policies in this region more frequently than in any other part of the world. And

each of these reassessments has led to the same inescapable conclusion-that the United States is a Pacific nation whose security and economic prosperity are inextricably linked to the stability and growth of this vast area. [30:3]

Another aspect of U.S. policy following World War Two concerning the Southwest Pacific, was that given American preoccupation with the dangers in Northeast and Southeast Asia the lack of interest in the Southwestern Pacific affairs was unavoidable. In any case, the region had been put on the backburner for the U.S. virtually from the conclusion of the ANZUS alliance in 1951. [31:187]

The United States has a strong interest in the maintenance of a stable equilibrium of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Economic factors such as natural resources, markets, energy, trade, and investment closely tie together the United States and the burgeoning countries of Asia. Not only do we have a major interest in such economic, political, and strategic matters, but our interests also include issues involving deeply held American values, as listed above. The three keys to a sound U.S. policy in the region are a free and open world economy, a solid deterrent posture, and effective diplomacy. Or to put it another way, the watchwords of our policy are realism, strength, and negotiation:

1) Realism: The acknowledgement that economic growth lies at the heart of progress in the Pacific. Economic growth, in turn, is the key to both military and political strength.

2) Strength: Economic development and diplomacy cannot succeed in an environment of fear borne by a sense of weakness.

3) Negotiation: Sound economies and a strong military commitment cannot by themselves provide stability and confidence. They must be accompanied by an active and creative diplomacy and a willingness to negotiate. [32:3-4]

In the Southwest Pacific, the focus of United States policy is our relationship with Australia and New Zealand, as ordinarily defined by ANZUS. ANZUS is not simply an isolated alliance for the defense of one portion of the globe, but part of a broader network of relations that together help hold in check a communist threat. The ANZUS countries share traditions of democratic freedom and a willingness to bear the cost of preserving these values. The United States recognizes that managing a democratic alliance requires mutual counsel as well as mutual obligations. It is for this reason that the United States takes ANZUS country views seriously into account in formulating American arms control provisions, which is a world wide concern. [32:3] But for its part, the U.S. considers ready access to Australian and New Zealand ports critical to its defense role in the Pacific.

Australia, by virtue of its size, geographic proximity--to the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific--and because of its military and political alignment, makes an important regional contribution to mutual U.S.-ANZUS strategic interests. Additionally, Australia plays an important role in the overall deterrence posture of the United States, due to it being host for a number of U.S. defense communication facilities. Three of these directly support the U.S. strategic posture: the Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, which relays communications with SLBM submarines; the Defense Space Research facility at Pine Gap, a signals intelligence unit that is

involved in the interception of Soviet and Chinese military and radar transmissions; and the defense space communications facility, at Nurrungar, which is part of the United States' satellite early warning system. In total, these three facilities provide the U.S. with communications, including command and control of ballistic missile submarines, early warning, targeting information and signals intelligence. [14:77]

United States interests in the Pacific Islands are largely derivative of those in East Asia generally, and more specifically in Australia/New Zealand, and generally are of a lesser magnitude than in other regions. However, with the decolonization cycle nearing its conclusion, and with the increasing importance of marine resources, new interests are emerging. [21:735]

The Southwest Pacific Islands assume an importance to the U.S. belying their small size because their location lies athwart our lines of communication with Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia. Additionally, the State of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, and our close relationship with the states emerging from the United States administered Trust Territory also give us a stake in the region's future. [19:2]

The extent of American interest in the region in the past has been more limited than that of either of its ANZUS partners. Outside the defense installations in the Micronesian entities and the security of its other regional territories, the United States has almost no direct military interest in the area. Indeed America's requirements of the Island states are essentially negative, no adventurous relations with potentially hostile



Figure 5 Lines of Communication in the Pacific

third parties and no action which would impair American military access to its ANZUS allies. [31:186]

The only "vital" national interests are that of preservation of open lines of communication within the region, and the denial of the region to hostile military forces. Most of the remaining security, political and economic interests and objectives however do relate to and serve those vital interests, and therefore fall into the "important" category. Economically, the most critical of our direct national interests is that of access to the region's marine resources which links directly to the welfare of not only the US fishing industry, but also to the economies of Hawaii and American Samoa. [33:35]

Major U.S. interests are: 1) to support friendly governments that pursue moderate foreign policies supportive of U.S. basic interests not only in the region, but also in the United Nations and in Third World councils; 2) to preserve the reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S. which exists throughout the region, but which has suffered erosion from lack of any real U.S. presence in the region since the end of World War II; and 3) to preserve U.S. access to fish and seabed resources in the region's exclusive economic zones. [21:736]

United States relations with the Pacific Islands are generally friendly, due to the fact that both share to a remarkable degree a belief in democratic government and devotion to individual liberties. Furthermore, it is in the interest of the U.S. to assist Island governments in their efforts to promote economic growth [34:172]; however, due to the proliferation of mini-states in the region it was impractical for the United

TABLE II

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE SW PACIFIC

STRATEGIC/SECURITY

1. region's relationship to our lines of communication with the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, Asia, and Australia/New Zealand.
2. US territorial/national possessions in the region--i.e. Hawaii, Guam, and missile test range.
3. global perception of the Pacific as a region of exclusive Western influence.

POLITICAL

1. Maintenance of stable, friendly governments that pursue moderate foreign policies supportive not only of US basic regional interests and objectives, but also in a global context in the UN and in Third World councils.
2. Regional acceptance of the US as a supportive regional partner power, and of US Pacific territories as regional partners in their own right.
3. Maintenance of the region's showcase record in the area of human rights and preservation of democratic institutions.
4. Promotion of regional cooperation and cohesion as elements essential to the region's development and stability.

ECONOMIC

1. Non-discriminatory access by US fisherman, and by third country fishing fleets that supply Hawaiian and US territorial processing plants, to the region's exclusive economic zones.
2. US access, as well as other friendly nation, to seabed resources in the region's economic zones.
3. Within the region, a level of sustained economic growth sufficient to induce continuing regional stability, and to pre-empt the possibility of fiscally desperate Island states undertaking initiatives with the Soviets, or other Soviet alinged states, which could introduce to the area great power rivalry and destabilizing political influences. [33:33-34]

US DEFENSE RELATIONS

The major features of the American defense posture in the Pacific are:

1. ANZUS for the military response to any global and major regional threats in this part of the world.
2. Strategic denial to limit the emergence of a major threat in the Islands region.
3. Reliance on Australia and New Zealand to manage lesser order threats in the area and to maintain its existing stability. [31:186]

States to establish diplomatic missions in each capital and maintenance of relationships through traditional bilateral means. This, together with limited AID resources, and the region's tendency to address issues through regional institutions, led to a U.S. policy focus on links with key regional states (Fiji and Papua New Guinea)[1] and support for strengthened regional cohesion through cooperation with regional institutions, i.e., a policy of regionalism rather than bilateralism. [33:29]

The United States has long been more active to the north of the equator than to the south, by the nature of its relationship with Guam and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Contrary to the case in other parts of the region, the movement toward political transition in the TTPI and the attempt to address islanders' desires for greater self-rule had generated considerable analysis of related security matters.[2] This analysis was affected by the territory's proximity to Guam and by

---

[1]The United States presently has two resident embassies in the area--Port Moresby and Suva. The Reagan Administration is seeking to expand these contacts by opening satellite missions in Apia (Western Samoa) and Honiara. These missions would provide the U.S. with an improved capacity to routinely pass its own defense and civilian concerns on to the Governments of the region and to respond to their interests. [31:187]

[2]The over-all policy goals of the United States with regard to the Compact of Free Association between the U.S. and the FSM and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, are based on a review of United States policy by the Senior Interagency Group on Foreign Policy and were approved by the President on September 21, 1981. An important policy goal of the United States is to see political stability in the freely associated states. The Compact seeks to help accomplish this goal of political stability through provision of annual grant assistance. [34:174]

developments outside Oceania itself. Important in this regard was the growing strategic importance of the bases at Guam in light of its use during the Vietnam Conflict and its use as a forward base for Polaris submarines. [12:474] Furthermore, the strategic importance of the TTPI has increased even more in the mid-1980's by the turmoil in the Philippines. The need to secure a fall-back position to the facilities at Clark and Subic, especially in light of the Soviet position in Vietnam, has became a prime concern of U.S. strategic planners.

C. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The Agency for International Development's (AID) South Pacific Regional Program assists 10 Island nations: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomons, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, and Niue. During FY1986, $6 million was budgeted for this assistance. The objectives of the program are to assist national development and support regionalism.[3]

---

[3]Principal problems by sector which the A.I.D. program addresses include: increased production, diversification, and marketing of cash crops, livestock, and marine life; agriculture research and extension; appropriate non-formal education in specific skills for specific groups; managerial level training and university extension; potable water supply and sanitation; increased private sector opportunities in agribusiness, trade and joint ventures; and alternative and renewable energy sources. A.I.D. assistance consists of both "grass roots" community projects and regional programs which benefit all of the Island countries. A.I.D.'s program strategy is increasing developmental skills at lower levels of society and has allowed several Island governments to make better use of both bilateral and multilateral programs conducted by other countries. [21:736]

Figure 6 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

The basic A.I.D. strategy is to provide modest, non-bilateral and indirect assistance from a regional development office located in Fiji. For the most part, this assistance is provided through intermediaries to the independent Island countries.[4] In addition, a modest bilateral assistance program for Fiji is under consideration for fiscal year 1986. About 450 Peace Corps volunteers, many of whom focus on rural development, are serving in the region. United States contributions to international organizations such as the Asian Development Bank also benefit the region. [19:2]

There are fairly regular but not constant visits by U.S. personnel to the three regional states which maintain uniformed forces, Fiji (2,600), Papua New Guinea (3,250), and Tonga (250), and less frequent contact with other Island states. Additionally, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomons, and Tonga participate in small international military education and training programs. [19:2] Vanuatu (300) and the Solomon Islands (50) maintain paramilitary forces, while the remainder have only small constabulary forces. [14:79] There are also efficiency programs such as the Hawaii-based Western Command's Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS) in which Island states participate. [31:186]

---

[4]Intermediaries used are United States and indigenous private and voluntary organizations which implement about 70% of the current program, South Pacific regional institutions, and the Peace Corps. Included are out-of-school, non-formal education and vocational training in needed skills, principally for small farmers and fisherman, and unemployed youth, and assistance to regional institutions in agricultural development, satellite communications, water and sanitation, and training. [34:189-91]

In summary, the United States and other major donors, Australia and New Zealand, share a common interest in seeing that the small, newly independent Island states maintain stable environments through political and economic growth.

D. SUMMARY

In the past the bridging role of Australia and New Zealand has served U.S. interests and objectives in the region in the management of regional security and Western hegemony. Furthermore, the United States has benefited from Australia's strategic objectives of: maintaining the mantle of the ANZUS treaty over the South Pacific; keeping the lines of communications to North America and Japan secure; and keeping the Soviet diplomatic and military presence in the region to a minimum. [14:79] This partnership has served in meeting the major strategic concern of the United States in the Southwest Pacific: the denial of its use for military purposes by any hostile outside power. Furthermore, in pursuit of this goal, the U.S. has attempted to maintain good relations with the region by dealing with its concern.

The key to maintaining the relative stability that the region enjoys today, and into the future, as far as U.S. policy is concerned lies in four related efforts of roughly equal importance: (1) the maintenance of a strong and capable U.S. presence, one backed not only by credible forces but also by a demonstrated U.S. will to stand by its commitments; (2) the United States' encouragement of increased efforts by friends and allies in support of common interests in proportion to their

ability to bear those burdens; (3) skillful diplomacy, to manage relations and to build ties with the very diverse countries in the region that share fundamental interests with the United States; and (4) the effort to encourage continued economic development, and to the extent that the United States can, the political development of countries in the region. A final consideration is that the United States does not rank these objectives in any order of importance; they are all equally important and mutually supportive of each other. [35:29-30]

As noted before, the focus of United States policy in the Southwest Pacific has been focused on ANZUS and our partners in the alliance, with Australia and New Zealand playing the major role in the area. However, with the potential break-up of ANZUS, the need for a change in U.S. policy concerning the Pacific must be looked at since the current difficulty with New Zealand has revealed what appears to be a basic disagreement over what the ANZUS alliance commitment means (which will be further expanded upon in this paper), the United States must be prepared to assume a larger role in the region as it concerns the security and economic programs that affect the Island states, since the ties of cooperation between New Zealand and the United States may be less effective in the future. Additionally, it will be in the interest of the United States to be in a position to state our views on such issues as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, and other issues, directly to the various states in the region, rather then being filtered through a government that has fundamental differences with the United States over this issue and perhaps others in the future.

IV. OTHER STATES WITH INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Besides the United States, Australia and New Zealand, there are several other states who have interests in the Southwest Pacific. Their activities and interests play a role in the makeup of the political, economic, and social environment of the region; therefore, an understanding of what the interests and activities of these other states are is important to the formulation of Americian policies.

A. FRANCE

If the world at large had forgotten that France still had territories in the Pacific, the troubles in New Caledonia and the Greenpeace incident in New Zealand have brought that fact back into the limelight, for at least the present time. For United States policymakers, the French presence has been an important factor in issues effecting U.S. interests and objectives in the region.

The French presence in the region is manifested mainly in the overseas territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia. France does not consider the region vital to French national security interests nor related to its global strategy except indirectly through its nuclear testing facility in French Polynesia. Aside from that program, the strategic significance of its island territories arises from France's economic stake in New Caledonia and support for French language and culture in all three of its dependencies. [12:489]

The French military presence in the South Pacific is divided between New Caledonia and French Polynesia. French forces are deployed in the Pacific to protect French territories from external aggression, act as a backup to internal security forces should the need arise, provide auxiliary logistics and disaster relief assistance to local governments, and maintain and protect the nuclear Pacific Test Center, which is located in French Polynesia. [12:489]

Both New Caledonia and the nuclear Pacific Test Center have fueled resentment in the region against France, for France is seen as a colonial power that is exploiting its territories for its own interests and disregarding the rights and needs of both the people who live in French possessions and the people of the region at large.

The issue in New Caledonia is that the native Melanesians are demanding their independence; however, French settlers want to retain ties with France. The fear in the region is that an Algerian-style conflict could erupt between the indigenous Melanesians and the French settlers. And from this conflict it is feared that meddling, unfriendly foreign powers would have an excuse to intrude and that the region would become unstable beyond New Caledonia. Already Melanesians from the Independence Front (FI) have traveled to Libya seeking funds, support and arms. Furthermore, in 1984 it was reported that 18 young militants from the Kanak Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS), a break away party from the FI, went to Libya to receive six weeks of so-called security-guard training. Prime Minister Hawke has

remarked that any involvement of a Libyan terrorist force in New Caledonia 'would be disastrous" for the South Pacific. [36:100]

The rigid French stand on conducting nuclear tests in the region has also resulted in hard feelings against the French presence in the area. Furthermore, the French nuclear tests have directly impacted on the United States, which will be further examined in the sections on the New Zealand nuclear-free zone issue and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

Since its nuclear program began in 1966, France has carried out over 113 test in the Pacific, 45 of them atmospheric and over 70 underground. [36:99] France stopped atmospheric testing in the mid-1970's after strong protests from the states in the region. The culmination of this pressure to stop testing came in May 1973, when Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji filed legal briefs with the International Court of Justice contesting the legality and morality of the tests. The Court ruled that the French Government should avoid nuclear tests that resulted in the deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territories of other states. The French Government responded by not recognizing the decision of the Court; however, it finally did bow to international pressure and stopped above-ground testing in 1975. [37:210-11]

The French move to conducting only underground nuclear testing has not made the issue any less explosive. During a series of French test in September 1985, the governments of Australia and New Zealand condemned as untimely and "provocative" the visit of French President Mitterrand to his country's nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll.

Colin McDonald, head of Australia's European, American and North Asian Desk, met with the French ambassador to Australia, Bernard Follin and stated that:

> The ambassador was told to convey to the president that the Australian Government and people considered the meeting (of French diplomatic and military representatives at Mururoa Atoll) to be "highly provocative and contemptuous" of countries of the South Pacific, including Australia. He was also told to inform Mr. Mitterrand that the government felt the meeting was apparently designed to "highlight the determination of France to continue nuclear testing in the face of universal and total condemnation of South Pacific governments." [38:m1]

Prime Minister Lange stated that the visit of Mitterrand to French testing site was for the purpose of making a statement about future French intentions. Mr. Lange said, "This (visit) could be aimed at promoting an even more vigorous and reckless campaign to encounter the growing opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific. If this is so, it will serve to harden the attitudes of those in the region." [39:m2]

The Pacific Island states joined in protesting the continuance of French testing. For example, Fiji's Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara cautioned France against using President's Mitterrand's visit to Mururoa Atoll as a show of defiance against the people of the South Pacific. Ratu Sir Kamisese said he hoped that the visit would cause France to take heed of the very strong opposition of the South Pacific nations to the nuclear tests. [40:m1]

The Australian ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Woolcott, sums up the feelings of the leaders and people of the region concerning French testing, when he stated that, "This practice is an affront to the region and a willful defiance of

the aspirations of the people of the region to live in a nuclear free zone." [41:2]

The final chapter of the ramifications of the French nuclear tests has not been written. France will continue the tests to insure that it possesses a respectable nuclear strike force, which is based on the French belief that France needs nuclear armament, not in order to indulge in dreams of vain greatness, but because her national security and very existence is at stake. [37:210] And the continuance of these tests will further inflame the passions of the people of the Southwest Pacific.

B. PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The PRC has actively cultivated regional governments and leaders for the past several years, including state visits by Island leaders to Bejing, modest assistance programs, and through the dispatch of trade delegations, dance troupes, and high-level officials to the area. In order of priority, Chinese interests/objectives appear to be pre-emption of a Soviet presence and influence in the region, cultivation of support from Island states within the Third World context, and replacement of Taiwanese influence. [33:24]

China has been successful in developing quite close and friendly relations with both Australia and New Zealand, and even some of the Island states in the Southwest Pacific. It is generally seen as less threatening than the Soviet Union and has been able to establish resident missions in several countries, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Western Samoa. [23:72]

China has good and expanding relations, both political and economic, with Australia and New Zealand. Its main objectives towards these two countries include encouragement of the ANZUS policy of keeping the Soviet diplomatic and military presence in the South Pacific to a minimum, and the development of economic relations that assist China's modernization program. [14:78]

C. JAPAN

Japan has significant economic interests in the Southwest Pacific. Japan is a major trading partner of Australia and New Zealand. In the islands area, Japan has a major stake in fishing. Japan has invested in fish freezing plants and canneries which service Japanese fishing fleets, and tends to focus her relationships in areas where there are significant fisheries: Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons, Kiribati, Western Samoa, and Tonga.[1] Tokyo has negotiated bilateral fisheries agreements with most of these states and provides some aid, mostly in the form of concessional loans. [33:23] Japan's future economic growth will result in increased trade, investment, and aid links with most of the region.

At various times it has been suggested by Japan, followed up by studies, that parts of the Southwest Pacific should be used to store or dump nuclear waste (Japan, while not a nuclear-armed state, has a large commitment to nuclear energy as a power

---

[1]For example, in the Solomon Islands, Japan has a strong presence. The fish freezing depot is a joint venture between Japan's Taiyo Fisheries and the Solomon Islands Government. A new fish cannery will extend this plant at a cost of $11 million.

source). While there are no current programs for dumping radioactive waste in the region, the suggestions alone have been strongly opposed by South Pacific states, and in deferrence to their views, Japan has not made any concrete actions in this direction. [14:80]

The increase in Japan's defense capabilities has resulted in concern in some of the Island states. Prime Minister Nakasone, during a tour of the Southwest Pacific in January 1985, assured Fiji's Prime Minister that Japan was still bound by its own peace constitution and non-nuclear policy. The Japanese prime minister further assured Island leaders that Japan would never dump low-level radioactive waste in the Pacific without the consent of the countries concerned. [42:m4]

D. GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain, once the major colonial power and dominant political influence in the region, divested itself of its last significant political responsibilities in the area with the independence of Vanuatu (the former New Hebrides) in 1980. It still has responsibility for Pitcairn Island. However, Britain is likely to continue to have some political influence in the region, due to the fact that the majority of the independent states in the region are members of the Commonwealth. [33:22]

E. THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet economic interests in the region are slight. Moscow has attempted to improve its access by seeking fishing agreements with Australia, New Zealand and several Island states, and has currently negotiated agreements with New Zealand and Kiribati. A

substantial number of Soviet and allied fishing vessels have access to New Zealand port facilities and have fishing rights in New Zealand waters. The remaining regional economic interest of note is merchant shipping. The Soviet merchant marine is becoming more active in the region largely by undercutting Western competitors by substantial margins. [14:78]

The current most outward sign of a Soviet presence in the region is its fishing fleet. The USSR has the largest fishing fleet in the world and the declaration by many countries of 200-mile fishing zones has encouraged an increase in its distant fishing operations. Fish provides 15 per cent of the animal protein in the Soviet diet and the consumption of fish has more than doubled in the USSR in the last 20 years. The Soviet Union has been particularly concerned to establish a base for its fishing fleet in the Southwest Pacific, which operates at a some distance of 6,000 nautical miles from its headquarters at Vladivostok. [23:73]

The Soviets have had a limited military presence in the area for several years. The ocean area north of Kiribati serves as the impact area for re-entry vehicles during Soviet tests of their ICBMs. Additionally, since 1980, there has been an notable increase in the region of Soviet naval activity. Although, this activity still amounts to just several ships a year, it still represents a the beginning of a different sort of Soviet presence in the area.

Politically, the Soviet Union currently does not have a major presence in the region. It does have embassies in Australia and New Zealand; however, due largely to the vigorous actions of

Australia and New Zealand, not a single diplomatic mission has been opened in the Island states. The USSR, however, does have non-resident accreditation in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. [14:78]

The decolonization process in the Southwest Pacific and the coming to power of socialist governments in Australia and New Zealand have attracted Soviet attention. Additionally, current issues between the United States and several of the states in the region (which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections) have drawn the attention of Moscow, since these issues may present the Soviet Union with opportunities to crack what has in the past been a solid front to Soviet efforts to increase its influence in the region.

Because of Moscow's increased attention to the region, and given the nature of the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe it is necessary to examine more closely the Soviet Union's interest in the area and what it could hope to achieve by taking a greater role in the region.

1. Historical Interest in the Region

Russian activities in the Pacific in the first half of the nineteenth century were concentrated in the North Pacific and were transacted not only in Asiatic Russia but also across the way in Alaska. Insofar as having anything to do with Polynesia, they chiefly focused on the Hawaiian Islands, in which at various times the Russians considered founding a settlement. But because land communications between European Russia and the Pacific littoral were long and difficult--the journey ordinarily took two

years--it seemed reasonable to establish a link by sea to Alaska, using Capes Horn and Good Hope, and in doing this the Russians arrived at the islands of the South Pacific. Apparently however, the Russians found the voyage from the Baltic via Cape Horn to Alaska and Asiatic Russia hardly a profitable substitute for the overland route, for after 1826, no more Russian visits to the South Pacific were made. As remarked, the only part of Polynesia they ever coveted was Hawaii in the north, because it bore a rational relation to their holdings on either side of the North Pacific Ocean at the time.

The above review of past Russian interest in the Pacific is not to establish a basis to formulate a grand Russian-Soviet design on the islands of the Pacific or even a future attempt to grab Hawaii. Instead it is intended to show that the Russians have shown an interest in the Pacific in the past which arose from other Russian possessions in the world at that time and that the Soviets, as both communist and inheritors of Russian history, will venture into the Pacific again if it suits Soviets interests, which will be further examined below.

2. Soviet Views on the Region

In Soviets perceptions Australia and New Zealand are tied directly into the Western alliance system and the Islands of the Southwest Pacific are Western inclined and generally suspicious of Soviet intentions. With the decline of British power in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets saw the U.S. being compelled, in its search for reliable allies in the immense region spreading east of Suez, to "turn" increasingly away from

England and toward Japan and Australia. The Nixon Doctrine gave added movement towards formation of a future Pacific regional military organization. This projected PATO bloc (the Pacific Ocean Treaty Organization) would have included the countries of SEATO and ANZUS, already linked to the United States through various agreements. The Soviet Union has found and still finds the idea of any American attempt to build an Asian security system very distasteful, because it has itself encountered nothing but negative responses from Asia and Pacific states when it has tried to launch similar projects. [43:145]

In Soviet thinking the Indian Ocean is increasingly viewed as an extension of the Pacific, with Southeast Asia and Australia as the hinge. Hence the Soviets viewed with alarm the involvement of ANZUS in the Indian Ocean and the possibility that ASEAN might throw in its lot militarily with a "Pacific Community" that would coordinate the various American bilateral and multilateral military relationships in the Pacific area. The visit of Australian Prime Minister Fraser to Beijing in 1982 was, in Moscow's view, an attempt to involve China. [44:22]

Unlike NATO, ANZUS does not directly threaten the national security of the Soviet Union with military attack. But the roles of North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar suggest that it is in the Soviet Union's interests to see them removed form Australia through political pressure. Moreover, Moscow would like to see the U.S. prevented from using port and air facilities in the region for its naval warships and military aircraft. Soviet propaganda seeks to influence the denial of such facilities to the U.S. by frequently pointing out that it is only

the presence of U.S. military forces in Australia and New Zealand that would make them Soviet nuclear targets. [23:70] The Australians have been specifically warned by the Soviet Union of the danger of becoming an American "nuclear hostage" because of their willing cooperation in American designs:

> In the event of a nuclear war, Australia would no doubt be one of the targets of the Soviet nuclear attack, special advisor for national security questions in the Soviet party Central Committee Stanislav Menshikov stated on Australian Television. Menshikov said that not only U.S. bases would be destroyed in the political attack but also facilities not connected with them, such as ports in which U.S. nuclear war ships are docking. The Soviet Union, however, has no interest in threatening Australia nor should Australia in any way feel endangered by Moscow. [45:E1]

The Australian elections in 1983 stimulated Soviet interest, and Moscow noted hopefully Labour's less pro-American position However,the Soviets soon concluded that things had not really changed, and the usual polemics were resumed in connection with ANZUS meetings, focusing on Australia's continuing military cooperation with the United States and implications for Australia's role in the American Pacific strategy. [46:11]

The Soviet Union is a substantial trade partner of both Australia and New Zealand. Trade turnover has more than doubled in the last seven years and is now worth about US $1.2 billion annually. However, from a Soviet perspective, trade with Australia and New Zealand has always been heavily in favor of these countries and it show no sign of moving to a more even balance. In 1982 the ratio was 35:1 against the Soviets. [23:73]

Soviet concern also extends into the Pacific Islands, focusing on the new relationships being developed between the United States and these countries. Soviet media has played up

demonstrations on Kwajelein, as well as the second conference of the Pacific Trade Union Forum, held in Noumea in September 1982, where demilitarization of the region was discussed. For their part the Soviets seek to ridicule claims that they seek positions of military strength in the Pacific Islands. [44:23] Moscow has also called for the full independence of the Trust Territories and New Caledonia and nuclear-free status for the entire Pacific Islands region [46:11].:

> The U.S. policy of annexing the strategic U.N. trust territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia) and converting it into an American strategic military staging areas has been censured by the U.N. Decolonization Committee . . . . It is strategic military considerations that have determined the American Administration's approach to the problem of the exercise of their rights by the people of Micronesia and prompted the U.S. general policy of sabotaging the fulfillment of the UN declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples and U.S. attempts to arrogate step by step territories which never belonged to Washington . . . . The USSR strongly condemns this policy. It supports the sovereign right of the people of the region to a peaceful and free development. [47:A5-6]

And:

> The U.S. policy aimed at absorbing and transforming it into a military bridgehead in the western Pacific crudely contravenes . . . granting independence to colonial countries and peoples . . . . The course toward the militarization of Micronesia, its utilization as a proving ground for missile equipment, and the plans to site nuclear weapons there create a direct threat to the entire region and conflict with the desire of Pacific states to create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The (U.N.) Decolonization Committee must fulfill its duty by backing the people of Micronesia in their struggle against militarist nuclear neocolonialism. [48:E4]

On the economic side, Soviet trade with the Pacific Islands is so small that it is not recorded in official Soviet trade statistics. What trade there is, in such commodities as copra, coffee, and tea, is either done through third countries or is purchased by the USSR on world markets. [23:73]

3. Views on ANZUS Difficulties

The Soviet Union would like to see the ANZUS alliance system disrupted in its favor and the close relationship that has developed between Australia, New Zealand and the United States with the ASEAN countries and with the nations of the Southwest Pacific destroyed; therefore, the Soviet Government cannot conceal its delight at this turn of events, which offers an unprecedented threat to the cohesion of ANZUS, and thus to American conventional and nuclear capacities in the Southwest Pacific. [4:8]

Although the Soviets feel it is still to early to talk about the way events in Wellington will develop, there is no doubt in the Soviet's mind that the Labour Party's victory in the New Zealand elections and it's anti-nuclear stance has dealt a heavy blow to Washington's strategy in the Pacific area. [49:E2] Consequently, the Soviet media has played up the importance of the Labour Party's stance, pushing the idea that, "The Labour Party position also testifies that the number of New Zealanders opposing the presence of U.S. nuclear vessels has increased considerably and that such a tendency is logical and natural, due to growing understanding of the indisputable fact that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in New Zealand territorial waters is fraught with catastrophic consequences. For in that case New Zealand becomes the Pentagon's nuclear hostage. What is more, it cannot be ruled out that this country may find itself involved in the realization of U.S. strategists' adventurous designs to turn the Pacific Ocean region into a nuclear missile bridgehead directed against the Soviet Union." [50:E3]

Moscow also points out that with the American Pacific Fleet adopting Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles, Oceania may well turn into a giant American nuclear base and for this reason Island nations of the Pacific are resisting Washington's militarism in an effort to restrict its military expansion in the region. Furthermore, despite strong pressure from Washington, New Zealand has done the same and that its position has been appreciated throughout the world. In fact, the Soviets point out, that New Zealand's resolve helped to speed up the drafting of the treaty declaring the southern Pacific free of nuclear weapons. [51:E1]

Furthermore, the Soviets point to the wider ramifications of New Zealnd's nuclear-free policy:

> At the same time, speaking more broadly, the anti-nuclear mood in New Zealand is not an isolated phenomenon . . . . It is such an antinuclear chain reaction which is feared most of all in Washington. Mainichi (a major Japanese paper) wrote in this connection that Wellington's position is strengthening the anti-nuclear mood in Japan. The United States is afraid that New Zealand's example may undermine its supremacy in the Pacific Ocean which it regards as its own backyard, Mainichi points out; and not only in the Pacific Ocean. The United States is attempting to also turn many other regions of our planet into its nuclear fiefdom." [50:E3]

4. Views on Nuclear-Free Zone

In the Soviet view, the Cook Islands Forum decisions will undoubtedly provoke widespread international response, since they reflect the desire of the peoples of all continents for peace and peaceful cooperation and for the removal of the threat of nuclear catastrophe. [52:E2]:

> The leaders of the thirteen states incorporated into the South Pacific Forum . . . have unanimously passed a decision declaring that region to be a nuclear free-zone. This time again the decision (The Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 concerning

> Latin America being the first) adopted on the Cook Islands has met with hostile reception from the USA and the other Western powers . . . . In this day and age, the creation of nuclear-free zones has become one of the essential trends in the struggle for curbing "the nuclear jinn". The "Avarua Treaty" is fresh proof of that . . . . The importance of creative nuclear-free zones is obvious to all those who seriously set the aim of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a stabilization of the international situation. There is no doubt that the signal, which has come from the Cook Islands, will attract much attention all over the world. [52:E1]

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific also fits into Soviet domestic and global interests. Fears that might be aroused in the Soviet citizen by his leaders' view of the world are assuaged by official assurances about the "invincible might" of the USSR, as well as by pointing out the growing power of the peace movement in the West. Whatever the imperialists might be scheming, the "peace-loving masses" of ordinary citizens in the capitalist countries stand, Moscow points out, as an additional barrier against unleashing of a nuclear war. [53:311]

5. Soviet Power and Policy

> The Soviet Navy is used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military might of our state beyond its borders.
>
> Naval Collections (Soviet naval journal) 1971 [54:33]

The most important single change in the strategic situation in the Asian-Pacific region since the end of the Vietnam War has been the build-up of the USSR's military strength. From the Soviet point of view, what has been the purpose of this build-up? In part, it represents an attempt to balance the long-standing and relatively large defense effort of the U.S. in the Pacific region, the USSR's changed perception of

China, and apprehension over the build-up of Japan's Self-Defense Force. However, in more general terms, the Soviet military build-up can be viewed as an attempt to address diplomatic failure in the region over the past 30 years. On balance, Asian resistance to Soviet penetration by non-military means has been striking, and the Soviet response to the growing military and economic development of the region has been to build ever more impressive land, sea and air forces. [55:8]

In applying Admiral Gorshkov's precepts of seapower, which stress political pressure and force projection, the Soviet Union has created a centrally controlled maritime force of merchant ships, intelligence gatherers, oceanographic vessels (that can provide a research data base for submarines), and a vast fishing fleet that probes for footholds for power projection. The merchant marine, the world's largest, is designed to integrate with the Soviet Navy, and regularly carries naval officers and equipment. With ships ranging from passenger liners to small break bulk carriers, useful for discreet arms shipments and able to unload on the beach, the possibilities for deception operations as well as instant coordination at the outbreak of hostilities are obvious. [56:13-4]

Soviet foreign policy may be seen as the pursuit of a number of interrelated objectives in the face of complex constraints and pressures, both internal and external to the USSR. These objectives range from self-preservation and security to a number of others whose relative priority may depend on the expected price to be paid for their attainment. A related aspect of Soviet foreign policy is a habitual inclination to

exploit political crises and power vacuums in Third World areas insofar as these can be exploited without incurring undue costs or risks. [57:339]

By words, policies, and actions the Soviet Union has long demonstrated its firm commitment to involvement in the Third World. Major foreign policy declarations unfailingly link the destiny of the Soviet Union and the Socialist world community with that of the Third World. This central idea has its root in Lenin; over a half century ago he perceived the natural linkage of interests between the then colonial-imperial areas of the world and the Soviet Union; the idea has been nurtured and applied as practical policy. An undergirding principle in Soviet policy toward the Third World has been this belief that a symbiotic relationship exists between the Soviet Union and the emerging nations of the former colonial areas. [58:118]

Since 1954, Soviet economic aid, technical assistance, and trade with the Third World have been important instruments of Soviet Third World policy. Moscow seems well aware of the Third World's need and desire for developmental assistance. The Soviet Union also seems cognizant of the increasingly important role of Soviet economic aid in Third World development, though in the past it has always given such aid on a highly selective and concentrated basis and may continue to do so. Consequently the Soviet leadership views economic aid and trade as important instruments of Soviet foreign policy: these instruments are capable of creating goodwill and enhancing Soviet prestige, influence, and power in the Third World. A well-coordinated and well-executed economic program is viewed by the Soviets as being

just as an effective method of Soviet penetration in the Third World as political infiltration. [59:68]

In line with these beliefs, the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its fishing interests in the region. It will seek to use its scientific and technical knowledge to entice Island states into joint fishing ventures. Recent Soviet overtures indicate that this is one of the few areas where the USSR feels that it has a potential lever with which it can influence the small Island states of the region. [23:75]

But for practical, if not ideological, reasons, it is impossible for the Soviet leadership to abandon the tenet of Marxism-Leninism that proclaims that recent history must be understood in terms of a struggle between two systems: one epitomized and led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union. This struggle does not have to assume violent forms, and in the nuclear age, it must not, if at all possible, lead to an all-out war. But to discard the old formula entirely, and to halt the attempts at destabilizing the capitalist world and expanding the Soviet sphere of domination and influence, would, in the Kremlin's view, pose a grave danger to the cohesion of the Soviet system itself. Over and above any considerations of national security, it is those touching on the preservation of the present form of Communist rule in Russia that require Moscow to persist in conceiving of international politics as an arena of constant struggle, with Communism and its allies advancing and capitalism in retreat. [53:311]

With the country's mounting social and economic problems, with the ideology itself having become discredited or irrelevant

in the minds of the great mass of the Soviet people, the regime strives to demonstrate its viability and dynamism through foreign expansion. It tries, and not without success, to inculcate the lesson that for all of its internal shortcomings and excesses, it has been under Communism that Russia has steadily advanced in power and worldwide influence, while the democracies, for all their alleged freedoms and riches, have been in disorderly retreat, insofar as their international role is concerned. [53:312]

The Southwest Pacific has in the past not been an area of primary strategic interest for the Soviet Union and it appears unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future. Most Soviet strategic interest in the Pacific has been focused on areas to the north and east of the Oceania and the closest Soviet bases to the area are located some 1875 miles west of the Palau in Vietnam and over 3,000 miles northwest of the Northern Marianas in Vladivostok. The Soviet Union however, is a global power, and therefore no area of the world is completely void of strategic interest to it. It must be assumed that the Soviet Union has subsidiary strategic interests in the South pacific that relate to the sea/air-lanes of communication running through it and to the United States military presence in Guam and Hawaii. There is also speculation that the Soviets might also be interested in the Southwest Pacific as a place where strategic submarines could be deployed to escape detection, as well as an area to conduct ASW operations to hunt American submarines. Additionally, it can be speculated that over the long term the Soviet Union might be interested in developing mid-range bases in the Southwest Pacific to support operations in Antarctica. [12:490-1]

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a detailed assessment of Soviet interests, objectives and priorities in the Southwest Pacific or of the exact resources it is prepared to devote to achieving these aims. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does have interests in the region which it pursues, however indifferently, through a variety of avenues. While the outcome of Soviet approaches generally reveal a low level of sympathy amongst the Islands, and little to none in Australia and New Zealand, the persistent efforts of Moscow to gain an entry into the region clearly indicate that the Soviet Union does intend to achieve some improvement in its access to the region if at all possible. [60:4-5] Thus, probings for opportunity (such as the fishing issue between the Islands and the United States, which will be covered in a subsequent chapter) are likely to continue at least on an occasional basis, with an increase in resources devoted to probings if large cracks appear to be developing in the stability of the region.

V. TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE NEW ZEALAND

In his speeches, Mr. Lange, as well as others, has pointed out that over the last several years New Zealanders have felt an increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress in bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal overall. This concern has been heightened by the growing realization that, despite its physical isolation, New Zealand would not escape the consequences of a nuclear conflict. Anti-nuclear sentiment has also been fanned by French intransigence in persisting with its nuclear testing program in the Southwest Pacific, in defiance of the expressed views of countries in the region. [61:1010]

The New Zealand ambassador to the United States, Bryce Harland, in a speech given in March 1985, emphasized the importance of these issues in the actions that New Zealand has taken:

> Why then has New Zealand done what no other country in the world has done and actually closed its ports to nuclear armed ships? The reasons are not simple. Many factors are involved, at various levels, but the two that are most effective can easily be identified. The first is nuclear testing. The South Pacific is the only part of the world where a nuclear power is still carrying out tests outside its own metropolitan territory . . . . The U.S. and the United Kingdom stopped testing in the Central Pacific 20 years ago, but France has gone on carrying out tests in the South Pacific. This testing has aroused public concern in all the countries in the area . . . . The second reason follows from the first. Since the mid-70s, no significant progress has been made in arms control negotiations . . . . . If we cannot get the great powers to stop (the arms race) themselves, people in New Zealand say, we can at least show them that we will have nothing to do with nuclear weapons." [62:12]

Against this background, the Labour Government acted to implement what it saw as the only practical measure of nuclear arms control that it viewed as available to it: the absolute exclusion of nuclear weapons and power from New Zealand. To ensure that the exclusion of nuclear weapons is complete, the Labour Government decided, upon entering office in July 1984, that access to New Zealand's ports would be granted only to those vessels which it could satisfy itself were neither nuclear-powered nor nuclear armed. Given the neither-confirm-nor-deny stance of the nuclear powers (for practical purposes the United States and Great Britain), this meant that the New Zealand Government itself has to decide, based on its own assessment, on the weaponry carried by a vessel. [61:1011]

The nuclear exclusion issue had come to the forefront once before in the early 1970s when the Labour Party had been in power, and has been a part of the Labour Party's platform for almost twenty years. The United States, in the early 1970's, while taking issue with the stance did not react strongly. The Labour Government lasted only three years and was replaced with a National Party Government that moved quickly to strengthen defense ties with the United States. However, when the Labour Party came into power in July 1984, it moved quickly to put into effect its nuclear-free zone. policy, and more importantly, stated its intention to make its nuclear-free policy into the law of the land. This placed the issue into an entirely different context for the United States. For a nation which had been considered such a stauch ally since World War II to refute the basic foundation upon which U.S. (Western) defense was built,

nuclear deterrence, called for a strong United States response, otherwise the U.S. could possibly face a wave of allied nations moving to detach themselves from the concept of nuclear deterrence.

In order for the United States to deal effectively with this current issue of dispute with New Zealand, and the current and future shock waves that a breakup of the ANZUS alliance would send throughout the region and the Western global security network, American national security decision makers, must understand the internal dynamics of the issue in New Zealand. And in dealing with New Zealand's nuclear stance, it is important to remember that there are three sets of debate: in New Zealand internally, between New Zealand and the United States bilaterally and between the United States, New Zealand and Australia trilaterally. The security of the Pacific Island states will be effected by the outcome of the debate.

A. INTERNAL FACTORS

Both the major political parties in New Zealand accept the ANZUS alliance as a vital part of the country's foreign policy; but they differ in emphasis and interpretations. The National Party, in power from 1975 to 1984, is in favor of continuing the status quo. The Labour Party's position reveals unmistakable traces of ambivalence. It wants to retain ANZUS, but in renegotiated form.[1] The two minor parties are more specific in

---

[1]In 1983, Labour's new leader David Lange shocked party faithfuls by proposing that nuclear armed and/or powered ships could be given transit rights in a South Pacific NWFZ. This

their ANZUS policies. Social Credit would withdraw from the alliance and institute a policy of armed neutrality. The New Zealand Party's official policy is to conduct a national debate and hold a referendum before making a final decision on the issue. On the basis of these choices presented to the voters in July 1984, one can conclude that one fifth of the people, in voting for the two minor parties, indicated some support for withdrawal from ANZUS. The four-fifths majority however supports a retention of the alliance. [63:17]

Prime Minister David Lange came from a party whose national conference wished to see New Zealand out of the ANZUS treaty, and American nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships excluded from New Zealand ports. [4:7] Ever since the 1950s resolutions have come forward at Labour Party conferences that New Zealand should withdraw from ANZUS (or from all military pacts or alliances with nuclear weapons states. For many years such resolutions were invariably rejected. However, on five occasions recently, in 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983, the party conference passed resolutions favoring withdrawal from military alliances. [64:162]

Within the Labour Party itself, demands to withdraw entirely from the alliance are confined to left-wing groups.[2] The demand

---

departed significantly from the party's 1981 manifesto which expressed opposition to visits by nuclear powered or nuclear armed craft. [63:18]

[2]A recent Massey University study showed that the anti-nuclear and anti-American Left Wing of the Labour Party, while vociferous, is a minority in Labour and a very small group indeed within the larger community. Its influence is exaggerated

to ban nuclear ship visits by contrast is very much the center ground of the Labour Party. Consequently, if a Labour Government was to retreat from this position, the Party would also most certainly be split in both its organizational and parliamentary sectors. The Government is caught in a similar trap regarding a law banning all nuclear ship visits to New Zealand, rather than simply adopt a policy to this effect. If the Labour Government does not bring in an anti-nuclear law, then Social Credit almost certainly would introduce a similar bill, thus presenting Labour with an acute political dilemma. Opposing a Social Credit bill which merely expressed Labour policy would again risk splitting the Labour Party. [63:21]

The Labour Government of New Zealand is a prisoner of certain political realities. The 1975 NWFZ (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) initiative at the U.N. celebrated a year in which there had been no atmosphere nuclear test in the South Pacific. Nevertheless, the South Pacific remains the only region where (underground) nuclear testing is conducted outside the main national territory of a nuclear power: France conducted four nuclear tests at Mururoa in the first six months of 1984 and also two tests alone in Oct. 1985) The French series of nuclear testing at Mururoa serves to underline the fact that on its own New Zealand cannot hope to achieve significant impact on arms control and

---

because many of its adherents are skillful in the use of publicity. Assiduous in the delivery of press releases, always available to talk to reporters and proficient in the organization of protest marches, they have had an effect which is out of proportion to their actual numbers in the community. [65:m3]

disarmament issues. Making New Zealand nuclear-free would be a purely symbolic gesture, born of frustrations at its inability to do anything else. [63:20]

1. Anti-nuclear and Peace Movement

Those in government who are pushing for a nuclear free New Zealand draw support from several anti-nuclear movements in New Zealand and also from several outside organizations. Furthermore, as some of the statements below show, these groups help to keep pressure on Prime Minister Lange and other government officials to push forward with their non-nuclear stance.

There has been a rapid growth in nonparty groups concerned with nuclear issues in New Zealand. Many local authorities, including the Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch city councils, have declared their districts to be NWFZs; there are now 30 such zones covering 900,000 people or 30 percent of the population. Church, student, medical, and trade unions have given increased attention to the issue. [64:164] The coordinating body for the 300 peace groups in a country of 3.3 million people is called Peace Movement Aotearoa. Aotearoa, or Long White Cloud, is the Maori name for New Zealand. Among the objectives of Peace Movement Aotearoa are government support for peace studies in the school curriculum and a permanent Commission for Peace and Disarmament to be established by 1986. [7:8]

Perhaps the largest organizations within New Zealand that can and does put direct pressure on the Labour Government are the Labor unions. The Federation of Labor's president, Jim Knox,

reaffirmed the federation's strong support for the government's policy and condemned any outright interference in it. Mr. Knox said the federation has had the same policy on the nuclear issue since 1963, and he hopes the Government recognizes that fact and does not change its tack. [66:m2]

While on the subject of Labor Unions, it is important to bring up a connection between the Federation of Labor and Socialist Unity Party (SUP), because this ties into the influence of outside organizations in the non-nuclear movement.

The SUP boasts extensive trade union connections. For example, SUP leader Ken Douglas is secretary-treasurer of New Zealand's 450,000-member Federation of Labor (FOL) and is generally considered one of the trade union movement's best tacticians. In addition, SUP National President Bill Andersen serves as a member of the NOL's national executive and as president of the Auckland Trades Council, the largest in the country. [67:223] It should be further noted that in 1985 23 round trip tickets to Moscow were provided to union leaders free of charge by the Soviet Union.

Most New Zealanders view the SUP as the country's leading communist party, probably because of its higher public profile. The Socialist Unity Party (membership of 100) was organized in 1966, the result of the CPNZ's break with Moscow. It has retained its Soviet ties and is the only communist party in New Zealand recognized by Moscow. In May 1984, the SUP sent a delegation to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Central Committee to study organizational and party activities. The SUP's pro-Moscow line has, in recent years, included endorsement

of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and support for Soviet proposals on disarmament. [67:223]

The Auckland-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has sent a petition to David Lange asking him not to give into overseas pressure on New Zealand's nuclear weapons stance. Spokeswoman Marie Wedgeworth said the petition was hurriedly organized after Mr. Lange was quoted as saying that if the United States' Senate curbed New Zealand trade too severely, the nuclear weapons stance may have to be reviewed. [68:m1]

New Zealand peace activists have warned the Labour Government of "all-out protest" if the government backed down on its ban on nuclear warships. Speaking for the peace movement Aotearoa, Owen Wilkes said that plans to have senior ministers make the final decision on a warship's nuclear capacity suggests the United States can get back into New Zealand ports. Allowing any nuclear-capable ship to visit would be "an unacceptable softening" of the Labour Government's strong anti-nuclear policy, he said. He also warned that a visit "by a nuclear-capable vessel of any nation will be met with concerted and determined opposition . . . this means any vessel possessing missile launchers, aircraft or torpedo tubes equipped for delivering nuclear weapons." "The Government is completely unable to judge whether a nuclear-capable warship is or is not carrying nuclear weapons beneath its decks," he said. He said protestors would come out in force with big demonstrations and a revival of harbor blockades by peace squadron vessels if nuclear-capable warship tried to visit New Zealand. "We have set an example for the

world with our anti-nuclear policy, its a very precious thing and something to be safeguarded at any cost," he said. [69:m2-3]

A December 2, 1985 editorial in the Wellington 'Evening Post' brings up an interesting point regarding the Soviet Union in the peace movement in New Zealand:

> The dilemas for defence which this slow, strange withdrawal from the West has posed, will not trouble the peace movement which as a broad spectrum organisation seems able to maintain a consensus only by limiting any criticism of Soviet action. While it would be paranoid to regard the whole peace movement as supporters of the Soviet Union, the silence which greeted the eight Soviet missile tests in the Pacific area over the past year is deafening.3 This silence poses more questions about the limits of our peace movement's agenda, and should increase the warning signals about the costs and implications of New Zealand cutting adrift from the West. [70:m5]

There is a vague but persistent anti-American strain that pervades three distinct but overlapping lobbies representing the Polynesians, the peace movement and the women's movement. Each of these lobbies has the ear of the government not least because their votes were crucial to the election of the Labour Government in 1984. And if for no other reason than to safeguard themselves from any defections from their ranks, the government was under pressure to deliver some form of "political payment", this being the banning of 'anything nuclear' from New Zealand. This ban satisfied the political requirements of the three groups, even through each has its own internal agenda. [7:8]

The reason why the American Government is the focus of so much attention from peace campaigners in New Zealand is that

---

[3]The Soviet Union carried out test firings of missiles in the Pacific from 22-31 May 1985 inside a zone which had a radius of 110 nm, and had the following co-ordinates at its center: latitude 22 27 N, longitude 174 40 E. [71:961]

the U.S. is perceived as the major bellicose power in the world today. Many New Zealanders have come to regard the U.S. administration as belligerent toward Moscow, arrogant toward allies and unworthy of the role of world leadership. [63:24]

2. Opposition

Although those who oppose the anti-nuclear platform of the Labour Party initially did not react strongly to Labour's policies, they are now mobilizing the overturn the gains the anti-movement has made; conservative principles have been challenged, first by the woman's forums, then by the extent of a social change signalled in some clauses of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill. [65:m3]

In September 1985 Acting Opposition Leader Mr. Jim Bolger said the Government's anti-nuclear, and the resulting conflict with the United States, was proposed to satisfy the electorate at home, particularly left-wing elements, at the expense of New Zealand's international standing. Mr. Bolger stated that, "I am fearful that the Labour Government does not intend to look at New Zealand's wider concerns and only intends to look at the narrower concerns of an electorate back in New Zealand that they want to massage." [72:m2] Furthermore, Mr. Doug Graham, Opposition spokesman on disarmament, (on 19 Sept 85) has pointed out that, "It (the Government's nuclear-free zone policy) will lead to the end of ANZUS, which 70 percent of all New Zealanders want for conventional purpose and it will lead to instability in the Pacific region." Opposition defense spokesman Mr. Doug Kidd has reiterated that the National Party, if returned to power, would

recommit New Zealand to full commitment to the Western alliance and ANZUS, if it could be revived. [73:m5]

3. Professional View

There is another factor in the internal debate in New Zealand that must be discussed, this being the role of professional military men who are directly responsible for the defense of their country.[4] In the internal debate that has arisen since the Labour Party's nuclear-free zone policy has been implemented, the Labour Government appears to be extremely sensitive to any part being played in the debate by defense professionals. Mr. Lange has prohibited the Department of Defence from playing any public part in the discussion of the issue. Additionally, Lange scorned as "geriatric generals" former defense chiefs who, in October 1985, criticized his anti-nuclear policies. The seventeen former defense chiefs attacked the Labour Government's anti-nuclear policies, and said that the ban on U.S. ships could cause "a grave breakdown" in relations with the U.S. Mr. Lange said the group were "geriatric generals" who had "shot themselves in the foot, or the mouth," by speaking out when they had. [75:m1]

It seems to me that the reason that Mr. Lange and his Government is so sensitive to preventing any defense professional

---

[4]New Zealand also: 1) has statutory responsibility for the defense of Cook Island, Niue and Tokalau; 2) has maintained one of its only two infantry battalions in Singapore; and 3) maintains close defense relations with Tonga and Fiji, and has sought to assist all of its smaller neighbors to maintain stability in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. [74:38]

from playing an active part in the anti-nuclear debate, is that defense professionals will point out how important defense ties are with the United States for the conventional defense of New Zealand. Mr. Lange and his Government were well aware of the importance of the alliance linkage before he implemented his Party's anti-nuclear platform.

After the election of the Labour Government in July 1984, Lange, as the incoming Prime Minister, was presented with a brief by the New Zealand Department of Defence that covered the country's entire defense capabilities. Mr. Lange was briefed that the list of military specializations in which N.Z. has no capacity at all is long. It has no air defense for airfields and ground forces, heavy artillery, satellite communications systems, over-the-horizon radar; there is no effective interceptor/fighter capacity in the air, nor surface-to-surface guided missiles for any of the three services; there are no main battle tanks; the Navy lacks submarines, an oil tanker to extend the range of its ships, or vessels able to provide logistic support for operations in the Pacific or Antarctic; and the Air Force has no aerial refuelling capability for its aircraft. Although some of these problems areas were to be addressed by future defense plans, Mr. Lange was told that, "Some of these systems, however, are beyond our resources and unneccessary for New Zealand because in the high-intensity conflict in which they would be required the capability would be supplied by one of our other partners. This assumption makes it possible for New Zealand to assess realistically its equipment requirements against our actual

strategic circumstances and the likely conditions in which our forces might be engaged." [74:38]

New Zealand, the brief further stated, does not have an indigenous defense industry capable of providing modern high technology defense equipment. "New Zealand's armed forces are, therefore, almost totally dependent on overseas suppliers for defense equipment which uses advanced technology."[5] Furthermore, Lange was told that New Zealand's independent defense intelligence collection facilities are limited; that the Directorate of Defense Intelligence was almost totally dependent upon information supplied by the intelligence agencies of allied countries, including Australia and the United States. [74:38-9]

The brief wrapped it all up for Mr. Lange, and his Party with a conclusion that stated:

> The ANZUS connection gives a dimension and depth to mutual defense exchanges between the services of the three nations which goes beyond that provided by other co-operative bilateral or multinational arrangements. It fosters a high degree of understanding and confidence which it would be difficult if not impossible to achieve by other means. This in turn encourages the sense of purpose and commitment of our defense forces. Bilateral defense arrangements with Australia (the ANZAC connection) are sound. But, while Australia attaches so much weight to ANZUS, it is clear that that alliance must be the foundation for the ANZAC link. The trilateral structure of ANZUS by contrast, permits New Zealand's voice, in relation to defense, readily to be identified as a needed, independent and sovereign influence. It overcomes isolation. [74:39]

---

[5]To provide the arrangements for technical exchange, New Zealand has signed a number of agreements. Although not directly connected to ANZUS, the agreements fall within the general umbrella of mutual cooperation and understanding provided by the ANZUS Treaty. The most important scientific agreements and co-operative program to which New Zealand belongs is the Technical Co-operation Program (TTCP) which has a number of sub-groups covering such subjects as undersea warfare, electronic warfare, communications, aeronauticstechnology and materials. [74:39]

4. Legislation Introduced

The anti-nuclear Bill was introduced into Parliament on 10 December 1985 and was referred to a Select Committee which will invite public comment, schedule hearings and examine witnesses. It could be April or May 1986 before the Select Committee reports back to Parliament. [76:1340] Mr. Lange said the legislation could be passed through all its stages before June 1986 under the new parliamentary timetable. [77:m3]

In introducing the New Zealand nuclear-free zone, disarmament and arms control bill, Prime Minister Lange said it gives "the sanction of laws to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from New Zealand, and hence to New Zealand's disengagement from any nuclear strategy for the defence of New Zealand." [78:m3]

B. THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND

The debate between the United States and New Zealand basically boils down to the policy of the United States of "neither confirming nor denying" the existence of nuclear weapons on board its military vessels. The current non-nuclear policy of New Zealand and the proposed nuclear-free zone legislation, directly challenges this American policy. Additionally, the issue of visits by nuclear-powered vessels also causes a strain in the alliance relationship. Finally, the question of just what the objective of the ANZUS allaince is and how that objective is to be achieved, enters into the dispute.

1. New Zealand's Position

Upon coming into office in July 1984, the Labour Government implemented its nuclear-free zone policy, stating that it would not allow either nuclear-powered vessels or nuclear armed vessels into its ports. The United States at first decided not to press the issue too hard and sought to find some compromise in the situation. In pursuit of this end, the United States put off any proposed ship visits until March 1985, when an ANZUS exercise (Sea Eagle) would take place. However, at the beginning of 1985, there was still no compromise solution to the issue at hand and the United States presented its request for the USS Buchanan, a conventionally powered destroyer. This brought the issue to a head.

On January 31, 1985, Mr. Lange said the nuclear capable vessel (the Buchanan) nominated to call at a New Zealand port by the United States could not be confirmed as not carrying nuclear

weapons. Therefore he stated that, "No nuclear capable ship will be allowed into New Zealand unless there is confirmation that it is not nuclear armed . . . . We are not prepared to accept any area of doubt or ambiguity." "Unless we are assured it is not carrying nuclear arms and we have no way of verifying that, then Q.E.D.--no come." [79:m2] And since the Buchanan could not be confirmed as not having nuclear weapons on board, Mr. Lange refused entry to New Zealand ports by the vessels.

The New Zealand Government had planned to use their external intelligence sources to establish whether or not the ships that the United States wanted to send on port calls were nuclear-armed or not. Mr. Lange felt that New Zealand's Defence Department and External Intelligence Bureau were of considerable quality and expertise and that given American resolve not to say whether its warships are nuclear-armed, he was relying on these organizations to provide an assessment of whether or not military vessels can be assured, assessed and confirmed to be not nuclear armed. [80:m-6] However, in the case of the Buchanan (and potential future ones) Mr. Lange was forced to admit in late January 1985 that New Zealand's intelligence agencies had failed to confirm whether the ship was carrying nuclear weapons or not. Only U.S. officials "are the ones who can answer the question of whether the ship had nuclear arms aboard," he said. [81:m-3]

Mr. Lange has however, consistently stated that although having nuclear weapons in New Zealand was not negotiable that ". . . there is a need to respect the United States position that it will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weaponry abroad its vessels--we are not going to confront that." [72:m2]

Furthermore, he has stated that New Zealand's nuclear-free policy not be misunderstood. "This policy is not anti-ANZUS, not anti-American, it is not neutralist, but we are not going to have nuclear weapons in New Zealand," Mr. Lange has stated, adding that ANZUS "can certainly continue" despite the ban. [81:m-3]

In September 1985, in an effort to find a solution to the U.S.-New Zealand inpasse, Deputy Prime Minister Palmer traveled to the United States, with the proposal that New Zealand should make its own assessment as to whether an American warship was carrying nuclear weapons.[1] New Zealand's proposals were said to center on its not ruling out in advance visits by U.S. ships that are "nuclear capable," but only those deemed by Wellington to be carrying nuclear weapons. [82:m2] However, Mr. Palmer found the Washington political climate "very difficult" and returned with the issue still unresolved. Consequently, in late October 1985, Prime Minister Lange urged the United States to overcome its objections to his country's ban on nuclear warships. He said New Zealand's proposal to make its own assessment as to whether or not an American vessel was nuclear armed would allow American warships to visit New Zealand without the United States disclosing whether they carried nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this arrangement would not compromise his country's anti-nuclear stance. He said Japan and Scandinavian countries allowed

---

[1]This self assessment was centered around New Zealand defense and intelligence officials making an assessment of any navy ship seeking to visit to decide if it was nuclear-armed. If the finding was that the ship could be carrying nuclear weapons, it would be banned. [83:m5]

American warships into their ports despite their opposition to nuclear weapons and suggested that New Zealand could also compromise with the United States on the matter. [84:M1-2] Furthermore, Lange stated that the U.S. would be allowed to study the full draft of New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation as part of the government's attempt to heal the rift over the ANZUS row. Lange believed because the United States wanted to study the legislation, the door was still open to a solution and that his government should continue to try to heal the rift with the U.S. with constructive diplomacy. [85:m1-2]

The New Zealand Government hoped that the United States would look carefully at the bill. Mr. Lange stated that, "I want to stress that there have been considerable efforts made to produce legislation which does not breach the neither confirm nor deny policy. Our concern is not to legislate against port visits. They are welcome to come here...that welcome is not tendered however to nuclear weaponry or propulsion." [86:m1]

Under the legislation introduced to Parliment on December 10, 1985, the New Zealand Prime Minister would have the power to allow entry of a vessel when he was satisfied it was not carrying nuclear weapons without first being obliged to receive a report from the chief of staff of the New Zealand Defence Forces, as the orginal draft of the legislation proposed. [87:m1]

In the view of New Zealand, the ANZUS row between New Zealand and the United States over nuclear warship visits is not about whether Pacific security should be maintained but how it should be maintained, Mr. Lange has stated. The dispute over nuclear warship visits is essentially about the operational

character of ANZUS. "That alliance (ANZUS) is not the same as NATO. It has no standing forces, no plans, no HQ or command structure. "New Zealand has always seen ANZUS as a non-nuclear alliance. We neither ask nor expect to be defended by nuclear weapons. We have, since its inception, made our contribution to ANZUS in conventional ways," Mr. Lange said. The nuclear element is eliminated from any future calculations about the defence of New Zealand." [88:m4] The need to eliminate the nuclear element is vital, because in the words of Mr. Palmer, "We want a nuclear-free South Pacific and a nuclear-free New Zealand and we are going to have it." [87:m1]

The Labour Government feels that there is simply no need for nuclear weapons to be brought into New Zealand, because the strategic environment does not call for nuclear weaponry and that New Zealand does not form part of a nuclear strategy. [61:1011] Labour holds to the view that ANZUS is as much the reflection and assertion of common interests as the framework of a formal military alliance. ANZUS is not the southern hemisphere replica of NATO. The contrast is absolute between Europe, a landmass divided ideologically and physically into antagonistic blocs, and the South Pacific, and that the two treaties reflect these strategic circumstances: in terms of both their core provisions and the form of defense cooperation evolved, they differ fundamentally. [61:1013]

Regarding American and New Zealand interest in Pacific security, Mr. Lange has stated that "I have consistently argued that in itself is common grounds enough for an agreement." "Whatever became of the military cooperation between the two

countries, all democracies had a continuing interest in the stability of the South Pacific "which must in the end assert itself," he said. [89:m4]

2. United States' Position On Labour's Policy

After deferring any ship visits for six months, in order to address our differences, the U.S., in January 1985, nominated the U.S.S. Buchanan, a conventionally powered destroyer, as a ship to visit New Zealand as part of a joint ANZUS exercise. The New Zealand Government refused the visit, based on its insistence on a virtually explicit guarantee by the U.S. Government that the ship was not nuclear armed. [10:2] After the refusal of the visit, the United States moved to curtail defense ties between the United States and New Zealand based on the belief that one party to an alliance cannot insist on narrowing the scope of the alliance unilaterally in one respect while retaining it as a broad arrangement in other respects without some consequences. [63:23]

The basic United States Government position is that the New Zealand ban on port access to potentially nuclear armed or nuclear powered vessels goes to the core of the mutual responsibilities of allies.[2] America's ability to exercise with New Zealand forces under ANZUS depends in large part on port

---

[2]A Memorandum of Understanding on Logistic Support was signed by New Zealand and the U.S. in May 1982. In the Memorandum, the U.S. undertook to ensure uninterrupted supply of a range of American weapons systems and other logistic support to New Zealand. In return, New Zealand agreed to provide such assistance as the refit and maintenance of U.S. ships, aircraft and equipment in New Zealand. [63:19]

access. Opportunities for repair, refueling, and replenishment of supplies, as well as for rest and shore leave, are critical factors on long voyages. In a crisis situation, the U.S. may be unable to fulfill ANZUS treaty obligations without unlimited port access. [15:2] Furthermore, the United States points out that it has only one navy-not one conventionally capable navy and one nuclear-capable navy; not one navy to accommodate one country's policy and another navy for the rest of the world.[3] The United States points out that in the words of the 1984 ANZUS Council communique, "Access by allied aircraft and ships to the airfields and ports of the ANZUS members was reaffirmed as essential to the continuing effectiveness of the alliance." [10:2]

Paul D.Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, underlined U.S. interests concerning this issue when he stated that:

> The United States attaches critical importance to the opportunity to use Australian and New Zealand ports that provide ready access to the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. We view Australia's and New Zealand's willingness to allow us use of their ports as part of their contribution to ANZUS. We also value efforts to assure standardization or interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, share intelligence, exchange personnel, and consult on problems. The maintenance of U.S. presence in the region, and the demonstration of our ability to operate effectively with our treaty partners, are tangible physical evidence of our treaty commitments. All of the ANZUS nations share in this effort and all benefit from it. [13:5]

---

[3]Admiral Robert Lang, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, said at a press conference in Wellington on April 27, 1983 that nuclear powered warships were particularly well suited to Pacific vastness; banning their visits would be a blow to the ANZUS alliance. [63:22]

The other main U.S. counter-point to the New Zealand position that the ANZUS alliance is not part of an overall world-wide deterrence, is that the role of New Zealand and Australia in the South Pacific does indeed fit into the world-wide deterrence of the Western democracies. As Secretary of State George Schultz has pointed out:

> Deterring aggression is never an easy task. But for democracies, there is a special difficulty. A democracy at peace would much rather focus on the more immediate and tangible social benefits to its people than on the potential danger that exists beyond the horizon. Indeed, we sometimes take for granted that security itself is a vital part of our public welfare.
>
> When even one partner shirks its responsibilities, the health and unity of the entire alliance are placed in jeopardy. All the allies face the same kind of domestic problems; all would prefer to use their resources in other ways that offer more immediate and tangible benefits to their peoples; and all would rather avoid the political complications that may be brought on by fulfilling alliance commitments. If one partner is unwilling to make these sacrifices, others will wonder why they should carry their share of the burden. The result may be the gradual erosion of the popular commitment to the common cause.

And furthermore:

> The goal of our alliances 35 years ago was to deter aggression against the alliance partners and preserve the peace, particularly against treats from the Soviet Union and its proxies. The purpose of our alliances, therefore, remains the same today: to deter aggression, and to preserve peace by making it clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that allied nations will resist, repel, and punish the aggressor.
>
> And something else that was true 35 years ago is also true today: it is not enough for allies to agree that when war starts they will come to each other's aid. Words and agreements alone will not deter war. Allies must work together to ensure that we have the capability to fight and win a war, and that our adversaries know it. That is real deterrent.[90:2]

The United States also feels that Prime Minister Lange's contention that the ANZUS alliance is not a nuclear one and that there is simply no need for nuclear weapons to be brought into New Zealand because the strategic environment does not call for

nuclear weaponry and that New Zealand does not form part of a nuclear strategy, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the Western system of deterrence. [61:1011] The United States pointed this out when Secretary Schultz stated that:

> The first and most basic responsibility is that each of us has a share in maintaining the overall deterrent strength of the alliance. For the United States, that means restoring our own strength, in both conventional and nuclear arms. Our allies, of course, have an equally grave responsibility to help maintain the deterrent strength of the alliance. They must make the necessary effort to ensure their own security-and particularly in the area of conventional defense. Joint military exercises and intelligence cooperation are also essential. They need not possess their own nuclear deterrent; but if they undermine ours as New Zealand has, they weaken their own national security. Commitments cannot be met selectively by one nation without eroding the security of all and undermining popular support for the alliance . . . . The arguments for isolationism or unilateralism should have been dashed long, long ago. The global equilibrium would be that much more precarious. Nor is it a serious option for our allies: the aggression we see in many parts of the world has shown that there is no defense in isolation. For any of us, to retreat from this collective security system-in a world of new dangers-would be foolish." [90:2-4]

There is an additional U.S. concern on this idea that New Zealand sees no place in its defense for nuclear weapons or nuclear powered ships, or anything nuclear. The ANZUS treaty provides for the treaty partners to consult together if there is an armed attack on the territory or "armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific" (Article V). It is possible then to suggest that U.S. nuclear vessels and aircraft come under the protective umbrella of ANZUS. If a category of craft not specifically listed in ANZUS can be excluded by an unilateral New Zealand interpretation, then of course all categories could be taken off the list one by one. [63:19] Furthermore, if a U.S. vessel came under attack in the South Pacific, would New Zealand first check to see what its 'nuclear status' was before coming to

the aid of the ship. Additionally, would a New Zealand vessel in distress refuse help from a nuclear U.S. vessel?

Prime Minister Lange is always quick to point out that New Zealand's decision to implement a nuclear-free zone was arrived at through a democratic process and that the United States should respect this process and not punish New Zealand for making a democratic decision. However, the Prime Minister seems to lose sight that the United States is also a democratic nation and also has its own interests, as Secretary Wolfowitz has pointed out:

> We recognize that New Zealand's decision has been a product of the democratic process. New Zealand is under no compulsion to cooperate with us militarily if it feels that this does not serve its interest. But the United States is also a democratic nation with broad responsibilities. We must husband our defense resources for use in areas where our help is wanted and appreciated. Our people would tolerate nothing less. [10:3]

The United States has also pointed out that it feels that New Zealand is off base concerning the nuclear arms race and disarmament. Mr. Lange has pointed out the New Zealanders have felt an increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress in bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal and in recent years almost nonexistent. [61:1010] The United States response to New Zealand's concern and subsequent action is that instead of helping the arms control and disarmament effort, that New Zealand's nuclear-free zone policy and proposed law instead works against the process. The United States has pointed out that a principal Soviet aim throughout the postwar period has been to divide the alliance. Instead of pursuing arms negotiations seriously in the quest for an equal and stable strategic balance, the Soviets have often tried to develop and

exploit differences among the allies, leaving us to negotiate among ourselves while they sit back and wait for unilateral concessions that they need not reciprocate. [90:3]

The response of the Reagan Administration to the actions of New Zealand, has also been strongly backed by members of Congress, who are on both sides of the aisle. Mr. Solarz (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the Asia Pacific subcommitte of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, is a frequent critic of the New Zealand stand against entry of ships carrying nuclear weapons, and has said he is prepared to lead a delegation of U.S. legislators to try to have the matter resolved. And that if there was no resolution, that he would move in the Congress to have the ANZUS alliance terminated. [91:m3]

The bipartisan support for the United States position extends beyond Congress. In September 1985, the New Zealand Opposition Leader Mr. McLay visited the United States and discussed the current row between the his country and the U.S. He said that during his visit he had met a group of people "who would be best described as the Democratic Party foreign policy establishment. They made it very clear to me that even though many of them were sympathic to what the Labour Party is trying to achieve, that even a Democratic president would have treated us in the same way on this issue as a Republican administration." [92:m4-5]

Concerning the American public at large Sir Wallace Rowling, New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States, best described American public opinion when he stated that, "At the other end of the situation, public feeling is not relevant. In

fact, it is totally irrelevant. From the discussions . . . I don't know of any attempt anywhere in the U.S. to assess public opinion . . . if there is such a thing as public opinion, on the ANZUS question." [93:m4]

An additional aspect of the U.S.-N.Z. dispute has been risen by Opposition Leader McLay. During his visit to the United States in September 1985, Mr. McLay met with Secretary of Defense Weinberger.[4] Upon his return to N.Z., Mr. McLay said that the one message that had got through to him in his discussions with Mr. Weinberger and other Administration officials was that New Zealand's best support in Washington had come from the Pentagon and the State Department. "Every time someone has wanted to put a countervailing duty on New Zealand products, or everytime a congressman has wanted to pass a law that might restrict New Zealand access to the American markets it's been the State Department and the Pentagon that have gone to those people and said 'don't do things that damage New Zealand's interests.'[5]

---

[4]In October 1985, Deputy PM Palmer deplored attempts by senior Reagan administration officials to directly influence New Zealand public opinion on the nuclear warship port access row. Mr. Weinberger, during a special seven-nation satellite link which included New Zealand, said in an interview the U.S. would have to consider alternative security arrangements for the South Pacific if New Zealand passed laws banning nuclear weapons. He appealed to New Zealand to rethink its nuclear warship ban. Mr. Palmer said that New Zealanders were being told the whole issue would reach breaking point "unless the government buckles to the American view on this matter." "That we will not do," he said. He said that New Zealand also would not leave ANZUS and that it was the United States that had declared the treaty inoperative "on a unilateral basis." [94:m1]

[5]The New Zealand farming community has been troubled for some time that the American Administration's refusal to grant high

Mr. McLay said the administration had been saying it did not want trade sanctions, and he accepted that. "But they don't control trade. The Congress does and it's there a protectionist law could be passed. What we in New Zealand may not fully appreciate at our distance is the very strong protectionist sentiment that is developing in the United States Congress. "Now at that stage, New Zealand, as an agricultural exporting nation has a lot to worry about. Indeed, I was given that message very bluntly even by very friendly congressmen." Furthermore, Mr. McLay stated that, "As one person put it to me this morning . . . 'I'm not spending any of my time in Congress now arguing New Zealand's case.' That's simply because they can't say that New Zealand is a safe, sane, solid ally of the United States," said Mr. McLay. "With the best will in the world, that argument isn't available," he said. "And that, in the longterm, can be very damaging to our interests." [92:m5]

The response of the United States to the introduction of the legislation in New Zealand, even with the modification to the legislation whereby the Prime Minister will not be advised from intelligence and defense officials on whether a ship is nuclear-armed or not, was a flat refusal to look at the new changes. Additionally, Mr. James Lilley, a senior State Department offical, said that the United States saw no value in receiving an envoy from New Zealand with the draft legislation. [89:m3] It

---

level access to the New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Wallace Rowling, is a signal that their economic problems are of little interest in a capital where once they were a matter of sympathetic concern. [65:3m]

was (and is) the position of the United States that the basic intent of the proposed legislation still violates the "neither confirm nor deny" policy of the United States.

As the Labour Party moved to introduce the nuclear-free zone legislation, the feeling in the State Department was that turning the port-access issue into law would be a step backward and away from the U.S. goal of restoring normal port access. The other side of the United States "messages" was a blunt reiteration that, if New Zealand put its nuclear-free legislation into law--and that effectively blocked port access--then the U.S. would have to "review its obligations under the ANZUS alliance." [91:m2] The American position is that a process which called upon New Zealand authorities to make their own assessments as to whether U.S. ships are carrying nuclear weapons is not acceptable. In the American view, it compromises the purpose of their 'neither confirm nor deny' policy. [95:m3] Furthermore, Secretary Schultz has stated that if the New Zealand Government proceeded with statutory changes which would affect its ability to participate in ANZUS, the treaty would have to be reexamined by the United States. [96:165]

C. AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON THE ISSUE

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) entered the polls in March 1983 with a platform that included foreign policy provisions prompted by its left wing that seemed bound to prove embarrassing if the Party came into office. The platform (chap. II.B7) declared that Labor in office would:

> Pursue an independent foreign policy and develop reliable lines of communication with all great powers, thereby enabling Australia to achieve a closer association with the non-aligned movement and to engage in effective collective action for the establishment of regional zones of peace and neutrality, notably in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. [4:1]

One of the first actions that the Australian Labour Party undertook when it assumed control of the government in 1983, in seeking to pursue this platform, was to initiate a review of the contemporary relevance to Australia of the ANZUS treaty. And as Mr. Kim Beazley, the Australian Minister for Defence has stated:

> That review highlighted the fact that the treaty relationship had facilitated for Australia the development of a framework for valuable--and in some ways irreplaceable--cooperation on defence matters, with benefits much wider than the scope of the provisions of the treaty. I refer to such matters as regular consultations on strategic matters; favoured customer standing in equipment purchasing; supply/support arrangements; exchanges on military doctrine, operational techniques, intelligence and defence science; and co-operation through the Joint Defence Facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar. Indeed, the breadth and depth of the cooperation on what one might term a daily basis has become in many ways the central feature of a relationship that was initially perceived largely in terms of guarantees of assistance presented in the treaty.
>
> As a result of this co-operation the Australian government has secured an input into U.S. strategic policy. This and the character of aspects of joint co-operation dovetail with a strong sense of responsibility in the government on the need to pursue vigorously the policies on arms control. This allows Australia to address potential if distant threats to the security of its people which are beyond the capacity of any individual government to deal with.

> For most of its history, Australia's principal security concern has been that world forces could turn against our natural allies, and so make Australia's position unacceptably insecure, especially because of the large land mass that would need to be defended by a population so small in numbers. [5:12-13]

The ALP left wing's hankering after a more non-aligned, more independent, foreign policy ran up against the findings of the ANZUS review, and the uncomfortable fact that the great majority of Australians have no desire to be non-aligned, feel far more comfortable with the American alliance than they would without it, and have shown no desire to spend more on defense than they can possibly avoid. [4:5]

Given this background, from the beginning of the U.S.-New Zealand dispute, Australia has distanced itself from New Zealand's ANZUS stand. Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Foreign Minister Bill Hayden have constantly reiterated Australia's sideline position in the ANZUS row, declined to condemn the refusal by the United States to accept a personal New Zealand briefing on its anti-nuclear legislation, and insisted that Australia's relations with the U.S. remain unchanged. The Australian Government has consistently stated that it regards granting a reasonable level of port access as a responsibility inherent in the status of an ally.[1] And furthermore, that

---

[1]Yet in the past incidents have occurred that have pointed out that the issue has not been entirely worked out within the Australian government and Australian society. In December 1983, under Labor, the British carrier HMS Invincible-which would have been sold to the Australian navy but for the Falklands war-was refused access to Sydney's drydock facilities because the British declined to reveal whether it carried nuclear weapons. Another curious incident in January 1984 demonstrated even more the ambiguities in Labor's position. The British aircraft carrier

Australia understands the reasons for the neither confirm nor deny policy regarding carriage of nuclear weapons aboard warships and accepted that policy. [16:2]

Even though Australia has tried to maintain a sideline position in the U.S.-N.Z. dispute, in January 1985, just prior to the New Zealand decision not to permit the U.S.S. Buchanan to make a port call after the 'Sea Eagle' exercise, Prime Minister Hawke sent a strongly worded letter to New Zealand Prime Minister Lange concerning Lange's government ban on nuclear-powered or possibly nuclear-armed ships. In the letter Mr. Hawke firmly backed the U.S. position on the issue. Mr. Hawke pointed out that Australia could not accept as a permanent arrangement that the alliance ANZUS had a different meaning and entailed different obligations for different members. The prime minister also said he told Mr. Lange that the Australian Government would "continue to make clear that, whatever New Zealand's position or policies might be, Australia . . . had its own well known and clearly expressed position on visits by U.S. warships and the importance of maintaining the 'neither confirm nor deny' principle." Mr. Hawke said Australia would avoid any public statements which would cast doubt on whether the U.S. was applying its policy of

---

Invincible came to Sydney on a goodwill visit and asked for dry dock facilities to carry out repairs. (Former) Minister for Defense Scholes refused to allow the ship in, on the grounds that the ship's captain would not declare whether or not the vessel was carrying nuclear weapons. Scholes saw a distinction between berthing at a wharf, thus staying in the water, and entering a dry dock which is "Australian territory" or "soil" on which, under the Australian Labor Party's party platform, nuclear weapons cannot be "stored". [4:10]

neither confirming or denying that warships were carrying nuclear weapons and said that it was important that New Zealand, as an alliance partner, should do the same. [97:m1]

Even Foreign Minister Bill Hayden,[2] who has been the sometimes querulous, "chip-on-the-shoulder," suspicious ally, over-affected perhaps by U.S. paternalism, resentful of its dominance in the alliance and its hardnosed attitude in all negotiations [4:5], when asked whether, given the nature of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand, that there was room for the Australian Government to change its policy to a harder anti-nuclear stance, replied that:

> We have already declared quite categorically our belief that we should provide port facilities for American nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable vessels, for that was a proposition challenged at the last federal conference of the (Australian Labor) Party. The challenge was beaten off quite comfortably . . . . Overwhelmingly the party supports the government's view. Overwhelmingly the community supports the government's view; and that is, the Australian Government provides port facilities for American vessels in transit--nuclear-powered, nuclear capable. [98:m-4]

Even though the leader of the opposition, John Howard and his "shadow" foreign minister, Michael MacKellar, have attempted to find some fault with the Government's response to the nuclear

---

[2]What concerns many people about Hayden is whether his periodic deference to the left, the occasional bone thrown to it or cause pursued on its behalf, derives from his determination to keep them around in the party jungle, or whether he is privately dedicated to their general position and resiles from it only as a temporary concession or discretion to enable him to fight another day for more radical causes. On substantive issues of foreign policy, he has found the party platform dangerously impractical, and despite concern with the causes of the left he has come to join his leader (Hawke) in promoting the essential policies of their Liberal predecessors. [4:4]

issue overall they have been hard put to find points of substance to criticize.[3] It is now clear that an alliance with the United States has a broad base of support in all the Australian political parties and that close ties will continue no matter which group forms the government in either Canberra or Washington. [2:350] Furthermore, the important thing to keep in mind with the current dialouge between Australia and New Zealand on the nuclear issue, is that the Labour (Labor) Parties are in power in both nations, and that the Australian Labor Party is telling its New Zealand counterpart that it is going to far on the issue and endangering the alliance relationship. One would have expected this from a Liberal-Country Party Government. But it is even more stunning that it is an Australian Labor Government that is siding with the United States on the dispute.

Australia shares New Zealand's concern about the arms race; moreover, if anything the Australian Labor Government has proved itself to be (especially via Foreign Minister Bill Hayden) the more active one in seeking a negotiated end to the arms race,

---

[3]For example on August 10, 1985, speaking at the opening of the New South Wales Liberal Party convention in Sydney, Mr. Peacock said the nuclear-free treaty has thrown more obstacles in the path of American attempts to maintain its strategic presence in the region. Earlier, the opposition spokesman on defense, Mr. Sinclair, said the nuclear-free treaty would put further stress on Australia's relations with the United States. Mr. Sinclair also claimed that the treaty would play straight into the hands of the Soviet Union. [68:m1] Additionally, in overall foreign policy matters, and in some specific instances Hawke is, if anything, to the right of Fraser. Above all it is a remainder that whatever their domestic policies-and even here Hawke has, for the most part, merely made Fraser's policies more palatable by appealing successfully to the notion of consensus--Australians are conservatives in looking at the outside world. [4:15]

such as an upgrading of personnel working on this subject. However, the Australia Government realizes that if it seeks to go too far too fast on disarmament it will find itself clashing with its main ally, the United States. [99:200] The Australian position is that:

> The Australian government rejects the attractive but unrealistic idea that unilateral disarmament by Western countries would somehow ensure our security. The objective of all concerned governments must be to promote multilateral arms control and disarmament proposals that are balanced, equitable, and able to be verified. [5:11]

The Australian government is as concerned as the New Zealand government over the threat of nuclear war. The Australian government has elevated arms control and disarmament issues to the first order of priority and has worked energetically and openly through international forums on a broad range of initiatives. In 1983 and 1984 Australia, with New Zealand, jointly and successfully sponsored resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly calling for a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty to end all nuclear testing in all environments." [5:11] Furthermore, it was Australia that originally put forward the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Yet, in the Australia view, the content of the proposed nuclear-free zone legislation in New Zealand goes well beyond that of the South Pacific Forum's nuclear-free zone treaty, and reinforces the difference in stands between the Lange and Hawke governments over nuclear ship visits and whether the ANZUS allaince with the United States means such visits must be allowed without question. [83:m5] Furthermore, the Australian position, in agreement with that of the United States, is that nuclear ships are now much more important in the

total fleet structure of the U.S. Navy than used to be the case. Denying entry to nuclear ships is therefore tantamount to dismantling ANZUS. [63:26]

Even though the United States has suspended military cooperation with New Zealand, Australia is still actively seeking to ensure that the important aspects of her cooperation with both the United states and New Zealand continue on a bilateral basis." [5:14] A Joint Communique by New Zealand Minister of Defence F.D. O'Flynn and the Australian Minister for Defence K.C. Beazley on April 3,1985, reaffirmed the relevance and importance of the ANZUS Treaty and that both governments remained firmly committed members of the Western alliance. It also stated that both governments would also together continue to pursue the objective of a nuclear-free zone in the Southwest Pacific. [16:1]

Yet there is trouble on the horizon for the defense ties between Australia and New Zealand. For example, in February 1985, Prime Minister Hawke notified New Zealand that Australia would not pass to New Zealand intelligence material originating in the United States. [100:11] This action definitely deprives New Zealand of valuable information. Furthermore, according to a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Closer Defence Logistics Cooperation entered into by both countries in 1983, both Australia and New Zealand agreed to undertake cooperative arrangements for logistic support and defence production and supply. [5:16-7] Yet, if the defense ties between the U.S. and New Zealand are cut off permanently and New Zealand turns to other suppliers for defense supplies and systems, while Australia

retains close ties to the United States, the ability of New Zealand and Australia to coordinate logistic support and defense production and supply would be placed in serious difficulty. This is an issue that both nations will have to face in the future, if the U.S.-N.Z. split becomes final.

D. SUMMARY

Instead of trying to summarize New Zealand's position on its anti-nuclear stance, I believe the following comments by Derek Davies, a reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review, who conducted an interview with Prime Minister Lange in March 1985, best sums up the situation:

> Several people have asked me how I squared New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange's passionate defence of his country's non-nuclear stance plus his known sincerity (he is a Methodist lay preacher) with my impression . . . that his heart really wasn't in it-that, like a lawyer, he was arguing a case he did not entirely believe in because he needed the support of the unions and his party's leftwing for his economic policies. The answer is I can't--not if it means accusing him of conscious hypocrisy. On the other hand, he is too intelligent not to see the contradictions inherent in his pro-ANZUS, anti-nuclear stance.
>
> As I reported after my interview with his, he and his government's policies are full of ironic contradictions. It may be that he calculated that the chance of getting his economic policies through was worth a tiff with the US, and has been taken aback by the strength of Washington's reaction. He may also have been taken aback by reservations expressed by leaders of the Island states of the Pacific. Already worried by the unrest in New Caledonia, Pacific Island leaders such as the King of Tonga, Ratu Mara of Fiji, Tofilau Eti of Western Samoa and Tom Davis of the Cook Islands, have expressed concern over Wellington's ANZUS policy-a point being bashed home by the leader of the opposition Jim McLay. [101:49]

Additionally, the following editorial form a New Zealand paper spells out Mr. Lange's domestic concerns:

> What has happened to ANZUS was predictable from the start and now the Government has the responsibility to tell the nation what happens next. Only the historians will be able to decide

if the voters knowningly gave their assent to the break-up of ANZUS last year when they voted in large numbers for the present Government. Certainly the port visit policy was in Labour's manifesto and Sir Robert Muldoon warned what would happen if the policy was put into effect. American officials have told Mr. Palmer that they will review their security commitment to New Zealand if the proposed anti-nuclear legislation becomes law. Additionally, they told Mr. Palmer that they would not replay the situation in January 1985 when the USS Buchanan was not permitted to visit our ports. On that occassion the Americans came very close to allowing one ally a different set of rules than they have allowed others. Pressure on the Government from those who want no part of the American alliance forced the last-minute cancellation of the visit. Since then sections of the Labour Party have called at their conference for an end to ANZUS and a policy of neutrality between the West and the Soviet Union.

Intense anti-nuclear feelings and burgeoning nationalism have coalesced around a desire to be a nuclear-free country. It is an attractive prospect but the electorate does not seem to have thought through the consequences of a gesture the rest of the West simply see as a small country opting out of a shared burden while wanting to retain the benefits of a joint alliance. Had these arguments been fought through in the past election campaign and membership of ANZUS unequivocally rejected at the polls then a neutral role would have had democratic endorsement. But the argument was a muffled one. Labour had assured the nervous that ANZUS would remain in place and the electorate had got tired of nine years of National Administration. [102:m4]

Mr. Lange has painted himself into a corner. He has found no support from Australia in pushing New Zealand's non-nuclear position, as a matter of fact he has been repeatedly told that he is backing the wrong horse. His attempts to change the proposed non-nuclear legislation so as to leave an opening for the entry of American ships and his contention that it does not conflict with the United States' policy of 'neither confirming nor denying', has run into continued stiff opposition from the United States, as it should. Clause 9: Subclause 2 of the legislation presented to the New Zealand Parliament on December 10, 1985 still states that:

> The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.

This provision still directly calls into question the neither 'confirm nor deny' policy of the United States. Even if Mr. Lange, or any future Prime Minister, were to simply assume that every ship that the United States asks for port visits for was not armed with nuclear weapons in order to avoid a dispute with the United States, the legislation, by its wording, is stating that the ship in question does not have nuclear weapons. This is not satisfactory to the United States.

Even if the United States was willing to live with this proposed situation, American nuclear propelled warships would still be prohibited from entry into the internal water of New Zealand. (see Appendix A, clause 11). This prohibition by itself renders a functional alliance relationship unworkable.

Opposition from within the Labour Party and also the various domestic anti-nuclear groups, will not allow Mr. Lange to back off too far from his current stance. If he tries to remove the parts of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone that the United States says will result in the termination of the ANZUS relationship, the leftwing of the Labour Party will withdraw its support from the Government, most likely resulting in a vote of no-confidence.

To forestall this situation, Mr. Lange seems to be stalling for time. In October 1985 the government set up a committee to study New Zealand's defense needs. The three-member committee would hear submissions from the public to discover "what ordinary New Zealanders feel about defense." Mr. Lange stated that, "What

I want to know is how people in bars, in supermarkets, in church halls and in plunket (childcare) groups perceive our defence interests." [75:m1] The results of the committee are due sometime in the spring of 1986, around the same time that the committee that is studying the nuclear-free legisaltion is to report its findings.

And what are the likely findings of these committees? An editorial in the Wellington newpaper 'THE EVENING POST' in September 1985, I believe points out what the results maybe:

> National Research Bureau polls shows that 71 percent of the electorate wants New Zealand to remain in ANZUS. THE NRB respondents decided by a majority of two to one that they supported the visits of nuclear-powered warships; however, by the same majority they continue to oppose nuclear-armed ships visiting our ports. Yet some of the 50 percent that do not want nuclear arms in New Zealand also must be a part of the 71 percent of the voters who want to remain in ANZUS.
>
> The obvious question to ask is how many people will take the risk of occasionally hosting nuclear arms in our waters if the alternative is a withdrawal from or an end to ANZUS? [65:m3]

If Mr. Lange can show his Party that the majority of New Zealanders want to remain in ANZUS, and are willing to accept occasionally possibly nuclear-armed or nuclear powered vessels, he maybe able to stand off the extreme leftwing of his Party and remain in power. On the other hand, he may just be attempting to show that there truly is broad public support for his Party's position, in order to push the nuclear-free zone legislation through and withstand the opposition pressure when the United States moves to terminate its ANZUS ties to New Zealand.

New Zealand's current action, and its possible future moves, represents a serious step away from its commitment to broader Western security interests. ANZUS is an important part of the

post-World War II alliance system which has helped to keep the peace and underwrite regional stability. A political signal that democratic Western societies were disengaging from mutual support, no matter how tentative, would, in the view of the United States, encourage our adversaries-reconfirming their sense that opportunities for inducing isolationist tendencies in the West were still available. [103:3-4]

Even if the United States takes the necessary steps to minimize the effects of New Zealand's actions, there will still be some repercussions. As a symbolic gesture, declaring New Zealand permanently nuclear-free would have considerable political significance. The political fallout would certainly be felt in Australia, where the government would come under increased pressure from its leftwing to emulate Australia's smaller neighbor. Additionally, peace movements would also be heartened and strengthened in other Western countries, including the U.S. [63:26] Finally, the Soviet Union would have a propaganda field day, no matter how many times Mr. Lange expressed his anger at "Soviet impertience" to the Soviet ambassador.

The United States must start now to establish more direct permanent ties and presence with the Island states, because if the New Zealand NFZ legislation is passed, the United States must be in a position to deal directly with the Island states in the region and not hope to use New Zealand as a channel for U.S. interests. Permanent termination of defense ties with New Zealand will result in a severe disruption of normal relations between the United States and the Labour Government. Emotions

are likely to run high, and the United States cannot expect the Labour Government to act in good faith when presenting the position of the United States on various issues to the other states in the region.

VI. SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

During the early 1970s, the Labour Government in New Zealand, using regional concern over nuclear testing in the region, sought to implement its Party's commitment to establish a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the Southwest Pacific. However, when the Labour Government went out of office in 1975, the proposal went into cold storage.

One of the platforms of the Australian Labor Party, when it came into office in 1983, was a commitment to a wide range of arms control objectives. Among these, but with no particular emphasis, was a pledge to promote 'zones of peace and nuclear free zones in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.' Building on the opposition of the Island states to French nuclear testing, Australia revived the lapsed New Zealand nuclear-free proposal at the 1983 meeting of the South Pacific Forum. [14:81]

Australian advocacy for a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) finally bore fruit with the decision by the South Pacific Forum states on August 6, 1985 to adopt a treaty that would make the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, along with Latin America and Antarctica.[1] Indonesia Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said the forming of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone "is a

---

[1]The Antarctic Treaty outlaws nuclear weapons from the southern continent by declaring it a zone of peace. The Treaty of Tlateloco of 1967 prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin American, although the nuclear power states do not recognize any prohibition on transit of weapons through the region.

manifestation of the long-standing strong feeling of the countries in the Pacific dating back to the first nuclear test explosions in the 1940." More recent concerns, he said, had been French tests and the dumping of nuclear wastes. [104:n1] Indeed, one of the targets, besides France of the treaty's provisions is Japan. By establishing a NFZ in the Southwest Pacific, it is hoped that any opportunity for Japan to dump radio-active material in the area will pre-empted.

Besides the Treaty, there are three protocols. The first invites France, the United States and the United Kingdom (members of the SPC) to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their Southwest Pacific territories. The other two protocols respectively invite the five nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty and not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone. [26:2]

Prime Minister Lange told Parliament in a ministerial statement, in September 1985, that the decision to adopt the treaty was "an important event in the history of co-operation among the countries of the South Pacific . . . an important event in the history of co-operation among the countries of the South Pacific." "It is an act to strengthen regional security and to underline our mutual determination that nuclear weapons will not be possessed by any of us or stationed on our territories. The treaty will also provide a new means for providing pressure on France to halt its testing programs at Mururoa." [82:m2]

Building on this theme of stopping French testing, Australian Defense Minister Beasley has pointed out that the treaty was aimed mainly at trying to stop France from continuing

nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia. Mr. Beasley stated that, "We don't see American security interests as being placed in jeopardy by the treaty." He pointed out that the treaty did not prohibit the passage of vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons through the area or prevent ships from docking at ports of nations that allow their presence. [105:36]

The cautious attitude of Australia and the majority of the South Pacific Forum states reflects a dual concern with French nuclear testing on the one hand and with U.S. security links on the other; however, from the perspective of the United States, it doesn't matter if the NFZ treaty is suppose to be directed at France, if it in effect hinders American operations in the Southwest Pacific. The U.S. concern is partly based on the belief that the NFZ will curtail the freedom of movement of its military ships and aircraft in the Southwest Pacific, especially if the majority of the states which have signed the treaty try to tighten restrictions as New Zealand and Vanuatu have.

As the current NFZ stands, it does not preclude countries entering into treaties with others that are nuclear capable, and it does not prevent nuclear-powered ships from coming through the South Pacific. Therefore, the treaty does not really reduce the number of nuclear weapons that traverse the region. [82:m3] However, if in the future a stronger version of a NFZ is passed, such as the version of the treaty that Vanuatu and New Zealand tried to get the SPF to pass initially, this would place strong restrictions on 'anything nuclear' in the region.

Another American concern is that since the U.S. is the only nuclear weapons state which currently deploys in the Southwest

Pacific, the NFZ will in effect unilaterally restrict its movements while not imposing similar constraints on its strategic adversary--the Soviet Union. Since the U.S. maintains strategic installations and other security links with its ANZUS allies, it stands to be more disadvantaged by a nuclear-free zone than its strategic adversary. [14:80]

While not opposed to NFZs in principle, the U.S. feels it should only support those that were regionally comprehensive, do not distrub 'necessary security arrangements', and are capable of adequate verification. [14:81] Although the current SPNFZ is a regionally comprehensive one and currently does not distrub American security arrangements in the region, it is certainly not capable of adequate verification. And even if the United States were to sign the Treaty, it would still need to state that it would only comply with certain provisions of the Treaty, since the United States cannot renounce its right to have nuclear weapons.

Additionally, it should be remembered that the primary reason for the Treaty is to force the end to French nuclear testing in the region. Even if the United States signs the Treaty as a gesture of good faith, it means nothing if the French continue to test. Another consideration is that the Labour Government in New Zealand, the leftwing of the Australian Labor Party, and other anti-nuclear forces in the Southwest Pacific and their allies worldwide, could interpert an American decision to sign the Treaty as a signal that they are following the proper course towards world peace, instead of addressing the real underlying nature of the competition between democracies and totalitarianism.

In the final analysis, the bottom line for the United States regarding the SPNFZ Treaty is global rather than regional. Any significant denial of U.S. Navy or Air Force access to and transit through the area, accompanied by deterioration of the ANZUS relationship, would: (1) set dangerous denuclearization precedents for other oceanic areas where our strategic and other interests may indeed be vital; and (2) contribute to global perceptions of eroding U.S. power relationships and the ability to project power. [33:72] And given the world situation and the current issues the United States is addressing in the Southwest Pacific, it does not appear to be in the national interest of the United States to become a Party to the Treaty.

VII. FISHING ISSUE

> The small islands of the Pacific, including our own Trust Territories, are making the transition to independence or self-governing status. This promising development carries with it, however, additional complications for such important matters as fishing rights, law of the sea, and the exploitation of mineral resources.
>
> Cyrus Vance (1980) [30:4]

In examining the relations between the United States and the Island states, the overriding bone of contention between the two that comes to the forefront is the issue of fishing rights. The fishing issue has been thorn in U.S.-Island relations for several years. In August 1985, the director of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (SPFFA), Philipp Muller, said that South Pacific Island nations may resort to gunboats to stop U.S. tuna vessels if a licensing agreement cannot be reached with the Reagan Administration. Additionally, he stated that the refusal of the American Tuna Boat Association to recognize the Islands' exclusive rights to migratory fish in their economic zones has damaged U.S. relations in the Pacific. [106:5] And unless this issue is solved in a matter that satisfies both parties, relations will remained strained and the Soviet Union will continue to be presented a channel for gaining increasing levels of influence in the Islands.

A. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

The dominant internal question for most South Pacific countries continues to be efforts to achieve more economic self-sufficiency. Some, such as the Cook Islands, have sought to

establish tax haven status by passing an Offshore Banking Act, that have attracted a number of banks. However, the only real effective, long-term solution to chronic balance of payments problems in the smaller Polynesian states is to capitalize on whatever possibilities a narrow resource base provides. [20:112]

Economic development in the Southwest Pacific is proving more difficult than political advancement. Few significant economic resources exist; all economies are fragile, and most depend on sizable amount of financial aid. As only about 1.8 per cent of the area of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) is land, it is not surprising that the marine resources of the 30 million square kilometers of ocean in the area have attracted great interest from the Island countries. Due to this interest, the Island states of the region have long recognized the significance of a comprehensive international regime which recognizes the rights, obligations and interests of coastal states and which will serve to promote more efficient and equitable ocean management. [18:20] And with the declaration of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) around each Island state by the South Pacific Forum in October 1976 (and sanctioned by the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention) in a situation has resulted where more than a third of the entire South Pacific Ocean falls under the jurisdiction of one local state or another. [23:72]

The known offshore resources of the South Pacific are dominated by highly migratory species, predominately tuna. Of the total fishing catch from the 200-mile zones of the Island states tuna accounts for 88 per cent of the catch, valued at around U.S. $300 million. The greater part of the total (about



Figure 7 Area Covered by 200 Mile EEZs

Source: [107:15]

87 per cent) is taken by foreign vessels fishing indepedently of the coastal states. ANd while the Pacific Island countries receive only about U.S. $6 million from the total tuna catch, tuna already represents the biggest industry in the Solomon Islands, the second biggest in Fiji and is the sixth biggest in Papua New Guinea. For countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati the value of tuna caught by distant-water tuna vessels exploiting their 200-mile zones is greater than their entire GNP. The South Pacific states therefore, agree that because the highly migratory species are the major resource within their 200-mile zones they must be controlled by the coastal state. [18:25]

As indicated above, the Pacific Island states themselves do not have well-developed commercial fishing fleets. There is little expertise and capital available for such development. What these countries do is 'rent' their water out to overseas fishing fleets. States, such as Kiribati, which consist of large numbers of scattered small islands have a rare advantage because these islands create the basis for claim of a large 200-mile EEZ. This 'rent' has become a major source of income for several Pacific states. [108:7]

Although the United States and the South Pacific nations have all consistently advocated the creation of a regional fisheries organization in an effort for these states to effectively use their marine resources, there are very important differences between their approaches. The United States' position is that it will recognize the jurisdiction over marine resources to the extent that it is exercised through a regional organization. The power of this regional organization would be derived from an

international treaty that gave the organization the power to regulate regional fishing. The South Pacific nations however, believe that a regional organization's authority should be derived from the delegation of national rights over each states own EEZ and that the organization will act as agent for the member nations by their consent. [107:168]

The U.S. does not recognize national assertions of sovereignty over tuna, a view expressed in U.S. domestic legislation, the U.S. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA).[1] The FCMA prohibits the importation of fish and fish products into the U.S. from any country "not allowing fishing vessels of the U.S. to engage in fishing for highly migratory species in accordance with an international fishery agreement."[2] This provision of the FCMA has already provided the basis for cutting off tuna imports from Canada, Peru, Costa Rica and Mexico because of these states refusal to allow U.S. vessels to catch tuna in their 200-mile zones. [18:25]

It is the position of the United States, that any U.S. vessel fishing inside a nation's EEZ is not breaking any international law because the U.S. refuses to recognize as valid

---

[1]U.S. law, written largely under pressure from tuna fishing interests, defines tuna as a migratory fish uncovered by such exclusion zones. The law also directs the United States to impose sanctions against nations that seize U.S. tuna boats in those circumstances. In some cases, it indemnifies the boat owners against loss of their craft. [109:2]

[2]Section 205 of the US Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 providies for a mandatory embargo on fish products from any nation which seizes a United States flag fishing vessel as a consequence of a claim of jurisdiction which we do not recognize. [33:75]

such law. The U.S. has also refused to recognize the authority of the SPFFA (Japan has also ignored the agency where possible).[3] This is because the agency is the organization which registers foreign fishing vessels that have permission to operate within EEZs. Registered vessels are required to provide the agency with a daily log of their catch. U.S. vessels send their logs via the South Pacific Commission. [108:7]

Because of their differences, several incidents have occurred between U.S. vessels and several Pacific Island states, in actions that have been an attempt by these states to show that they serious about preventing what they see as poaching. In March 1982, the U.S. registered superseiner, the Danica, was seized and prosecuted by Papua New Guinea for illegally fishing in Papua New Guinea's 200-mile economic zone. The matter was reasonably and amicably settled with the Port Moresby Government offering to 'sell' back the vessel for $250,000. [108:8]

---

[3]In August 1977 the SPF decided in Port Moresby to have the SPEC convene a meeting with a view to setting up a regional fisheries agency. At the signing of the "Port Moresby Declaration" the Forum envisaged that the new agency would join together the Island countries so that they would have coordinated policies with which to face the distant-water fishing nations. This notion became confused however, because the meeting was attended by the U.S., the U.K. and France and certain problems emerged, mainly due to the different interests being represented by the coastal states on the one hand and the distant-water fishing nations on the other. However, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was finally successfully negotiated and the FFA was established in Honiara in 1979. The U.S. and other non-Forum states continue to not be members due to their continuing differences over fishing rights. [18:25]

A more serious incident occurred in June 1984. The Solomon Islands Government seized the U.S. Jeanette Diana, operating within its EEZ. The Solomon Islands rejected a suggestion by the South Pacific Forum that it bilaterally resolve the dispute with the United States. The Solomon Islands Government instead declared that the vessel was now its property and offered it for sale for about $4 million. [110:Q1] However, there were no buyers, mainly because the United States stated that it would take any opportunity to seize the vessel back regardless of its buyer. More importantly for U.S.-Islands relation, the United States invoked the Magnusson Act banning Solomon Islands' produce from the United States. Australia was drawn into the dispute as the 'honest broker'. Fortunately for all concerned, the 1984 Solomon Islands' elections saw the return of the moderate Sir Peter Kenilorea as Prime Minister, ousting the more radical Mr. Solomon Mamaloni. In January 1985, the Jeanette Diana was sold back to its owners for $842,000. [108:8]

Sharing the Islanders hopes that the ocean will provide the economic bounty the land has withheld, Australia has been especially responsive to Island states defense requests related to marine resources.[4] In the Australian view, the economic potential of the Islands offshore zones are seen both as contributing to the stability of the region by reducing its

---

[4]On 1 June 1985, the Australian Government awarded a contract to an Australian firm to build 10 patrol boats, to be supplied to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga and Western Samoa, under Australia's defense cooperation program, for patrolling 200-mile economic zones. [111:956]

economic vulnerability and as creating a source of instability due to the relative incapacity of the Islands to enforce control over their extended maritime zones. For Australia, the connections between economic and defense in this matter are intricate and extensive. [31:189]

New Zealand's also disagrees with the stance of the United States on the issue. Deputy Prime Minister Palmer has stated that his government is critical of the American attitude to fishing zones in the Pacific, which he sees as the underlying reason behind the recent Kiribati fishing agreement with the Soviet Union and the consideration by Vanuatu of accepting a similar offer from Moscow. Mr. Palmer stated that:

> When you look at the fishing situation in the Pacific, it is complicated one. And it has resulted, in our judgment, from the failure of American policy to appreciate the implications of their tuna boat activities, and I think the best thing that has happened in the Pacific so far as the fishing issue is concerned in the last few years is a belated recognition by the United States that the tuna boat issue was affecting adversely, very much, American interests in the Pacific, and they have moved to try and change that policy so that the extraterritorial reach of the legislation relating to tuna boats is halted. [9:1]

The Pacific Islands view the American position as arrogant, insofar as the U.S. denies coastal states the right to exercise control over a resource that proportionately is of far greater value to their economies than U.S. fisheries are to the American economy. The Island countries also stress that the American position is hypocritical in that the U.S. claims the right to conserve marlin, a highly migratory species. [18:28]

B. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

The importance of the continuing dispute over the fishing issue to United States interests in the area is that it has opened a 'window of opportunity' for the Soviet Union in the Southwest Pacific. Since the United States, up until the present time, has not reached a agreement with the Pacific Islands over the EEZs and the 'rent' of the waters therein, the Soviets have been able to offer 'rent' themselves for the right to fish in these waters.

Since the first Soviet offer to Southwest Pacific Island states in 1976, Australia and New Zealand have consistently used the South Pacific Forum meetings as a sounding board to warn about the dangers of extending even non-security related concessions to the Soviets. In 1976 a particular incident was used to demonstrate the ostensible dangers inherent in inviting the Soviet fishing fleet into the region. During 1976 Soviet trawlers entered Australian waters for visual and electronic surveillance of the ANZUS Kangaroo exercise. This strengthened Australia's hand in putting its case to South Pacific countries that the Soviet fishing fleet was not entirely benign. [112:3-4]

However, since 1976, playing the so-called "Soviet card" has become something of a South Pacific pastime: for example in 1982 the Prime Minister of the Solomons, Mr. Solomon Mamaloni, talked about approaching the Soviet Union for aid, but his interest happened to coincide with his conviction that Australia was being obstinate in not providing the Solomons with a fast patrol boat of the type used by the Australian Navy. In 1976, when the Soviet card was first played, the Soviet Ambassador in New

Zealand allegedly offered to give Tonga assistance in upgrading its airfield at Fuaamotu, which would help the tourist industry, and provide a dockyard at Vavau in exchange for a base for Soviet fishing boats and air facilities for changing fishing crews. The fears of a potential Soviet maritime presence in the region persuaded the Australian and New Zealand governments to allocate more economic aid to the region (Australia in fact quadrupled its aid), to give it higher priority, and to initiate modest defense cooperation programs. [23:72]

The Solomon Islands apparently tried to play the Soviet card during the dispute with the United States over the Jeanette Diana. At that time, the Solomon Islands hinted that it may allow Soviet vessels to fish in its waters. The move came after the Solomon Islands Government received written confirmation that the United States had banned tuna exports from that nation, in response to the impoundment of the American tuna boat. The Solomon Islands Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade said that it had been approached earlier in 1984 by the Soviet Union about fishing in local waters and that in light of the Solomon Islands policy of banning Soviet vessels from its ports, the government was reluctant to consider Moscow's approaches. [113:Q1] However, due to the ban by the United States on Solomon Islands fish exports, the government needed to re-evaluate the Soviet request. But, with a solution to the Jeanette Diana affair, the Solomon Islands dropped its re-evaluation of the Soviet offer.

In not wishing to present the Soviets with an opportunity to establish a forward base in the South Pacific, the ANZUS nations as a matter of policy have encouraged Island states to deny the

Soviets any concessions. When necessary, the ANZUS nations have offered aid or other incentives to counteract or pre-empt a Soviet initiative. Indeed, it has been suggested that their demonstrated willingness to do so might tempt Island states to 'play the Soviet card" in order to reap the benefits of refusing a Soviet offer. [12:475] However, the recent fishing agreement between Kiribati and the Soviets would seem to indicate that we have gone beyond bluffing.

C. THE CARD IS PLAYED

Even though the Soviets found their offers were constantly turned down, they persisted in extending their offers. And their persistence finally paid off, with the conclusion of a fishing agreement with Kiribati in August 1985.[5] The Soviet Union had made their offer in 1984. It offered a return to Kiribati of perhaps two to four times the normal fishing deal, but it required an actual 'on land' presence by Soviet officials. It was also well-timed. The Kiribati government was frustrated by U.S. and Japanese vessels refusing to co-operate with the SPFFA. Kiribati also noted U.S. and Japanese reluctance to give figures relating to their catches and hold-ups in U.S. payments. [108:8] Kiribati President Tabai signed the agreement with Moscow allowing the Soviets to fish his country's 2-million-square-mile resource zone, although no landing or base facilities rights were

---

[5]The agreement allowed 18 Soviet trawlers to fish in Kiribati waters and in return the Soviet Union would provide the Island nation with $2.4 million a year in license fees. No landing rights or facilities were involved in the deal. [109:2]

permitted in the agreement. Tabai said he was dealing with the Soviets because the American Tuna Boat Association fished in his country's waters without permission. [106:5]

Mr. Ieremia Tabai, strongly defended his country's fishing treaty with the Soviet Union. "The Russians want to fish our waters and we don't see anything wrong with it." "It is purely economic."[6] However, the has agreement split public opinion. Opposition MPs urged the government to heed Australian and New Zealand criticism against the agreement with the Soviet Union. But Kiribati's foreign affairs secretary and roving ambassador, Mr. Atanraoi Baiteke, claimed that the opposition was based on misunderstanding and said that most Kiribati islanders favored the deal. "They're afraid of a ghost. It is absurd to suggest that Kiribati could turn communist because of a fishing agreement," Mr. Baiteke said. [114:7]

Prior to the acceptance of the Soviet offer by Kiribati, the Australian Government offered to provide an aid package that would be equal to the $2.4 million fishing fee the Soviets had put on the table. The Australian offer was turned down however, because the Kiribati Government wanted to move towards financial self-sufficiency instead.. Whereas the Australian aid would still have kept Kiribati dependent on a foreign government for economic support, the Soviet deal would provide, in the Kiribati mind, a return on the marine resources of the Kiribati EEZ.

---

[6]Islanders from two northern atolls, Butaritari and Marakie, staged demonstrations--an unusual step in a placid Micronesian culture. "Tabai: Go to hell with the Russian's fishing rights!" declared a banner at one meeting.

New Zealand also attempted to persuade the Kiribati Government not to let the Soviets into their waters, but had to try to explain that against the background of New Zealand already having let the Soviets into one of its ports to conduct fishing operations in the Southern Ocean. [115:533] The Kiribati Government's attitude was that if New Zealand can control the Soviets and profit from the relationship, then so can and should Kiribati.

The prospect of Soviet fishing officials setting up office in tiny Kiribati is sufficient enough to set off alarm bells in Washington, Canberra and Wellington. The anxiety in Canberra, and throughout the Southwest Pacific, is that once the Soviets are established on the Kiribati fishing grounds, the Soviets will make a sufficiently attractive offer to secure base facilities from which the operations of much U.S. naval activity could be monitored. In the meantime, their fishing boats will, it is presumed, be conducting hydrographic and oceanographic surveys of interest to the Soviet Pacific fleet commanders. [115:533] Furthermore, Soviet shore facilities in the past have been used for espionage and the organization of elements prejudicial to the stability of the host government. The refusal of the Kiribati Government not to provide shore facilities, seems to indicate that it is aware of this activities and does not want them in their country. The primary concern for the United States is that the Soviet fishing fleet is also heavily engaged in intelligence gathering. And that Soviet access to the Kiribati EEZ would (and does) provide the Soviet Union with closer access to the US test site at Kwajalein Island. [71:961] Furthermore, there is a U.S.

Air Force satellite tracking station on Canton Island in the Phoenix group belonging to Kiribati. [108:8]

It is also important to remember that the Kiribati offer was not an isolated move by the Soviet Union, for it had extended fishing agreements to several other Pacific Islands states. While the Kiribati Government agreed to a deal with the Soviets, both Tonga Fiji rejected a Soviet request to fish and provide bases in their economic zone. [106:5] However, the Solomon Islands is still considering the matter.

In August 1985, Prime Minister Lange called on South Pacific nations to be vigilant against Soviet expansionism which resulted in Soviet bases being established in the Southwest Pacific. Mr. Lange has repeated his opposition to a small Pacific country such as Vanautu allowing the Soviet Union to develop its port facilities. He said the development of port facilities in Vanautu for Soviet fishing could bring a whole new dimension to the Soviet presence in the region, and he described it as an unwanted escalation. Mr. Lange described such an eventuality as a result as the escalation of France's military presence in New Caledonia, which he said is also unwanted. The New Zealand leader has also said that his country will increase maritime surveillance of the South Pacific and that it is making its Navy more Pacific-oriented. [68:m1-2]

Thus far, the coordinated policies of the ANZUS partners and the countries of the South Pacific Forum have been successful in denying the Soviet Union a major political foothold in the region. They are anxious to avoid a situation arising in the Southwest Pacific comparable to that in the Indian Ocean where

Soviet offers of aid to the fishing industry and visits by hydrographic vessels have developed into port calls by warships. Although the USSR does not appear to have any compelling strategic reasons to deploy military forces to the region, the Southwest Pacific has many islands with good harbors. [23:72]

D. REMARKS

The leaders of the Pacific Islands have a strong commitment to regionalism and regional activities continue to grow. Fisheries diplomacy is likely to be the major foreign relations issue for many of the developing countries of the region in the immediate future. It would be surprising, therefore, if there were not further moves to strengthen regional fisheries cooperation, particularly as the Island countries become more involved in the management of their marine resources. [18:30] And it would greatly benefit U.S. policy in the region if we are viewed as helping to develop these resources to the benefit of the Island states versus a roadblock to progress and some level of economic self-sufficiency.

However, the problem of continuing inequities in the region cannot be met simply by rearranging the geography of jurisdictions. At best, this could only be a temporary corrective, in the same way that a one-time gift of resources from the rich to the poor would only temporarily alter the balance. It is obvious that the skew in the distribution of the world's wealth is not due primarily to the fact that some nations are better endowed with natural resources than others. If it were, Japan and England would be desperately poor, while Latin

Americans would count themselves among the most comfortable. The point is that although direct control over natural resources is certainly one cause of inequities, it is greatly overshadowed by the role of social structures, and particularly the structure of trade relationships. [107:155]

Less developed countries can invite developed countries to provide capital and technology for exploitation of their resources through joint ventures or other arrangements. It must be realized of course, that the less developed countries are then obligated to share the benefits. Furthermore, because of the developed countries greater bargaining powers, joint ventures or other contractual agreements are likely to be of greater benefit to the developed nations. [107:154] However, this does not mean that the less developed countries cannot also gain significant benefits from joint ventures.

The Southwest Pacific is simply playing out some of the familiar dynamics of world politics. Relationships typically found between developed and less developed nations are being reenacted within the region in the relationships between the more and the less developed of these less developed nations. The seemingly inexorable widening of the gap between the rich and poor, the strong and the weak appears to be continuing here as elsewhere. Nations which have more are able to strike harder bargains, whether with fellow islanders or with outsiders, and thus gain larger shares of the benefits. Politics are determined by rather pinched visions of short-term material interests, and cooperation is undertaken only incidentally when it is seen as serving that interest. [107:171]

Pacific Islands leaders, as well as some Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans, feel that the United States must be more empathetic towards the needs of their countries. Additionally, they seem to feel that all that is needed to correct the current situation is for the Administration to direct Congress to provide more funding and legislation to accommodate the needs of the Islands.

This attitude seems to indicate a lack of understanding of by these individuals about how resources are allocated in the American system. There seems to be little recognition of the role of special interest groups and lobbying in the halls of Congress in order to affect the budget allocation process.

This lack of understanding of the American political system probably results from two factors. First, considering that most of these Pacific Island states have small populations and cultural systems that call for consensus and close personal relations, political leaders probably project this image of conducting business into the American political system. The cultural perspectives of the islanders is compounded by the lack of intensive contact with the American political process. Few Pacific Islands states can afford to keep permanent representatives in the United States. As it is, Australia pays some $500,000 a year to keep up one office in New York for the use of the Pacific states for those occasions when they feel they must make their voice heard in the UN General Assembly. [108:7] Even larger countries, with more resources, have as of yet failed to fully understand how the American political system really works.

In the past, those in Washington who direct American policy towards the South Pacific, have assumed too readily that the Islands will understand the intricacies and legalisms of the American political process and will accommodate. This is unfortunate particularly in a region characterized by intimate and pragmatic political systems. Australia itself has not always understood the reasons for the American stand on the fisheries issue. [31:189]

Given the domestic politics that go towards the formulation of foreign policy and foreign aid amounts in the US and other democratic countries with interests in the region, the Soviet card may be critical for the Islands states in their competition with the other special interests groups in the halls of Congress and other legislative bodies in securing financial and other forms of aid. The idea of a Soviet foothold in the South-West Pacific serves to motivate Defense and State Department officials to lobby in Congress on behalf of Island states interests.

This is not to mean that concern over the Soviet Union should be our only motivating factor in dealing with the Southwest Pacific. Our basic concerns with democratic ideals, decent government and institutions should also play a role in directing our policies towards these states.

The United States and our allies, also need to make sure that the Pacific Islands governments understand that Soviet 'license fees' does not necessarily mean they have moved away from dependence on aid given by friendly Western states and moved towards self-sufficiency by using the marine resources from their EEZs' to fund their economies.

For example, in the Kiribati deal, the Soviet Union paid a hefty fee to the Kiribati Government for fishing rights. It was estimated by the Kiribati Government that the total catch in 1985 by foreign vessels (Japanese, Taiwanese, Soviet, and American ships) in its EEZ was worth $30 million. Although it is unknown the exact amount, lets say that each country accounted for 25 percent of the total catch. The Soviet share would then represent $7.5 million and the fishing fee it paid would mean it pay 32 percent of its total catch in fees alone. This represents a pretty large premium on the part of the Soviet Union for the right to fish in the Kiribati EEZ, if commercial reasons alone account for the Soviet presence. However, if intelligence gathering opportunities and future channels for political influence are factored in, then the fishing fee paid by the Soviets is not out-of-line with real or projected returns. Assuming Soviet foreign policy goals, the fishing fee then does not really represent a true economic return from its marine resources for Kiribati.

Furthermore, if the Kiribati Government does not use the money it is getting from the Soviet deal to build an economic infrastructure that will allow it to harvest its own marine resources, and instead simply uses the money to run government and social program, then all the Kiribati Government has done is shift its financial support base from a friendly Western country, Australia, to a totalitarian state that could very well pull the 'financial rug' out from under the Kiribati economy at some future date if certain conditions were not met.

The experience of the United States with the fishing issue in the South Pacific has been predominately an unhappy one. The United States has treated the issue as an economic one, rather than as a political problem, as Australia and New Zealand have advised the United States to do. Islanders suspicions of American motives in this matter have been intense in some quarters and has led to acrimony and hostility from the time of the agreement in 1978 at the Niue Forum to exclude the United States from the FFA. [31:189]

The United States needs to concentrate on resolving the fishing issue with the Pacific Island states, in conjunction with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and other free-world countries. As has been pointed out before, the objectives of the United States in the Southwest Pacific are that it remains stable and that it grows politically and economically. And furthermore, that the region remain free of Soviet influence. In line with these objectives, if the future economic basis for the growth of these states is their marine resources and the need to manage these resources effectively, the United States needs to close the 'window of opportunity' that the current fishing dispute is offering the Soviet Union. It would appear that in the long-run that the security interests of the United States in the region would be better served by reaching some form of accommodation on the issue, even if it does not necessarily please the American Tuna Boat Association, rather then let the dispute continue.

Furthermore, even if the current fisheries issue is resolved, the general issue itself will not disappear. As the statement by

Cyrus Vance at the beginning of this chapter pointed out, additional complications may arise with the Island states over such issues as law of the sea, and the exploitation of mineral resources. Advances in marine technology may permit sea-bed mineral resources, such as manganese nodules, to be exploited by industrially advanced countries. [23:73] And as a country that is in the forefront of high technology, American advances in marine technology will ensure that the U.S. will constantly have to decide whether to assist the Islands by sharing these developments in one way or another or to be seen to be part of the resources security problem by denying them this knowledge. [31:189] If the United States is to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting these other potential issues, American national security planners must play a greater role in finding the proper priority of American economic, political, and security interests and objectives concerning these issues and how they effect American influence in the region.

VIII. THREATS TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION

The central problem of American national security decision makers is that their nation bears the major responsibility for the defense of the Islands, Australasia and the Americas against any external threat from Asia.

Though changing technology has removed some of the potential importance of Pacific island bases, they would still prove to be useful to aggressors against Australasia or the Americas, and the basing of any aggressive forces in the area would greatly complicate American defense planning. The scattered populations of the Islands could not, by themselves, defend their territories against conquest and use by powerful nations from outside. The problem, then, is to keep open the necessary options to use the Islands while denying the same freedom, if possible, to potential foes. [37:236] A short historical note is in order here to help illustrate the past (present and future) significance of the Pacific Islands regarding the security of Asia and American interests there.

After World War II the allies discovered that the actual Japanese strategy was to isolate Australia, especially the southeastern heartland, from any succor from the United States by gaining control of the islands to the north, northeast, and east of Australia, thus cutting the lines of communication between North America and Australia versus the belief during the war that the Japanese would launch an invasion from New Guinea, once it was successfully occupied, down the Pacific coast of Queensland

with the objective of occupying the heartland of Brisbane. The Japanese believed that once the lines of communication were cut, that Australia could be left to "wither on the vine." Such a strategy clearly implied that the Japanese early on became confident that the United States would come to Australia's aid if its security was menaced by Japanese action. The Japanese strategy was frustrated by the overextension of Japanese power that the effort represented, and by the success in battle of the Australian, New Zealand, and American forces. [116:84-5]

The significance of the above is that given the current and projected future level of economic activity that will criss-cross the Pacific from North America to mainland Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the importance of keeping a foe from gaining a foothold in the Pacific from which the lines of communication could be cut takes on an importance today that equals and perhaps exceeds that of the past.

A major element of the region's strategic context is the absence of a general security threat in the South Pacific. The perception of a low level of strategic threat is held by the Islands States as well as those outside the region. For example, Rabbie Namaliu, the Papua New Guinea Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, outlined his assessment of the plausible risks to Islands security in an address to the Fiftieth Anniversary Conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in late August 1983. He listed and assessed these as: intra-regional conflict (slight); an unprovoked attack on an Island country by an external power (also slight); destabilization of an Island state for profit or ideology--including Great Power

rivalry (rather more likely); conflict over access to the region's marine resources (also moderately possible); domestic instability in New Caledonia (more likely yet); and domestic internal threats to individual states (the greatest security threat). [31:184]

From the standpoint of the United States, the primary threat to the region is that of the establishment of a totalitarian regime in one of the Island states by exploitation of internal divisions and economic disruption or stagnation by individuals native to an island population and receiving support from an outside source. The most dangerous source of this external assistance would be the Soviet Union. Since World War II the Soviet Union has been unable to make any headway into the region; however, this is no reason for complacency.

For most of the Southwest Pacific's developing countries, the main problem is that their resources are inadequate to maintain the levels of income to which they aspire, or even those to which they have become accustomed. [117:33] These countries, which include Western Samoa and Tonga as well as Niue and the Cook Islands, are already well on the way to permanent dependence on aid. Others, such as Tokelaus, Tuvalu, and Kiribati are basically the poorest countries of the Pacific. Their small size, internal dispersal over wide areas of ocean, and their remoteness, make it virtually impossible for them to operate export-oriented manufacturing industries, and it is difficult to see where they have any comparative advantage which can make up their high transfer costs to world markets. [117:34]

Threats to the region's basic domestic order can be categorized under two broad headings--changes which would result in a state's ideological realignment and changes which would result in corrupt or repressive regimes independent of ideology. A regime which found itself embattled or a group which seized control from its own gain will use any means to entrench itself in power. [60:46] Either category of change would give an opportunity to the Soviets, as well as to ourselves, depending which is quickest on the ball, to take advantage of any internal political development, whatever its ideological label.

While the basic West-leaning of the Southwest Pacific area and the remoteness of any strategic threat are positive advantages from the U.S. perspective, this contextual consideration must also be regarded as a crucial liability. With the exception of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, the other Islands states are all microstates in terms of their populations. As pointed out before, most of these microstates are land-limited and resource poor. These and other consequences of small scale make most of these regional states vulnerable to a sudden takeover. Their economies are fragile and most are aid-dependent. The cost of one of these countries as a client-state would be negligible to a power such as the Soviet Union or the United States. Yet it would be a financial burden the ANZUS allies are unlikely to be able to afford across the entire region. In addition, the lines of authority are very short in the Islands and the dominance of a few key decision-makers often go unchallenged by the majority of the population. Such vulnerability reduces the time-frame for defensive reaction

drastically and thus substantially undermines any complacency based on the absence of a recognized strategic threat in the region. [31:184-85]

Based on the social, cultural and political record of the region, the risks of a major domestic political upheavel are slight. The strong Christian beliefs of the people in the region help to serve as a deterrent to the rise of any sort of communist movement in the region; however, this is not to say that the region, particularly, the Island states, is immune to socialistic doctrines, including Marxism-Leninism.

In each of these countries, though in varying degrees, migration has become a significant feature of their adjustment, and it has some benefits. However, it is also structurally disruptive, in that it is the young male segment of the population that often migrates. Additionally, it tends to take an excessive proportion of the more skilled and literate workers. Finally, if unchecked by non-economic barriers, migration may become a flood, as it has from Niue and the Cook Islands,in which case it can endanger the survival of the original society in its home setting. [117:34] And who is to say, that some of those who leave their country for better opportunities in the Western world, return to their homes disillusioned with the Western system and seek to lead their fellow citizens to a different way of living.

Although there are many sources of tension within various Island states that could disrupt internal security, only in one instance--Vanuatu in 1980--has a problem escalated to a degree beyond an Island government's capability to handle it. In that

case, the situation was quickly brought under control after Vanuatu secured support from Australia and Papua New Guinea to put down the secessionist movement on the island of Espiritu Santo. [12:476]

Vulnerability is clearly a two-edged sword. While the relative weakness of the regional states is a source of concern to those who fear that a regional state might pursue an ambitious foreign policy and thereby upset the current stability of the region, critics of the American defense interests in the South Pacific worry lest the same factors of vulnerability allow Washington to distort the region's basic security outlooks. Here one finds fears over economic entrapment, misdirection of development plans, loss of neutrality and the like. [31:185]

Due to their very limited military capabilities all the Island states share a sense of vulnerability as all are conscious of their very limited capabilities to protect their sovereignty, their outlying territories and offshore resource claims. Economic security is a common, overriding and keenly felt concern. It stems from small economies made more fragile by being resource poor or, dependent on very few natural resources. All the Island states are heavily dependent on external aid, and the region as a whole receives the largest per capita aid in the world. A sense of vulnerability and fragility has contributed to a common concern to minimize great power rivalry in order to reduce the threat of intervention in local affairs. [14:79]

As was mentioned before in the section dealing with the French presence in the region, the current real potential source of regional disorder lay in New Caledonia, where the movement for

independence has divided the population and has received strong support from the South Pacific Forum. Support for the independence movement among the Island governments is grounded in their strong preference for all territories to reach independence as expeditiously as possible. [12:477] On the other hand, the opposition to an independent New Caledonia has resulted in violence on the island. And as noted before, external states, such as Libya, have already established ties to the more radical elements of the independence movement. This opening of a channel to a member of the 'terrorist network' does not help provide for stability in the region.

Besides direct Soviet activities in the region, an additional channel for Soviet penetration is through one of her client states. For example, Cuba got a foot in South Pacific waters in late July 1983 when it established full diplomatic links with Vanuatu. [20:112] The use of states in tune with Soviet objectives in the world, provides it with possible channels of influence without the external signs of Soviet attempts to gain access to certain countries.

The U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983 to put an end to Grenadian decisionmakers who were pursuing "adventurist" policies with the aid of the Soviets, Cubans, and North Koreans, should serve as a warning sign to all those concerned with the security and political and economic development of the South Pacific. Grenada is a prime example of how the United States can stop the Soviets and other of their ilk, from using social and economic unrest to exploit the situation to serve their strategic and political aims. Grenada shows that if the Soviets were willing,

with the Cubans, to attempt to establish an island staging area for military and political operations in the backyard of the U.S. sphere of influence, then why not at some future time in the Southwest Pacific as well. And in the Southwest Pacific, the U.S. may not have the luxury of another medical school to serve as a excuse for intervention. Grenada may prove to be the latest example of a lasting but unintended American legacy coloring the strategic complexion of defense relations with the Islands. The Caribbean incident has demonstrated the fragility of the climate of opinion which had previously discouraged intervention in mircostates. although the circumstances of the South Pacific are vastly different from those of the Caribbean particularly with regard to proximity of sources of threat and the extent of Great Power rivalry, the episode clearly has increased the perceived vulnerability of small Island states. The President of Kiribati, Ieremia Tabai, has openly expressed his concern that South Pacific microstates such as his own could be endangered by such a change in the climate of opinion. Reports that Great Britain and New Zealand have developed contingency plans and special forces to deal with Grenada-type situations in the South Pacific only help to reinforce these concerns. [31:188]

The threats to the region are those elements of the political, economic and social factors that are found throughout the region that could present the Soviets and those other states in the Soviet power orbit, with channels to extend their influence into the region. The economic and social problems that the Islands face may, in the future, place them into a position into which they could be drawn into the power orbit of the Soviet

Union. Although there is no direct threat of outside physical invasion for any of the states of the Southwest Pacific, for Australia and New Zealand, the only latent threat is a lack of will power to face the world as it really is, and by attempts to divorce themselves from the power structure of the world and their responsibilities to the Western alliance.

In trying to research threats to the region, I searched for a power other then the Soviet Union which seeks to extend its power over the region and could find none, not even Japan, France or any other potential economic "imperialist." American and other Western states' economic power is not in the same league as exploitation by the Soviet Union for political purposes. The tendency by Third Worlders to see an equal danger to their independence by both superpowers is totally off base. Economically powerful Western states indeed are sometimes like bulls in a China Shop, yet they are willing to help clean up and make amends. The Soviets and those like them, are bulls who come into the shop, destroy the owners and stay to run the shops themselves.

IX. CONCLUSION

The research presented in this thesis has been to provide some insight into the current interests and objectives of the United States in the Southwest Pacific and to examine whether the present policies of the United States are adequate to met the changing situation in the region.

Although the U.S. agrees with the assessment of its ANZUS allies that economic development is a key to domestic and international stability in this region, Washington in the past has not matched the levels of aid to the Island states of its two allies and has generally relied on the two ANZAC states to carry this burden. The U.S. does have a modest civil aid program in the region currently of the order of $6 million a year to the Forum Island states. [31:187] This aid is also distributed on a regional basis, versus bilateral programs, although recently a bilateral aid agreement has been concluded with Fiji.

In the past, the policy of the United States has been to let Australia and New Zealand manage the region, since the interests and objectives of these two allies were very much in tune with those of the United States. However, there is no longer a real confluence of policies.

Even though New Zealand had been a partner of the United States since World War II in fact and in name since the signing of the ANZUS pact in 1951, Mr. Lange and his Party view that a new factor has entered that relationship, this being nuclear weapons, and that the security of New Zealand requires the

exclusion from its territory of all nuclear weapons and that New Zealand divorce itself from all things nuclear. [61:1009]

The question that an American policymaker must ask is: Since nuclear weapons have been a part of the American arsenal since 1945, and indeed were used to bring the war against Japan to a close, why is it that it took until 1984 for a New Zealand government to see this as a new factor in the defense relationship with the United States?

The answer to this question is to be found in both a reaction to continued French nuclear testing in the region and a combination of internal forces in New Zealand (peace groups, labor unions, etc.), with some external support, that seek to avoid the hard realities of world power politics and hope to avoid being caught up in a nuclear conflict by renouncing all things nuclear. And in an attempt to take some form of positive action, the present Labour Government has moved to make New Zealand a nuclear-free state. Unfortunately, the only nuclear state it can really have any effect upon is its long time ally, the United States.

In seeking policies to deal with the current dispute between the United States and New Zealand, some voices from the past prove useful. During the original negotiations of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, Mr. Spender, the Australian External Secretary, stated that the idea of an indefinitely continuing obligation appealed to him, but he wondered whether there should not be a minimum period before any party could terminate its obligations under the treaty. The American representative, Ambassador Dulles, said that his idea was that there should be no time limit

on the main declaration but that any party could retire from the Council at any time it wished. He pointed out that a treaty of this sort which had no validity except from the flow of words was actually void. Mr. Doidge, the New Zealand External Secretary, agreed that the Pact would find its success in the sincerity of purpose of the parties. [118:167]

It appears from the current dispute between the United States and New Zealand that the 'sincerity of purpose' is now in question. Furthermore, since the need for consensus is an essential element of any agreement between nations, the current dispute between the United States and New Zealand should not be viewed as necessarily as bad development. If the foundations and perceptions of what the real purpose of the ANZUS alliance is has changed, even if it is due to a shift in one country, New Zealand, then it is better to raise these differences now and decide if a basis still exist for an alliance. This is not to say that the United States should seek to develop a conventional alliance with New Zealand, even if both agree that there is a conventional role for New Zealand in the region. The United States cannot allow itself to be decoupled from its global deterrence posture which is based on nuclear weapons. If New Zealand continues to insist that it wants nothing to do with a defense structure that relies on nuclear weapons, then so be it. A new consensus should be reached between the U.S. and New Zealand; however, this new consensus should not be in the form of a military alliance, since any military alliance with the United States would automatically involve 'something nuclear'.

The United States must continue a policy of stopping military cooperation with New Zealand, for we cannot decouple nuclear form conventional, as New Zealand wants to do. It may be in New Zealand's interest to do so (as they see it); however, it is not in the U.S. interest to do so.

This is true not only for our own strategic doctrine, but also to prevent the spread of the so-called "nuclear allergy" from New Zealand to other countries. For the spread of the mistaken belief that one can be safe conventionally by distancing oneself from a nuclear power could lead to the breakup of the Western alliance system, if other states saw that they could do this without some cost.

There is no way that the United States as a single nation can counteract the combined forces and resources of the Soviet empire and still maintain itself as a democracy rather than as a garrison state. It is, therefore, a serious, conceivably even fatal error to conceive of the United States as the sole adversary of the Soviet Union, to think of the contemporary contest as a "superpower" contest. [29:8] Yet if New Zealand does not see it to be in its national interest to be a part of the West's deterrence structure, then the U.S. and our other allies, are better off finding out now and re-structure our forces than having a half-hearted partner in defense of Western values.

The United States is not bullying New Zealand, we have our own national interests. We can try to reach an accord; however, only up to a point, after which we damage our own security. After that point we can go no further. The United States is a

large, powerful country that will create waves in the international system no matter which way she turns, and when she does turn, it must be in the direction, that in the end, ensures American security interests.

This is not to say that New Zealand should be let off scot-free, if the alliance breaks up due to passage of the nuclear free legislation; it must pay a price (by this I mean the Labour Government and its supporters). Lange constantly stresses that N.Z.'s nuclear-free policy was democratically arrived at and that N.Z. should not be penalized for carrying out the will of the people. This is fine. However, Mr. Lange and his supporters must also realize that we live in a world where decisions have consequences or opportunity costs. If New Zealand sees the presence of U.S. ships in her ports as a threat to her security or even more so an alliance with the United States, as paying too high a price for the benefits gained, then she must also realize that there are real cost for trading off that relationship with the United States. By cutting defense ties with the United States, New Zealand also changes the nature of that 'special relationship' with the U.S. no matter how you look at it. Even though the United States should not take direct economic actions against New Zealand, those who are responsible for formulating American foreign relations cannot help but be affected by a shift in the defense partnership.

U.S. national security planners need to restructure objectives and operational plans to take into account a neutral, uncooperative New Zealand, since even if Mr. Lange's Party should go down to defeat for some reason, it is apparent that there is

no longer a consensus in the New Zealand body politic concerning New Zealand's ties with the United States. The United States cannot afford to have its alliance relationships jerked around every couple of years. Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to assume a larger role in those areas were before we relied on the goodwill of New Zealand. This does not mean that we should cut ourselves off from cooperation with New Zealand. There is still a need to cooperate on political, economic and social issues that concern the region.

If the ANZUS alliance is terminated due to New Zealand's actions, the United States should institute a bilateral treaty with Australia. Australia has already asked itself if it is in its national interest and the Western world's collective strength to maintain strong defense ties with the United States, and come up with an overwhelming positive response, that cuts across party lines. And Australia is entitled to a strong commitment by the United States in response to its commitment to us.

Secondly, my research points out that the United States must deal with Southwest Pacific micro-states. And that in past times and perhaps future ones, these states do not have the population, resource base and economic infrastructure that will allow them to be self-sufficient and have an independent role in the international arena, but that have jurisdiction over land and ocean areas that impact on the security interests of the United States.

Clearly Island states that are impoverished or have disaffected populations present obstacles to both efficient administration and/or military security. Unfortunately, the

execution of sound policy protective of both American and Islands interests is hampered by confusion of policies by government agencies, the special interest lobbying of various groups in Congress, and by a lack of understanding on all sides concerning the needs of others involved in an issue. Furthermore, for American planners, it is clear that strategic questions cannot be disentangled from those of political status of the Islands and the economic bases on which autonomous regimes there can stand. On these matters, consultation with Island leaders must be an integral part of Pacific security policy. [37:236]

As stated before, the United States needs to expend more time and effort in reaching agreements with the Island states on what is the best way for these states to reach some level of economic development that will allow them some level of self-sufficiency. Perhaps the best means is for the United States, along with other interested Western states (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, etc.), to help the Island states establish an infrastructure that will enable them to play a greater role in harvesting their own available resources.

As noted in the chapter dealing with the fishing issue, there is potential for future disputes over other issues, such as mineral resources located on the ocean floor. Additionally, it has been pointed out that there is a lack of knowledge on all sides as to how the other side conducts its domestic politics. I believe this has arisen because in the past the United States has depended upon Australia and New Zealand as go betweens. For the future then, in order to help the United States resolve issues with the Island states, and perhaps head them off before they

really develop, it is important for the United States to establish a greater political presence in the region.

The United States is currently seeking to negotiate a regional fisheries agreement that would resolve legal differences over tuna fishing by American-owned tuna boats within the Islands' exclusive economic zones. Negotiations are also in progress on an environmental protection convention for the region to protect its fragile ecological system from pollution. This convention would address the issue of disposal of low-level radioactive waste, a matter of great concern to the islanders. [19:2] These are all positive steps in seeking to establish a firm, cooperative relationship with states in the region.

Thirdly, in dealing with threats to the region and also to the interests of the United States, my research placed heavy emphasis on the Soviet threat to the region, along with those states which are in the Soviet power orbit. There are those who say that the United States is too preoccupied with the Soviet threat and that United States policy should not be constantly aimed at countering Soviet moves worldwide. Furthermore, these same individuals point out that the Soviet Union is not behind all the turmoil in the world and that the United States must understand other causes underly trouble spots on the globe.

I agree that the Soviet Union is not the cause of all the region's or world's problems. Certainly, in the Southwest Pacific, France policy is doing much to foster policy problems for the United States. However, the Soviet Union has shown it is more than willing to take advantage of 'windows of opportunity' that are presented to it.

American national security planners and decisionmakers must be concerned with the Soviet threat as the primary one to U.S. and Western political, economic and social systems. No one can say that the United States should not be constantly concerned over how the Soviet's might exploit any opportunity anywhere on the globe to further the shift of world power towards a stronger Soviet position versus the U.S. (the prime capitalist enemy) specifically and the capitalist world in general.

As has been noted, the Soviet Union's political and strategic interests are inimical to those of the states in the Southwest Pacific and that there has been an apparent growth of concern in regional attitudes about Soviet international policies and behavior. [23:72] However, this 'we don't want you' attitude on the part of the region is unlikely to deter Soviet attempts to gain a foothold in the region, since for the Soviet Union, success in the region extends Soviet power. On the other hand, success in the Southwest Pacific for the United States simply means that a nation manages to maintain its own independence. It avoids incorporation. It may or may not make a contribution to collective strength. [29:8]

The Soviet process of incremental incorporation and consolidation of power provides a excuse for some in the Western world into deluding themselves about what is really happening. One of the favorite theoretical devices that some people use to remain unconcerned about these processes is the theory that such events are merely ongoing episodes in the ongoing process of modernization; that they are merely "normal" examples of regional turmoil, inevitable incidents on the road to modernization,

without any significant international content or relevance. [29:8] For the United States and its allies to adopt such an attitude to the present or future difficulties in the Southwest Pacific, would in the long term produce unnecessary riskss on their national interests.

Although the Soviet Union obviously has the right to discuss fishing agreements with the Island states, it should be American policy to develop measures which give the Island states no reason to consider turning to the USSR for such assistance, which could give the Soviets undue political influence in Island countries that have very fragile economies. Denial of Soviet economic influence among the small Island states of the Southwest Pacific is in the strategic interest of the United States.

The ability of the Soviet Union, and those other states in the totalitarian orbit, to increase its political, economic and military presence in the Southwest Pacific will largely depend on the opportunities that the United States and other Western states present to it. Any United States response, as well as other concerned Western countries, must recognize the key role of the West's superior economic assets in reducing the appeal of Soviet blandishments. If American economic assets are combined with a sensitivity to local regional issues (which are more concerned with domestic economic problems than external threats) and there is a sufficient display of regional military cooperation then Soviet gains in the region will be held to a minimum [23:75].

My research shows that there are currently shortcomings in United States policy in the Southwest Pacific. First, the United States can no longer rely on its ANZUS partners, specifically New

Zealand, to act as middlemen for American interests in the region. The United States must take a more active role and a greater presence in the Southwest Pacific. Secondly, the lack of real involvement in Island affairs in the past has led to current disputes between the Island states and the United States. These disputes, especially over the use of EEZs, provides the Soviet Union with opportunities for increasing its ability to penetrate the region and perhaps gain a real foothold in the Southwest Pacific. The United States must start treating its disputes with Island states as political and security ones, instead of as purely economic ones.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Copley, Gregory R., ed., Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook: 1985, The Perth Corp., 1985.

2. Brand, Robert A., "Australia, New Zealand and ANZUS," Atlantic Community Quarterly, v. 22, pp. 345-59, Winter 1984-85.

3. Whitaker, Donald P., ed., Area Handbook for Australia, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974.

4. Millar, T.B., "Emerging Bipartisanship in Australian Foreign Policy," Asia Pacific Community, no. 27, pp. 1-15, Winter 1985.

5. Australian Information Service, Consulate General, San Francisco,, Australian Defence Policy-The Way Ahead, news release no. 48/85, 3 April 1985.

6. McQueen, A.E., "New Zealand," The Far East and Australasia, 1983-84, pp. 622-37, The Stanhope Press, 1984.

7. Evans, Douglas, "ANZUS and Anti-Americanism," The Asian Wall Street Journal, p. 8, 15-16 March 1985.

8. Brockhagen, Bruce, The ANZUS Crisis: What's an Ally to Do?, paper presented to seminar NS 4690 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 16 December 1985.

9. "Melbourne Views NZ's Antinuclear, Pacific Stands," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 10 December 1985, pp. M1-M2.

10. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The ANZUS Alliance, Current Policy no. 674, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 18 March 1985.

11. Burnett, Alan A. and Robin B., The Australia and New Zealand Nexus, Australian National University, 1978.

12. Bunge, Frederica M., ed., Oceania: A Regional Study, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985.

13. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The ANZUS Relationship: Alliance Management, Current Policy no. 592, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1984.

14. Mediansky, F.A., "Nuclear Free Security in the South-West Pacific," Australian Outlook, v. 39 no. 2, pp. 77-83, August 1985.

15. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, GIST: The ANZUS Alliance, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 1985.

16. Australian Information Service, Consulate General, San Francisco,, Joint Communique, news release no. 49/85, 3 April 1985.

17. Allen, Bryant J., "The Pacific Islands," The Far East and Australasia, 1983-84, pp. 651-53, The Stanhope Press, 1984.

18. Bergin, Anthony, "Fisheries and the South Pacific," Asia Pacific Community, pp. 20-32, Fall 1983.

19. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, GIST: The US and Oceania, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March 1985.

20. "South Pacific," Asia 1984 Yearbook, pp. 109-14, Far Eastern Economic Review, Limited, 1984.

21. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1986, H. Hear, part 2, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985.

22. United Nations, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1984, United Nations, 1985.

23. Dibb, Paul, "Soviet Strategy Towards Australia, New Zealand and the South-West Pacific," Australian Outlook, v. 39 no. 2, pp. 69-76, August 1985.

24. Borthwick, Mark and Sneider, Richard L., "Institutions for Pacific Regional Cooperation," Asian Survey, vol. 23 no. 12, pp. 1245-54, December 1983.

25. Alves, Dora, The ANZUS Partners, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1984.

26. Australian Information Service, Consulate General, San Francisco, Backgrounder: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Draft Treaty, August 1985.

27. Rearden, Steven L., The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge, Westview Press, 1984.

28. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The Democratic Ideal and U.S. National Security, Current Policy no. 630, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., November 1984.

29. Kirkpatrick, Jeane, "High Stakes in the Third World," The Asian Wall Street Journal, p. 8, 25 March 1985.

30. Vance, Cyrus, "American Foreign Policy for the Pacific Nations," International Security, v. 5, pp. 3-13, Winter 1980-81.

31. Herr, Richard A., "The American Impact on Australian Defence Relations With the South Pacific Islands," Australian Outlook, vol. 38 no. 3, pp. 184-91, December 1984.

32. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Asia-Pacific and the Future, Current Policy no. 598, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1984.

33. Dorrance, John C., Oceania and the United States: An Analysis of U.S. Interests and Policy in the South Pacific, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 1980.

34. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1985, H. Hear, part 5, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984.

35. Wolfowitz, Paul, "The Interests and Policies of the United States," National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin, pp. 159-69, Claude A. Buss ed., Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

36. "South Pacific," Asia 1985 Yearbook, pp. 98-101, Far Eastern Economic Review, Limited, 1985.

37. Johnson, Donald D., "American Impact on the Pacific Islands Since World War II," Oceania and Beyond, pp. 232-43, F.P. King ed., Greenwood Press, 1976.

38. "French Meeting at Mururoa Atoll Criticized," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 12 September 1985, p. M1.

39. "Lange Calls Mitterrand's Pacific Trip 'Provocative'," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 12 September 1985, pp. M1-M2.

40. "Prime Minister Warns France on Mitterrand Visit," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 17 September 1985, p. M1.

41. "Australian Suggests French Test at Home," Monterey Peninsula Herald, p. 2, 5 October 1985.

42. "Nakasone, Prime Minister Mara Discuss Cooperation," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 14 January 1985, p. M4.

43. Kulski, W.W., The Soviet Union In World Affairs, Syracuse University Press, 1973.

44. Thornton, Thomas Perry, "The USSR and Asia in 1982: The End of the Brezhnev Era," Asian Survey, no. 23, pp. 11-23, January 1983.

45. "Australia 'Target' For USSR Nuclear Attack," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 26 July 1983, p. E1.

46. Thornton, Thomas Perry, "The USSR and Asia in 1983," Asian Survey, no. 24, pp. 1-13, January 1984.

47. "Commentary Condemns U.S. 'Annexing' Micronesia," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 14 August 1985, pp. A5-A6.

48. "U.N. Committee Delegate On U.S. Micronesia Policy," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 16 August 1985, p. E4.

49. "ANZUS Council Meeting in Wellington Previewed," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 16 July 1984, p. E2.

50. "Antinuclear Feeling in New Zealand Viewed," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 2 April 1985, p. E3.

51. "South Pacific Forum Antinuclear Treaty Praised," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 15 August 1985, p. E1.

52. "TASS Notes Cook Islands Nuclear-Free Initiative," FBIS USSR International Affairs, 9 August 1985, p. E1.

53. Ulam, Adam B., Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982, Oxford University Press, 1983.

54. Weeks, Albert L. and Bodie, William C., eds., War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1983.

55. Rafferty, Kevin, "Asia and the Pacific: Recent Trends," Asia 1984 Yearbook, pp. 8-20, Far Eastern Economic Review, Limited, 1984.

56. Alves, Dora, "A Strategy for the Indian and Pacific Oceans," Pacific Defence Reporter, pp. 10-16, October 1983.

57. Dallin, Alexander, "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 335-408, Seweryn Bialer ed., Westview Press, 1981.

58. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, H. Rept., March 1981, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.

59. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?, H. Rept., May 8, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977.

60. Kiste, Robert C. and Herr, R.A., The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment, paper presented to the U.S. Department of State, December 1984.

61. Lange, David, "New Zealand's Security Policy," Foreign Affairs, v. 63 no. 5, pp. 1009-19, Summer 1985.

62. Harland, Bryce, " 'No Nukes' Needn't Weaken the ANZUS Alliance," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, p. 12, 25 March 1985.

63. Thakur, Ramesh, "Toward a Nuclear Free New Zealand," Asia Pacific Community, no. 27, pp. 16-27, Winter 1985.

64. Kennaway, Richard, "The Interests and Policies of New Zealand," National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin, pp. 159-69, Claude A. Buss ed., Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

65. "Evening Post Views Palmer's Trip to U.S.," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 19 September 1985, pp. M3-M4.

66. "Labor Federation Backs Ban on Nuclear Ship Visit," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 31 January 1985, p. M2.

67. Staar, Richard F., ed., 1985 Yearbook On International Communist Affairs, Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

68. "Lange Urged Not to Yield on Nuclear Stance," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 12 August 1985, p. M1.

69. "Peace Activists Warn Against Lifting Nuclear Ban," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 9 September 1985, pp. M2-M3.

70. "Post Editorial Views 'Dilemmas for Defense'," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 10 December 1985, pp. M4-M5.

71. "News In Brief," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 961, 1 June 1985.

72. "Lange on Need to Respect U.S. Position," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 18 September 1985, p. M2.

73. "Parliament Debates Antinuclear Bill 18 Sep," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 September 1985, pp. M4-M5.

74. Warner, Denis, "ANZUS-The New Zealand Defence Department's View," Pacific Defence Reporter, pp. 38-9, March 1985.

75. "Lange Discusses Defense Policy Review Group," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 11 October 1985, p. M1.

76. "NZ Bill to Ban Nuclear Visits Delayed," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 1340, 21 December 1985.

77. "Lange Says Palmer's U.S. Trip Already Successful," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 18 September 1985, p. M3.

78. "Nuclear Legislation Introduced in Parliament," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 10 December 1985, pp. M3-M4.

79. "Lange to Tell U.S. 'No' on Nuclear Ship Visit," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 31 January 1985, p. M2.

80. "Acting Prime Minister on U.S. Warship Visit," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 January 1985, pp. M5-M6.

81. "Reportage on U.S. Nuclear Ships Port Calls," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 28 January 1985, pp. M1-M3.

82. "Deputy Prime Minister on Talks With U.S. Officials," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 20 September 1985, pp. M1-M2.

83. "Stand On Antinuclear Legislation Viewed," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 4 December 1985, pp. M4-M5.

84. "Lange Urges Compromise On Nuclear Ship Issue," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 October 1985, pp. M1-M2.

85. "Lange Says U.S. Can Study Antinuclear Legislation," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 31 October 1985, pp. M1-M2.

86. "Lange On Antinuclear Law Approved by Cabinet," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 2 December 1985, p. M1.

87. "Palmer Denies End to ANZUS Alliance," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 6 December 1985, pp. M1-M2.

88. "Lange Defines Issue of ANZUS Row With U.S.," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 4 December 1985, p. M4.

89. "Lange Decries U.S. Stance On Anti-Nuclear Bill," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 4 December 1985, pp. M2-M4.

90. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, On Alliance Responsibility, Current Policy no. 724, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1985.

91. "Palmer Discusses Talks With U.S. Officials," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 4 October 1985, pp. M1-M3.

92. "Opposition Leader McLay Meets With Weinberger," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 18 September 1985, pp. M4-M5.

93. "Envoy on Palmer's Talks," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 18 September 1985, pp. M3-M4.

94. "U.S. Efforts to Sway Public Opinion 'Deplored'," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 17 October 1985, p. M1.

95. "Palmer on 'Exceedingly Frank' Talks in U.S.," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 September 1985, p. M3.

96. Cranston, Frank, "New Zealand ANZUS Warning," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 165, 27 July 1985.

97. "Hawke Sends Letter to Lange on Ban on U.S. Ships," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 January 1985, p. M1.

98. "Hayden Stands Behind Nuclear Ship Port Calls," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 25 January 1985, pp. M3-M5.

99. Suter, Keith, "Australia's New Government," The Political Quarterly, v. 56 no. 2, pp. 193-201, April-June 1985.

100. "The Week," Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 11, 14 March 1985.

101. Davies, Derek, "Traveller's Tales," Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 49, 21 March 1985.

102. "Paper Views Results of Palmer's Talks in U.S.," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 4 October 1985, p. M4.

103. Armitage, Richard L., "Matching Strategy to the Problem," Defense/85, pp. 2-8, August 1985.

104. "Mokhtar on Question of ASEAN Nuclear Free Zone," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 9 August 1985, p. N1.

105. Morrocco, John D., "Australia Seeks Joint Decoy-Rocket System," Air Force Times, p. 36, 23 September 1985.

106. "Tuna Boats Anger South Sea Islanders," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 4 August 1985, p. 5.

107. Kent, George, The Politics of Pacific Island Fisheries, Westview Press, 1980.

108. Young, P. Lewis, "Soviets Seek to Exploit U.S. Pacific Insensitivities," Pacific Defence Reporter, pp. 7-8, June 1985.

109. "U.S., Australia Reaffirm Security Pact," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 16 July 1985, p. 2.

110. "Pacific Forum Stand on Tuna Dispute Rejected," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 30 August 1984, p. Q1.

111. "News In Brief," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 956, 1 June 1985.

112. Albinski, H.S., The Australian-American Security Relationship, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

113. "Ministry Statement on Soviet Fishery Request," FBIS Asia and Pacific, 29 August 1984, p. Q1.

114. "Kiribati Reports Agreement With Soviet Union," FBIS Asia and Pacific Annex, 19 July 1985, p. 7.

115. Cranston, Frank, "Australia, USA Worry Over Soviet Agreement," Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 533, 14 September 1985.

116. Grattan, C. Hartly, "Australia and New Zealand and Pacific Asia," Oceania and Beyond, pp. 80-116, F.P. King ed., Greenwood Press, 1976.

117. Fisk. E.K., "Development and Aid in the South Pacific in the 1980's," Australian Outlook, v. 36, pp. 32-7, August 1982.

118. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Asia and the Pacific, v. VI, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION COPY

Until the Minister in charge moves to introduce this Bill, this copy is for the information of members only (S.O. 206)

NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL BILL

EXPLANATORY NOTE

THIS Bill establishes in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone, promotes and encourages an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of disarmament and international arms control, and implements in New Zealand the following treaties:

(a) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985 (the text of which is set out in the *First* Schedule to the Bill):

(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out in the *Second* Schedule to the Bill):

(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 (the text of which is set out in the *Third* Schedule to the Bill):

(d) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Seafloor and in the Subsoil Thereof of 11 February 1971 (the text of which is set out in the *Fourth* Schedule to the Bill):

(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972 (the text of which is set out in the *Fifth* Schedule to the Bill).

Clause 1 relates to the Short Title of the Bill.

Clause 2 defines terms used in the Bill.

Clause 3 provides that the Act shall bind the Crown.

Clause 4 defines the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which is to comprise—

(a) All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of New Zealand; and

(b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and

(c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and

(d) The airspace above the areas specified in *paragraphs (a) to (c)* of this clause.

No. 00—1

P.C.O. 215/1

FOIAD/CINCPAC

NOV 1 1985

Prohibitions in Relation to Nuclear Explosive Devices and Biological Weapons

Clause 5: Subclause (1) provides that no person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

Subclause (2) provides that no person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

Clause 6 provides that no person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land or inland waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

Clause 7 provides that no person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

Clause 8 provides that no person shall manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

Clause 9: Subclause (1) provides that when the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

Subclause (2) provides that the Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.

Clause 10: Subclause (1) provides that when the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the landing in New Zealand of foreign military aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

Subclause (2) provides that the Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zealand by any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when it lands in New Zealand.

Subclause (3) provides that any such approval may relate to a category or class of foreign military aircraft and may be given for such period as is specified in the approval.

Clause 11 provides that entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.

Savings

Clause 12 provides that nothing in the Bill shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the freedom of—

(a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with international law) through the territorial sea of New Zealand;. or

(b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance with international law) through or over any strait used for international navigation: or

(c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.

Clause 13 provides that nothing in the Bill shall be interpreted as limiting the immunities of—

(a) Any foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes: or

(b) Any foreign military aircraft: or

(c) Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which *paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)* of the clause applies.

Offences

Clause 14: Subclause (1) makes it an offence to contravene or fail to comply with any provision of *clauses 5 to 8.*

Subclause (2) provides that every person who commits such an offence is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

Clause 15 provides that no information shall be laid against any person for such an offence without the leave of the Attorney-General.

Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control

Clause 16 establishes the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.

Clause 17: Subclause (1) provides that the functions of the Committee shall be:

(a) To advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit:

(b) To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of the Act:

(c) To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament and arms control matters and on the implementation of the Act.

Subclause (2) provides that the Committee shall have all such powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its functions.

Clause 18 relates to the membership of the Committee. Its Chairman is to be the Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control.

Clause 19 relates to the procedure of the Committee.

Clause 20 provides for the remuneration and travelling expenses of the membership of the Committee.

Clause 21 provides that all expenditure incurred under or in the administration of the Act is to be payable out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose.

Amendments to Other Acts

Clause 22: Subclause (1) inserts a new section 21A into the Marine Pollution Act 1974. The new section creates a number of offences in relation to the dumping of radioactive waste.

Radioactive waste means material and substances of any kind, form, or description having a specific radioactivity exceeding 100 kilbecquerels per kilogram and a total radioactivity exceeding 3 kilobecquerels.

Every person who is guilty of an offence under the new section—

(a) Is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000; and

(b) Is also liable to pay such amount as the Court may assess in respect of the expenses and costs that have been incurred or will be incurred in removing or cleaning up or dispersing the waste to which the offence relates.

Subclause (2) amends section 22B of the Marine Pollution Act 1974. The effect of the amendment is that no permit under that section is to authorise the dumping of radioactive waste.

Clause 23 inserts a new section 10A into the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968. The new section provides that the Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, confer upon any persons who are appointed as inspectors pursuant to any international agreement on disarmament or arms control all or any of the privileges and immunities specified in the Third Schedule to that Act.

Clause 24 amends the First Schedule to the Official Information Act 1982. The Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control is to be an organisation to which that Act applies.

Right Hon. David Lange

NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL

ANALYSIS

Title
1. Short Title
2. Interpretation
3. Act to bind the Crown
4. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone

Prohibitions in Relation to Nuclear Explosive Devices and Biological Weapons

5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices
6. Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive devices
7. Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices
8. Prohibition of biological weapons
9. Entry into internal waters of New Zealand
10. Landing in New Zealand
11. Visits by nuclear powered ships

Savings

12. Passage through territorial sea and straits
13. Immunities

Offences

14. Offences and penalties
15. Consent of Attorney-General to proceedings in relation to offences

Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control

16. Establishment of Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control
17. Functions and powers of Committee
18. Membership of Committee
19. Procedure of Committee
20. Remuneration and travelling expenses
21. Money to be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of this Act

Amendments to Other Acts

22. Amendments to Marine Pollution Act 1974
    21A. Offence to dump radioactive waste
23. Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968
    10A. Privileges and immunities of international inspectors pursuant to disarmament treaties
24. Amendment to Official Information Act 1982

Schedules

A BILL INTITULED

An Act to establish in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone, to promote and encourage an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of disarmament and international arms control, and to implement in New Zealand the following treaties:

No. 00—1

(a) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985 (the text of which is set out in the First Schedule to this Act):

(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out in the Second Schedule to this Act):

(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 (the text of which is set out in the Third Schedule to this Act):

(d) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Seafloor and in the Subsoil Thereof of 11 February 1971 (the text of which is set out in the Fourth Schedule to this Act):

(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972 (the text of which is set out in the Fifth Schedule to this Act):

BE IT ENACTED by the General Assembly of New Zealand in Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. **Short Title**—This Act may be cited as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1985.

2. **Interpretation**—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

"Biological weapon" means any microbial or biological agent or toxin designed for use as a weapon in armed conflict or for other hostile purposes; and includes equipment designed to facilitate such use:

"Distress" includes force majeure, emergencies, or extreme weather conditions:

"Foreign military aircraft" means any aircraft, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971, which is for the time being engaged in the service of or subject to the authority or direction of the military authorities of any state other than New Zealand:

"Foreign warship" means any ship, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971, which—

(a) Belongs to the armed forces of a state other than New Zealand; and

(b) Bears the external marks that distinguishes ships of that state's nationality; and

(c) Is under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the Government of that state; and

(d) Is manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline:

"Internal waters of New Zealand" means the internal waters of New Zealand as defined by section 4 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977:

"Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used, whether assembled, partly assembled, or unassembled; but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it:

"Passage" means continuous and expeditious navigation without stopping or anchoring except in as much as these are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in distress:

"Territorial sea of New Zealand" means the territorial sea of New Zealand as defined by section 3 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977.

3. Act to bind the Crown—This Act shall bind the Crown.

4. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone—There is hereby established the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which shall comprise:

(a) All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of New Zealand; and

(b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and

(c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and

(d) The airspace above the areas specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this section.

Prohibitions in Relation to Nuclear Explosive Devices and Biological Weapons

5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices—(1) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

(2) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

6. Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive devices—No person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land or inland waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

7. Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices—No person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

8. Prohibition of biological weapons—No person shall manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

9. Entry into internal waters of New Zealand—(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.

10. Landing in New Zealand—(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the landing in New Zealand of foreign military aircraft, the Prime MInister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zealand by any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when it lands in New Zealand.

(3) Any such approval may relate to a category or class of foreign military aircraft and may be given for such period as is specified in the approval.

11. Visits by nuclear powered ships—Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.

Savings

12. Passage through territorial sea and straits—Nothing in this Act shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the freedom of—

(a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with international law) through the territorial sea of New Zealand; or

(b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance with international law) through or over any strait used for international navigation; or

(c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.

13. Immunities—Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as limiting the immunities of—

(a) Any foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes; or

(b) any foreign military aircraft; or

(c) Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this section applies.

Offences

14. Offences and penalties—(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of sections 5 to 8 of this Act.

(2) Every person who commits an offence against this Act is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

15. Consent of Attorney-General to proceedings in relation to offences—(1) No information shall be laid against any person for—

(a) An offence against this Act; or

(b) The offence of conspiring to commit an offence against this Act; or

(c) The offence of attempting to commit an offence against this Act,—

except with the consent of the Attorney-General:

Provided that a person alleged to have committed any offence mentioned in this subsection may be arrested, or a warrant for any such person's arrest may be issued and executed, and any such person may be remanded in custody or on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attorney-General to the laying of an information for the offence has not been obtained, but no further or other proceedings shall be taken until that consent has been obtained.

(2) The Attorney-General may, before deciding whether or not to give consent under subsection (1) of this section, make such inquiries as the Attorney-General thinks fit.

Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control

16. Establishment of Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control—There is hereby established a committee to be called the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.

17. Functions and powers of Committee—(1) The functions of the Committee shall be—

(a) To advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit:

(b) To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of this Act:

(c) To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament and arms control matters and on the implementation of this Act.

(2) The Committee shall have all such powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its functions.

18. Membership of Committee—(1) The Committee shall consist of 7 members, of whom—

(a) One shall be the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, who shall be the Chairman; and

(b) One shall be the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or another officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nominated from time to time by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and

(c) One shall be the Secretary of Defence or another officer of the Ministry of Defence nominated from time to time by the Secretary of Defence; and

(d) Four shall be appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(2) Each member of the Committee appointed under subsection (1) (d) of this section holds office at the pleasure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(3) The functions and powers of the Committee shall not be affected by any vacancy in its membership.

19. Procedure of Committee—Subject to any directives given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Committee may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.

20. Remuneration and travelling expenses—The Committee is hereby declared to be a statutory Board within the meaning of the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951.

(2) There shall be paid to the members of the Committee, out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose, remuneration by way of fees or allowances, and travelling allowances and expenses, in accordance with the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951, and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly.

21. Money to be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of this Act—All fees, salaries, allowances, and other expenditure payable or incurred under or in the administration of this Act shall be payable out of money to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose.

Amendments to Other Acts

22. Amendments to Marine Pollution Act 1974—(1) The Marine Pollution Act 1974 is hereby amended by inserting, after section 21 (as enacted by section 4 of the Marine Pollution Amendment Act 1980), the following section:

"21A. **Offence to dump radioactive waste**—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the persons mentioned in subsection (2) of this section commit an offence if—

"(a) Any radioactive waste is taken on board any ship or aircraft in New Zealand or in New Zealand waters for the purpose of dumping; or

"(b) Any radioactive waste is dumped into New Zealand waters from any ship or aircraft to which this Part of this Act applies; or

"(c) Any radioactive waste is dumped into the sea from any offshore installation or fixed or floating platform or other artificial structure to which this Part of this Act applies; or

"(d) Any radioactive waste is dumped into the sea, other than in New Zealand waters, from any New Zealand ship or home-trade ship or New Zealand aircraft.

"(2) The persons who are guilty of an offence under subsection (1) of this section are as follows:

"(a) In any case to which paragraph (a), or paragraph (b), or paragraph (d) of that subsection applies, the owner and the master of the ship, or (as the case may be) the owner of the aircraft and the person in possession of the aircraft:

"(b) In any case to which paragraph (c) of that subsection applies, the owner of the offshore installation or fixed or floating platform or other artificial structure and the person having control of its operations.

"(3) For the purposes of this section, radioactive waste means material and substances of any kind, form, or description having a specific radioactivity exceeding 100 kilobecquerels per kilogram and a total radioactivity exceeding 3 kilobecquerels.

"(4) Every person who is guilty of an offence under this section—

"(a) Is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000; and

"(b) Is also liable to pay such amount as the Court may assess in respect of the expenses and costs that have been incurred or will be incurred in removing or cleaning up or dispersing the waste to which the offence relates.

"(5) Nothing in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of section 22 (1) of this Act or in paragraph (a) of section 22 (2) of this Act applies in respect of the dumping of radioactive waste."

(2) Section 22B of the Marine Pollution Act 1974 (as enacted by section 4 of the Marine Pollution Amendment Act 1980) is hereby amended by inserting, after subsection (6), the following subsection:

"(6A) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, no permit shall authorise the dumping of radioactive waste (as defined in section 21A (3) of this Act)."

23. Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968—The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 is hereby amended by inserting, after section 10, the following section:

"10A. **Privileges and immunities of international inspectors pursuant to disarmament treaties**—The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, confer upon any persons who are appointed as inspectors pursuant to any international agreement on disarmament or arms control all or any of the privileges and immunities specified in the Third Schedule to this Act."

24. Amendment to Official Information Act 1982—The Official Information Act 1982 is hereby amended by inserting in the First Schedule, after the item relating to the Phosphate Commission of New Zealand, the following item:

"Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control".

SCHEDULES

FIRST SCHEDULE

TEXT OF SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY OF 6 AUGUST 1985

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

PREAMBLE

The Parties of this Treaty

UNITED in their commitment to a world at peace;

GRAVELY CONCERNED that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

CONVINCED that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

BELIEVING that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

DETERMINED to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

REAFFIRMING the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security;

NOTING, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognises the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

NOTING that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific;

NOTING also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific;

DETERMINED to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

GUIDED by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communique of that meeting;

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1

USAGE OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex:

(b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them:

(c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it:

(d) "stationing" means emplanation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

Article 2

APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

(1) Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

(2) Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone:

(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device:

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

Article 4

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVIES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:

(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III. 1 of the NPT, or

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;

(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

Article 5

PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

(1) Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

(2) Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of straits.

PREVENTION OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

Article 7

PREVENTION OF DUMPING

(1) Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

(2) Paragraph 1 (a) and 1 (b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

Article 8

CONTROL SYSTEM

(1) The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

(2) The control system shall comprise:

(a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;

(b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);

(c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;

(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

Article 9

REPORTS AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION

(1) Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

(2) The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.

(3) The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Articles 8 (2) (d) and 10 and Annex 2 (4).

Article 10

CONSULTATIONS AND REVIEW

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

Article 11

AMENDMENT

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptances from all Parties.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

Article 12

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

(1) This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum.

(2) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

(3) If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.

Article 13

WITHDRAWAL

(1) This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

(2) Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

Article 14

RESERVATIONS

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 15

ENTRY INTO FORCE

(1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.

(2) For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 16

DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

Annex 1

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

A The area bounded by a line—

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;

(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Papua New Guinea;

(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;

(4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;

(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;

(6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East;

(7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;

(8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;

(9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;

(11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;

(12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;

(13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West;

(15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South;

(16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East;

(17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;

(18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;

(19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;

(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;

(21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and

(22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

B The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.

Annex 2

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

(1) The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Part, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

(2) The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

(3) For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.

(4) Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.

Annex 3

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

(1) There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

ZONE OF APPLICATION OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA



FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

(2) The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.

Annex 4

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

(1) A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.

(2) If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

(3) The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

(4) If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

(5) In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

FIRST SCHEDULE—*continued*

(6) Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee.

(7) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

(8) The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

(9) If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

SECOND SCHEDULE

TEXT OF TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER OF 5 AUGUST 1963

TREATY

banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties,"

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

SECOND SCHEDULE—*continued*

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(*a*) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(*b*) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

SECOND SCHEDULE—*continued*

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	For the Government of the United States of America
HOME	A. ГРОМЫКО	DEAN RUSK

THIRD SCHEDULE

TEXT OF TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF 1 JULY 1968

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

THIRD SCHEDULE—*continued*

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (*a*) source or special fissionable material, or (*b*) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

THIRD SCHEDULE—*continued*

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

THIRD SCHEDULE—*continued*

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

THIRD SCHEDULE—*continued*

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

FOURTH SCHEDULE

TEXT OF TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF OF 11 FEBRUARY 1971

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes,

Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions and strengthens friendly relations among States,

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone, as defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article shall also apply to the sea-bed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within such sea-bed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters.

3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and not to participate in any other way in such actions.

ARTICLE II

For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred to in Article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in Part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958, and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I, Section II, of that Convention and in accordance with international law.

FOURTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

ARTICLE III

1. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in Article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities.

2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall co-operate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in Article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and co-operation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.

3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and co-operate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to co-operate.

4. If consultation and co-operation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

5. Verification pursuant to this Article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.

FOURTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters of its coasts, including *inter alia*, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves.

ARTICLE V

The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

ARTICLE VI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and, thereafter, for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE VII

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

ARTICLE VIII

Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this Treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardised its supreme interests.

ARTICLE IX

The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

FOURTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

ARTICLE X

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto.

FIFTH SCHEDULE

TEXT OF CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION OF 10 APRIL 1972

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (bilogical) agents,

Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimuse this risk,

FIFTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes:

(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

ARTICLE III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

ARTICLE V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

FIFTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

ARTICLE VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

ARTICLE VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

ARTICLE VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

ARTICLE IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

ARTICLE X

(1) The State Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organisations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful

FIFTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

ARTICLE XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the State Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realised. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

ARTICLE XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

FIFTH SCHEDULE—*continued*

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United nations.

ARTICLE XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND: Printed under the authority of the New Zealand Government by V. R. WARD, Government Printer—1985
45137G—85PT.UG

APPENDIX B

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MULTILATERAL

SECURITY TREATY

TIAS 2493
Sept. 1, 1951

Signed at San Francisco September 1, 1951: ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America March 20, 1952: ratified by the President of the United States of America April 15, 1952: ratification of the United States of America deposited with the Government of Australia at Canberra April 29, 1952: proclaimed by the President of the United States of America May 9, 1952: entered into force April 29, 1952.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America was signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty is word for word as follows:

Source: U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements: 1952, v. 3, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1955, pp. 3420-25.

The Parties to this Treaty,

59 Stat. 1031

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Ante, p. 3169

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Peaceful settlement of international disputes

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

Development of capacity for resistance to attack.

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

Consultation.

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Action in case of armed attack.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

Territory included.

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

Rights and obligations.

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

Council.
Post, p. 3424

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Relationship with States, etc.

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

Ratification, entry into force.
Post, p. 3425.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

Duration.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

Percy C. Spender

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

C. A. Berendsen

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Dean Acheson

John Foster Dulles

Alexander Wiley

John J. Sparkman

I, Alfred Herbert Body, First Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the text of the original Security Treaty concluded between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America on the first day of September, One thousand, nine hundred and fifty-one.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Department of External Affairs this fourth day of October, One thousand, nine hundred and fifty-one.

[seal] A. H. Body.

WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by their resolution of March 20, 1952, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Treaty;

WHEREAS the said Treaty was duly ratified by the President of the United States of America on April 15, 1952, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate;

WHEREAS it is provided in Article IX of the said Treaty that the Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the instruments of ratification of the signatories have been deposited with the Government of Australia;

WHEREAS instruments of ratification of the said Treaty were deposited with the Government of Australia on April 29, 1952 by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America;

Entry into force

AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Article IX of the said Treaty, the Treaty came into force on April 29, 1952;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the said Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, on and after April 29, 1952, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this ninth day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred fifty-two and of [SEAL] the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred seventy-sixth.

HARRY S TRUMAN

By the President:

DEAN ACHESON

Secretary of State

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145	2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5002	2
3.	Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100	1
4.	Center for Naval Analyses 2000 North Beauregard Street P.O. Box 11280 Alexandria, Virginia 22311	1
5.	Professor Claude Buss, Code 56Bx Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100	5
6.	Professor Frank M. Teti, Code 56Tt Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100	1
7.	Asian Seminar, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100	1
8.	Library Air War College Maxwell AFB, Al. 36112	1
9.	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State 2210 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20350	1
10.	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 96861	1

11. Captain Wm. Lance Gatling — 1
1069 Spruance Road
Monterey, CA 93940

12. Major Thomas W. Shubert — 5
174 Cottage Blvd.
Hicksville, N.Y. 11801

13. Dr. Robert C. Kiste — 1
Director of Asian and Pacific Studies
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

14. Captain Bruce Brockhagen — 1
USADO
APO San Francisco 96404-5000

15. Debbie Subera — 1
P.O. Box 683
Monterey, CA 93940

16. Chris Sharpley — 1
1017 Halsey Dr.
Monterey, CA 93940

17. Captain George Steuber — 1
148 Brownell Circle
Monterey, CA 93940

602-197

217827

Thesis
S4893 Shubert
c.1 The United States and the Southwest Pacific: policy options for a changing region.

217827

Thesis
S4893 Shubert
c.1 The United States and the Southwest Pacific: policy options for a changing region.

AMERICAN BINDERIES

thesS4893
The United States and the Southwest Paci
3 2768 000 66150 8
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY